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A STUDY OF THE JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD
TRADE UNIONS AND LABOR LEGISLATION
By J. Louis WARM*

E QUITY jurisprudence has many times been accused of shirking
the great task which is the reason for its existence-that of
making the law fit present day living.' The courts of equity in
which the vast majority of all labor controversies are decided
are subject to the charge that they have lost the common touch.
They have become enmeshed in fine-spun theories, in abstract
questions of rights and principles. The fact that we must have
theories and rights and principles does not mean that the courts
should mistake them for ends. People do not live in an abstract
world; neither do they always act in accordance with theories
which fit some economic or juridical Utopia. 2 Compulsions to
action must, in the final analysis, be controlled and regulated by a
living, ever-changing and adaptive jurisprudence grounded in the
life of the people from which that jurisprudence springs.
Present day treatment of labor problems is still tainted by the
fictions which gained currency coincident with the beginnings of
the breakdown of the economy of the so-called feudal era and the
emergence of the industrial age. The endeavor of the business
classes to secure their interests and to freeze the economic order
which they were building led to a psuedo-sanctification of private
*Member of the Cincinnati, Ohio, Bar; Instructor, Cincinnati Y.M.C.A.

Law School.
'Warm, A Study of Some of the Problems Concerning Foreclosure
Sales and Deficiency Judgments, (1936) 6 Brooklyn L. Rev. 167, 168, 169.
Not all courts are subject to this criticism. For a discussion of the function
of equity see, Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., (N.D., Ohio, 1893),
54 Fed. 746, 751.
196.

-1fMumford, The Culture of Cities (1938) page 9; Russell, Power (1938)
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rights, especially of rights in property and the security of transactions in relation to property, at the expense of the public interest.
The nineteenth century was a period of rapid industrial expansion. As business grew in size, scope and power, it introduced a host of new problems and intensified many old ones. One
of the most vexatious of these, a problem which was at the same
time old in substance but new in form, was the status of the worker. The mad scramble for a foothold in the world of business
led to an intensification of old labor abuses and to the introduction of many new ones. The individual worker soon discovered
that he was no match for the economically more powerful employer. In order to obtain a semblance of economic equality with
his employer, he began to find it more necessary than ever before
to join with his fellows. The rise and growth of the modern
trade union movement in this country was the result of this feeling of insecurity on the part of the workers. However, this
movement was not to continue unmolested. Employers were
quick to understand that it constituted a serious challenge to their
theretofore undisputed dominance of the field of labor relations.
The challenge did not long remain unanswered. Employers began to make effective use of such weapons as the open shop, the
yellow dog contract, blacklists, lockouts, and a host of others,
and these were supplemented by the expansion of the doctrines
of conspiracy, inalienable and natural rights, free flow of labor,
restraint of trade, boycotts, and the like.
A study of the means which employers have used in their
attempts to impede the growth of the labor movement and of the
positions which the courts have adopted with reference to them,
may be of some advantage in casting light where light is very
much needed.
THE OPEN SHOP

Let us begin our study with a discussion of the so-called open
shop. The open shop may be a shop where none of the employees are members of a union or where the employees are both
union and nonunion indiscriminately.3 The argument for an open
shop of either type is that,
sConstruction Company v. St. Paul Building Trades Council, (1917)
136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520; State v. Employers of Labor, (1918) 102
Neb. 768, 169 N. W. 717; Cushman's Sons Co. v. Amalgamated F. W. B.,
(1926) 127 Misc. Rep. 152, 215 N. Y. S. 401; Clark Lunch Company v.
Waiters Local, (1926) 22 Ohio App. 265, 154 N. E. 362; Shine v. Fox Bros.
Manufacturing Company, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1907) 156 Fed. 357; Duplex
Company v. Deering, (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349.
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"It is a cardinal principle that an employer may conduct his
business as he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the
legal rights of others. If he determines that his interest will best
be served by the employment of nonunion help, the law will
protect him equally with those who operate union shops ...
Union and nonunion shops stand with their feet on the same
'4
level in the eyes of the law."
On its face this argument seems harmless enough, but from it
have sprung a number of vicious half truths and much specious
reasoning.
The open shop is an economic application of the age old
politico-military strategy of divide and rule. As long as an employer can treat with each employee separately, his control over his immediate labor situation is quite satisfactory to him. To the employer the matter of hiring or discharging an employee is of
comparatively small consequence, but to the employee a job means
the difference between food and shelter and the lack of it. The
emergence of the giant corporate employer as a symbol of the industrial life of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries has but
served to emphasize this difference in the situations of the employer and the employee.5 Thus the open shop and its variation,
the company union shop, have been widely used and desperately
fought for by the employer in his endeavor to keep wages down
and profits up.
The open shop in and of itself may be acceptable. Whether
it is or not depends in each case upon the conditions under which it
is operated. So long as the employees are sincerely satisfied to
4Cushman's Sons Co. v. Amalgamated F. W. B., (1926) 127 Misc. Rep.
152, 155, 215 N. Y. S. 401. Construction Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades
Council, (1917) 136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520; Garside v. Hollywood,
(1914) 88 Misc. Rep. 311, 150 N. Y. S. 647; Senn v. Tile Layers Protective
Union, Local No. 5, (1936) 222 Wis. 383, 268 N. W. 270.
Flaccus v. Smith, (1901) 199 Pa. St. 128, 136, 48 Atl. 894, contains a
good statement of the position adopted by these courts. While it is true
that an employer may conduct his business as he sees fit, it is true only in a
qualified sense. He is certainly responsible to society for any system which
he adopts. A continuance of the policy of unalloyed individualism in connection with our intricate industrial world will lead us eventually to chaos
and rebellion against accompanying injustices. Cf., Myers v. Louisiana &
A. Ry. Co., (W. D. La., 1933) 7 Fed. Supp. 92 (in this case the court
issued a temporary injunction restraining the employer from interfering
with the selection, by its employees, of a representative to confer with the
employer concerning matters affecting relations between the employees and
the employer. But quaere, whether the same result would have been
obtained had there been no Railway Labor Act upon which to base the
decision.)
'Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(1933). See also, Johnston Harvester Company v. Meinhart, (1880) 60
How. Prac. (N.Y.) 168, 176.
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work in that manner and so long as no union in good faith desires
to attempt the unionization of such a business establishment, an
open shop employer, as such, is not to be condemned. The question only arises when the employees become restive or an outside union desires, in good faith, to unionize the shop.6 The defense
of the open shop becomes quite difficult when either or both of
these conditions occur. The employer's resistance under either of
these conditions is generally the result of a desire to maintain a
whip hand over his employees at any cost-an attempt to prevent their unionization because that unionization would enable
them to bargain more effectively with him.
THE "YELLOW DOG" CONTRACT AND COMPANY UNION
TYPE OPEN SHOP

The individual contract system is one of the most effective
means of perpetuating the open shop. Under this system, the
employee signs a contract so-called agreeing that in return for
employment for an indefinite period he will, during the time
employed, refrain from joining a union, or, if he already belongs
to one, to resign his membership; and that, if he does join a union
7
thereafter, he will immediately withdraw from the employment.
6
The term "outside union" is used in this article to denote a union
which at the time of the controversy has no relation with the particular
employer concerned and is not recognized by the employer as representing
its employees.
7It is doubtful if agreements of this type can be considered valid in
those cases in which the employment is at will because of the lack of mutuality. Even where the period of employment is for a definite time it is
suggested that the agreement should be unenforceable because it was obtained
by the economic coercion of the employee. To the effect that such an
agreement where the employment is at will is not a contract, see the concurring opinion of Kephart, J., and the dissenting opinion of Maxey, J.,
in Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Fed. of F. F. H. W., (1931) 305
Pa. St. 206, 216, 233, 157 Atl. 588. See also, Exchange Bakery & Restaurant,
Inc., v. Rifkin, (1927) 245 N. Y. 260, 266, 157 N. E. 130; The Dayton Manufacturing Co. v. The Metal Polishers, etc., Union, (1901) 8 Ohio N. P. 574,
11 Ohio Dec. N. P. 643. Contra: Montgomery & Pacific Electric Ry. Co.,
(C.C.A., 9th Cir. 1919) 258 Fed. 382.
See the following cases for various types of yellow-dog arrangements:
Callan v. Exposition Cotton Mills, (1919) 149 Ga. 119, 99 S. E. 300;
Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Fed. of F. F. H. W., (1931) 305 Pa. St.
206, 157 Atl. 588; Nolan v. Farmington Shoe Manufacturing Co., (D. Mass.
1928) 25 F. (2d) 906.
Yellow-dog contracts have been protected by a court of equity although
the facts indicated that the contracts were secured by the employer after
a strike had begun and principally for the purpose of placing the employer
in a position to file an action to enjoin the strikers on the ground that
the actions of the strikers were intended to bring about breaches of those
contracts. United Tailors v. Amalgamated Workers, (1927) 26 Ohio N. P.
(N.S.) 439. The same result has been reached even where there is no
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This type of writing or agreement became a very common occurrence after the decisions by the Supreme Court of the United

States in Coppage v. Kansas, and Hitchnan Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mitchell, in which such agreements were held valid.8 The reasoning used to sustain these so-called contracts is both unsatisfactory and indefensible from any point of view. It presumes that
both the employer and the individual employee are free agents
and that the employee may freely make his choice whether to
continue at work or quit.9 The presumption is correct as an
question but that the yellow-dog contracts were executed for that purpose.
Brost Pattern Works v. Reid, (1922) 24 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 60.
A good statement with reference to the uncritical practice of labeling
yellow-dog contracts as having been voluntarily entered into on both sides,
is found in, House Report No. 669, Committee on the Judiciary, 72nd Congress, March 2, 1932, p. 7.
8(1915) 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. St. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441; (1917) 245 U. S.
229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260.
The following cases arose after 1915, in which year the Coppage Case,
(1915) 236 ,U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441, was decided: Moore
Drop. Forging Co. v. McCarthy, (1923) 243 Mass. 554, 137 N. E. 919;
Cyrus Currier & Sons v. International Molders' Union, (1921) 93 N. J. Eq.
61, 115 Atl. 66; Third Ave. Ry. Co. v. Shea, (1919) 109 Misc. Rep. 18,
179 N. Y. S. 43; Schwartz & Benjamin, Inc. v. Alexanderson, (1930) 138
Misc. Rep. 919, 246 N. Y. S. 422, (in which the court justified the yellow
dog contract because it would prevent the employment of possible communists. Cf., however, Schwartz & Benjamin, Inc., v. Alexanderson, (1930)
138 Misc. Rep. 917, 246 N. Y. S. 419) ; Nashville Ry. & Lt. Co. v. Lawson,
(1921) 144 Tenn. 78, 229 S. W. 741, in which a yellow dog contract was held
not contrary to public policy; San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local Union v.
Bell, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), 223 S. W. 506, (inferred that a municipal
corporation could exact a yellow dog contract of its employees.) ; Montgomery v. Pacific Electrical Ry. Co., (C.C.A., 9th Cir. 1919) 258 Fed. 382;
David Adler & Sons Co. v. Maglio, (1929) 200 Wis. 153, 228 N. W. 123.
In the following decisions statutes outlawing yellow dog contracts were
held invalid on the strength of Coppage v. Kansas, (1915) 236 U. S. 1, 35
Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441; People v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (1921)
70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac. 146; Jackson v. Chief of Police, (1915) 92 Oh. St.
130, 110 N. E. 732, cf., however, the very fine dissenting opinion of Wannamaker, J.; Montgomery v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1923)
293 Fed. 680. For cases decided prior to the Coppage Case, (1915) 236 U. S.
1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441; see, State v. Daniels, (1912) 118 Minn.
155, 136 N. W. 584; State v. La Monte Bateman, (1900) 7 Ohio N. P.
487, 10 Ohio Dec. N. P. 68; Order of RR. Telegraphers v. Louisville & N. R.
Co., (W.D. Ky. 1906) 148 Fed. 437, (a federal anti-yellow dog contract
statute was held void as not within the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce); Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners
Union No. 220, (D. Nev., 1908) 150 Fed. 500.
See, La France Co. v. Electrical Workers, (1923) 108 Ohio St. 61,
140 N. E. 899, in which the Hitchman case is distinguished.
gConstruction Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades Council, (1917) 136 Minn.
167, 161 N. W. 520; Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, (1902) 63 N. J.
Eq. 759, 53 AtI., 230; Albro J. Newton Co. v. Erickson, (1911) 70 Misc.
Rep. 291, 126 N. Y. S. 949; journeymen v. Master Horseshoers, (1912) 13
Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 297, 23 Ohio Dec., N. P., 338; Moreland Theatres Corp.
v. Portland Moving Pictures, etc., Union, (1932) 140 Or. 35, 12 P. (2d)
333. A typical argument along this line is found in The New York, Lake
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abstract proposition, but it lacks validity because it is based upon
an economic fallacy. The choice actually given to the employee
is between security and insecurity; between making a living and
facing destitution. 10 This is not a choice in the real sense of the
word.
The company union is another phase of the open shop. Ostensibly the employees are unionized, but the union is nevertheless
controlled and, in many instances, maintained by the employer.11
In a bona fide union the negotiators representing the employees
are usually outsiders-that is, non-employees whose fear of the
employer's retribution is minimized. In the case of a company
union, however, those who represent the union are also employees
and it is reasonable to suppose that they may be constrained by
Erie & Western Railroad Co. v. Wenger, (1887) 17 Ohio Law Bull. 306,
308, 9 Ohio Dec. 815. Cf., Meltzer v. Kaminer, (1927) 131 Misc. Rep. 813,
227 N. Y. S. 459, in which it is held that although a man may cease work
whenever he pleases, the determination to quit must be his, and not that of
another. Such a rule would prevent a union from calling a strike of its
members even where those members are employed at will. The rule has
not been followed generally.
lONational Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin, (1937) 301
U. S. 1, 32, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893; State v. Daniels, (1912) 118
Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584. See also, Reardon, Inc. v. Caton, (1919) 189
App. Div. 501, 178 N. Y. S. 713; Trade Press Publishing Co. v. Moore,
(1923) 180 Wis. 449, 193 N. W. 507, (dissenting opinion).
"Michaels v. Hillman, (1920) 112 Misc. Rep. 395, 183 N. Y. S. 195;
Gold Metal Dairy Employees' Protective Ass'n v. Supple-Wills-Jones Milk
Co., 1 Labor & Unemployment Insurance Service, Prentice-Hall, Inc., page
19525, Pa. 1937), ("Collective bargaining is nothing less than a sham and a
delusion when the employer sits on both sides of the table by reason of his
domination of a particular organization with which he deals. This domination may take many forms. It may take the form of added compensation
to the representatives of the employer in the union. It may also take the
form of permitting such representatives to conduct organizational work
among the employees during working hours without deduction of pay");
Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Ry. Clerks, (1930) 281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct.
427, 74 L. Ed. 1034; Penn. R. R. System v. Penn. Ry. Co., (1924) (E.D.
Penn.) 296 Fed. 220; The Virginia Railway Co. v. System Fed. No. 40,
Ry. Employees, (1937) 300 U. S. 515, 57 Sup. Ct 592, 81 L. Ed. 789.
That a company union is equally as advantageous to the employer as the
open shop, is indicated by the fact that a number of employers who have
a long history of anti-union and anti-closed shop activity to their credit
suddenly enter into an air-tight closed shop agreement with a company union
which has sprung up over night. These changes of attitude usually follow
immediately upon a demand by an outside union that it be allowed to organize the plant. Hotel, Restaurant, etc., Local Union No. 181 v. Miller,
(1938) 272 Ky. 471, 114 S. W. (2d) 501. Cf., Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S.
Clerks v. Texas & N. 0. R. R. Co., (S.D. Tex. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 876, (where
the employer promoted a company union and recognized it as the representative of its employees, the employer was held to have violated the Railway
Labor Act which provides for the selection by employees of their own
representatives without interference or influence of the employer) ; House
Report No. 1147, 74th Congress, Committee on Labor, June 10, 1935, pp. 17,
18. But see, Consolidated Edison Company v. National Labor Relations
Board, (1938) 59 Sup. Ct. 206.
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virtue of their economic necessities to acquiesce in the desires and
wishes of the employer. Thus the employer attains the same ends
reached by the ordinary type of open shop arrangement.
When the employer and his employees, or the employer and
an outside union, do not see eye to eye, the usual results have been
the strike and the lockout and their by-products, such as picketing, boycotts, blacklisting and many others. All men of good
will like to think that the time will come when men will resolve
their disputes in a manner more befitting a civilized people, but
hoping so is not synonymous with fruition, and we must reconcile ourselves to the scene as it is, and deal with it accordingly.
THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

There is no
themselves into
advantages that
action.12 As a
2

longer any question that men may now organize
labor unions for the purpose of obtaining the
go with collective action as against individual
corollary to this right to organize there is also

Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. v. Cruse, (1914) 189 Ala. 66, 66 So.
657; Local Union No. 313, v. Stathakis, (1918) 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W.
450; Paramount Enterprises v. Mitchell, (1932) 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328;
McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., (1921) 151 Ga. 776, 108 S. E. 226;
Robinson v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local No. 782, (1922) 35
Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132; Carpenters' Union v. Citizens Committee, (1928)
333 Ill. 225, 164 N. E. 393; Schuster v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
(1937) 293 I1. App. 177, 199, 12 N. E. (2d) 50, (".. . a single employee
is helpless in dealing with his employer and .. .labor unions were lawfully
organized out of the necessities of the situation to carry out their legitimate
objects of securing and maintaining fair wages and conditions of employment.") ; Hotel, Restaurant, etc., Local 'Union No. 181 v. Miller, (1938)
272 Ky. 471, 114 S. V. (2d) 501; Keith Theatre v. Vachon, (1936) 134
Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692; International Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove,
(1930) 158 Md. 496, 148 Atl. 826; Shinsky v. O'Neil, (1919) 232 Mass. 99,
121 N. E. 790; Beck v. Teamsters' Protective Union, (1898) 118 Mich.
497, 77 N. W. 13; Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, (1908) 215 Mo. 421,
114 S.W. 997; State v. Employers of Labor, (1918) 102 Neb. 768, 169 N.
W. 717; Cameron v. International Alliance, (1935) 118 N. J. Eq. 11, 176
Atl. 692; Willson & Adams Co. v. Pearce, (1929) 135 Misc. Rep. 426,
237 N. Y. S. 601; People v. Herbert, (1937) 162 Misc. Rep. 817, 819, 295
N. Y. S.251; Perkins, Campbell & Co. v. Rogg, (1892) 28 Ohio L. Bull.
32, 11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 585; Longshore Printing & Publishing Co. v. Howell,
(1894) 26 Or. 527, 38 Pa. St. 547; Kirmse v. Adler, (1933) 311 Pa. St.
78, 166 Atl. 566; Powers v. Journeymen Bricklayers' Union No. 3, (1914)
130 Tenn. 643, 172 S. W. 284; Sheehan v. Levy, (Tex. Civ. App. 1919),
215 S. W. 229; Iron Molders' Union No. 25, v. Allis-Chalmers Co., (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1908) 166 Fed. 45; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Local, (D. Mont.
1922) 283 Fed. 557, 561, (good discussion); State v. Stewart, (1887) 59
Vt. 273, 9 At. 559; Cole v. Commonwealth, (1937) 169 Va. 868, 193 S.E.
517; Pacific Coast Coal Co. v. Dist. No. 10 U. M. W. A., (1922) 122
Wash. 423, 210 Pac. 953; Parker Paint & Wall Paper Co. v. Local Union
No. 813, (1921) 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S. E. 911; Trustees of Wisconsin State
Fed. of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., (1934) 215 Wis. 623, 256 N. W.
56.
Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild,
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the right to strike, which, as an abstract right, is no longer denied
to workers in any jurisdiction.' 3
A strike has been generally defined as "a concerted refusal
to serve in an industry, either to assert a proposed right or to
obtain an economic advantage."' 14 By the great weight of
authority it has been held "that a strike only results where there
is the relation of employer and employee; that is, a strike can
only be said to exist where there is a trade dispute between the
(1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 545, 549, 195 Atl. 378, ("The right to organize is not

only a legal right but it is a natural right-it is a God-given right which
formed society and moulded governments.")
3
Local Union No. 313, v. Stathakis, (1918) 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W.
450; McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., (1921) 151 Ga. 776, 108 S.E. 225;
Robinson v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local No. 782, (1922) 35
Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132; Plant v. Woods, (1900) 175 Mass. 492, 505, 57
N. E. 1011 (dissenting opinion of Holmes, J.)

Olympia Operating Co. v. Costillo, (1932) 278 Mass. 125, 179 N. E.

804; Minnesota Stove Co. v. Cavanaugh, (1915)131 Minn. 458, 155 N. W.
638; Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of S. Workers, (1933)
114 N. J.Eq. 307, 168 Atl. 799, (the court indicates that employees may lose
their right to strike if the right to mediate is afforded) ; National Protective
Ass'n etc., v. Cumming, (1902) 170 N. Y. 315, 321, 63 N. E. 369, (in which
the right to strike is qualified by the proviso that "the object is not to
gratify malice or inflict injury upon others, but to secure better terms of
employment for themselves."); Laundry Co. v. Dickson, (1923) 121 Misc.
Rep. 416, 201 N. Y. S. 173; Hoster Brewing Co. v. Giblon, (1903) 1 Ohio
N. P. (N.S.) 377, 14 Ohio Dec. N. P. 305; Kirmse v. Adler, (1933) 311
Pa. St. 78, 166 Atl. 566; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific
RR. Co., (E. D. Wis. 1894) 60 Fed. 803, 821, (although this decision does
not represent the views of the vast majority of the courts, it does indicate
the bias under which some courts still labor) ; American Fed. of Labor v.
Buck's Stove & Range Co., (1909) 33 App. D. C. 83, 114, ("The right of
laboring men to organize into unions and the right of these unions to conduct
peaceable strikes is justified because of their inability to compete singlehanded in contests with their employers.")
14 Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Ry. Co., (N.D. Ga. 1921) 271
Fed. 743, 745. Other definitions of a strike may be found in, Kemp v.
Division No. 241, (1912) 255 Ill. 313, 99 N. E. 389; Keith Theatre v.
Vachon, (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 AtI. 692; Picket v. Walsh, (1906) 192
Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753; International Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, (1937) 122
N. J.Eq. 222, 193 Atl. 808; Albro J.Newton Co. v. Erickson, (1911) 70
Misc. Rep. 291, 126 N. Y. S.949; The Hamilton Tailoring Co. v. Cincinnati
Joint Board, (1935) 4 Ohio Opinions 295; Moreland Theatres Corp. v.
Portland Moving Picture, etc., 'Union, (1932) 140 Or. 35, 47, 12 P. (2d)
333; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., (E.D. Wis.
1894) 60 Fed. 803; Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co., (N.D. Ohio,
1917) 240 Fed. 759, (in which the court for all practical purposes limits the
right to strike to the right to quit work.) ; Uden v. Schaefer, (1920) 110
Wash. 391, 188 Pac. 395; Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Ry. Co.,
(N.D. Ga. 1921) 271 Fed. 743.
For definitions of a lockout and its distinction from a strike see, Restful
Slipper Co. v. United Shoe & Leather Union, (1934) 116 N. 3. Eq. 521, 524,
174 Atl. 543; Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, (S.D. N.Y. 1914) 214 Fed. 111,
118; Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland Co. Inc., (N.D. Ohio, 1919) 263
Fed. 171, 187. See also, concurring opinion of Grosscup, J., in Iron Molders'
Union No. 125, v. Allis-Chalmers Co., ,C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1908) 166 Fed. 45, 52.
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employer and his workmen."' 5 Many courts have confused this
limitation of the right to strike with the definition of a labor dispute. It is essential, therefore, that a distinction be clearly made
between a strike and a labor dispute. Every strike arises out of
a labor dispute, but every labor dispute does not necessarily result in a strike. As a matter of fact, a strike may exist when
there is no labor dispute between employer and employee. An
example of this is the sympathetic strike. 6
In discussing the right to strike, some courts have unequivocally stated that the lawfulness or unlawfulness of a strike does not
depend upon its cause,-that workmen may strike with or without
cause; and then they have immediately proceeded to examine
the purpose of the strike in order to determine its lawfulness or lack of lawfulness.' 7 Other courts have held that the
right to strike can be exercised only if the purpose is lawful
and there is justification for the action taken.'
Strikes have
1"Park v. Hotel, etc., Employees, (1919) 22 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 257, 274,
30 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 64.

See also, Philip Henrici Co. v. Alexander,

(1916) 198 Ill. App. 568; Blandford v. Duthie, (1925) 147 Md. 388, 128
Atl. 138; Mlle. Reif, Inc. v. Randau, (1937) 166 Misc. Rep. 247, 1 N. Y.
S. (2d) 515; Brown Son v. Mine Workers, (1925) 25 Ohio N. P. (N.S.)

485; Webb v. Cooks', Waiters' & Waitresses' Union No. 748, (Tex. Civ.
App.61918), 205 S. W. 465.

' Construction Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council, (1917) 136 Minn.
167, 170,
161 N. W. 520.
7
1 Kemp v. Division No. 241, (1912)

255 Ill. 213, 223, 224, 99 N. E.

389. See also, Rutan Co. v. Local Union No. 4, (1925) 97 N. J. Eq. 77,
128 AtI. 622; National Protective Ass'n of Steam Fitters, v. Cumming,
(1902) 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369; Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders'

Union No. 125, (E.D. Wis. 1906) 150 Fed. 155, 171, ("The right to strike
for any cause or no cause is clear .. . Even a conspiracy to strike ....

is

not unlawful
if formed to better labor conditions.")
'8For cases in which it is held that a strike may be legal or not, depend-

ing upon its purpose, see, Keith Theatre v. Vachon, (1936) 134 Me. 392,
187 AtI. 692; Reynolds v. Davis, (1908) 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457;
Wabash R. Co. v. Hannahan, (E.D. Mo. 1903) 121 Fed. 563; Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir., 1926) 15 F. (2d) 16,17;
Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Switchmen's Unions, (W.D. N.Y. 1907) 158
Fed. 541, (employees may strike if they do so in good faith and peaceably) ;
cf., United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Fitzgerald, (1921) 237 Mass. 537, 130
N. E. 86, (where the purpose of the employer in requiring yellow-dog contracts with its employees was to weaken the influence of the union and impair its power to strike, was held valid.)
For cases in which it is held that whether any particular strike is lawful
is a question of law, see, Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Manufacturer's Ass'n,
(1915) 221 Mass. 554, 109 N. E. 643; Bossert v. United Brotherhood, C. &
J. of A., (1912) 77 Misc. Rep. 592, 599, 137 N. Y. S. 321.
Whether or not a strike is for a lawful purpose often turns upon the
question of injury to the employer. On many occasions where the employer
is suffering financially because of the strike, the courts have enjoined the
strikers on the ground that the primary purpose of the strike was to injure
the employer and not to benefit the strikers. A typical statement is found
in Rosen v. United Shoe & Leather Workers' Union, (1936) 287 II. App.
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been held lawful where the purpose of the striking employees
was to obtain a concession from the employer in connection with
a demand relating to terms and conditions of employment;"9 to
force the employer to abide by a contract made with the union
of which the striking employees are members ;20 to force the employer to rectify a supposed injustice to one of his union employees ;21 to force the employer to bargain collectively with
them;2 to force the discharge of an employee who is not a
23
member of the union to which the striking employees belong.
But the fact that a particular strike may have a lawful purpose
does not necessarily prevent a court from outlawing it. Very
49, 55, 4 N. E. (2d) 507. But see, Kemp v. Division No. 241, (1912) 255
Ill. 213, 241, 99 N. E. 389, ("It is difficult to conceive of a strike without
the damage to the parties involved in the dispute. The employees intend to
deprive the employers of their labor, and prevent them from getting others
to take their places. They intentionally inflict harm as a means of compelling
the employers
to yield to their demands.")
19
Local Union No. 313 v. Stathakis, (1918) 135 Ark. 86, 205 S.W. 450;
L. D. Willcut & Sons Co. v. Bricklayers' Benevolent & P. U. No. 3, (1908)
200 Mass. 110, 85 N. E. 897; Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91
Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663; Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of Silk
Workers, (1934) 116 N. J.Eq. 146, 172 Atl. 551; Carter v. Fortney, (N.D.
W. Va., 1909) 170 Fed. 463; Iron Molders' Union No. 125, etc. v. AllisChalmers Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir., 1908) 166 Fed. 45. See also, Maisel v.
Sigman
(1924), 123 Misc. Rep. 714, 723, 205 N. Y. S.807.
20
Preble v. Architectural, etc., 'Union, (1931) 260 Ill. App. 435; Smith
v. Bowen, (1919) 232 Mass. 106, 121 N. E. 814; Spivak v. Wanofsky,
(1935) 155 Misc. Rep. 530, 278 N. Y. S. 562; Roosevelt Amusement Corp.
v. Empire State, etc., Union, (1930) 144 Misc. Rep. 644, 258 N. Y. S.240,
(courts have also granted injunctions to employers to prevent a breach by
the union of a contract between it and the employer.) See also, Walton
Lunch Co. v. Kearney, (1920) 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. E. 429, (the court
held lawful a strike called because the employer intentionally failed to keep
an appointment with his employees to discuss an agreement for a closed
shop.)
21
Pierce v. Stablemen's Union Local No. 8760, (1909) 156 Cal. 70, 103
Pac. 324; Machinery Co. v. Toohey, (1921) 114 Misc. Rep. 185, 186 N. Y. S.
95. Contra: Mechanics' Foundry & Machine Co. v. Lynch, (1920) 236 Mass.
504, 128 N. E. 877; Rutan Co. v. Local Union No. 4, (1925) 97 N. J. Eq.
77, 128
2 2 Atl. 622.
Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers, (1934). 116
N. J. Eq. 146, 172 Atl. 551; A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, (1934) 153
Misc. Rep. 363, 274 N. Y. S. 946; El Paso Electric Co v. Elliot, (W. D.
Texas, 1936) 15 F. Supp. 81. Contra: Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil,
(1920) 235 Mass. 269, 126 N. E. 479 (the court seems to be more concerned with the interference to the employer's business caused by a strike
for the purpose of enforcing a demand for collective bargaining than with
the right to bargain collectively.) See also, Cook v. Wilson, (1919) 108
Misc.2 3 Rep. 438, 178 N. Y. S. 463.
Pierce v. Stablemen's Union Local No. 8760, (1909) 156 Cal. 70, 103
Pac. 324; Connors v. Connolly, (1913) 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600, (although
the means adopted to achieve the end were held unlawful); Minasian v.
Osborne, (1911) 210 Mass. 250, 96 N. E. 1036; Bansback v. Reiff, (1914)
244 Pa. St. 559, 91 Atl. 224. Contra: Kemp v. Division No. 241, (1912)
255 111.
213, 99 N. E. 389; New England Wood Heel Co. v. Nolan, (1929)
268 Mass. 191, 167 N. E. 323.
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often, in cases where the purpose of the strike is lawful, the courts
will nevertheless make an inquiry as to the goodness or badness
4

of the motives of the strikers.1

An inquiry into the motives of the strikers is not always
attended by satisfactory results. Unless motives are clearly expressed, or the actions of the strikers leave no reasonable doubt
as to their motives (and neither of these is often the case), the
court is treading upon dangerous ground when it attempts to delve
into motivation. One of the results of the application of this
test is that the reports are filled with cases in which the courts
have decided strike cases in accordance with their personal economic and social predilections, and not upon the facts.25 Whenever a court adopts a test which allows it a wide leeway in the
introduction of its own economic and social views into the questions before it, the chances of a just result being reached are
impaired. What may or may not be the motive or motives of the
strikers is, in nearly all cases, a matter which borders on the
nebulous. Unless the strikers expressly state what their motives
are, a court must resort to conjecture, and this conjecture is
usually based upon the results of the strikers' actions. What
may be a good motive to one court may be a sinister motive to
another. - 1 Such a test can lead and has led to confusion and
injustice. By far the better view, although it represents the
minority, is that "the motive actuating a strike, or the withdrawal
27

of men from employment, is immaterial.
24Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, (1907) 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590;
Michaels v. Hillman, (1920) 112 Misc. Rep. 112, 183 N. Y. S.195. See also,
Kemp v. Division No. 241, (1912) 255 I1. 213, 240, 99 N. E. 389; Hughes
v. Kansas City Motion Picture M. 0. Local No. 170, (1920) 282 Mo. 304,
318, 221 S.W. 95; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, (1894) 53 N. 3. Eq. 101
30 Atl. 881.
-United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Fitzgerald, (1921) 237 Mass. 537,
541, 130 N. E. 86. See also, Plant v. Woods, (1900) 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E.
1011; cf., majority and minority opinions; Roraback v. Motion Picture
Machine Operators' Union, (1918) 140 Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766; Grimes v.
Durmin (1921) 80 N. H. 145, 114 Atl. 273; cf., Four Plating Co. v. Mako,
(1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 298, 194 Atl. 53; Webb v. Cooks', Waiters', & Waitresses' Union No. 748, (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 205 S.W. 465; In re, Higgins
443.
(N.D.
28 Tex. 1886) 27 Fed.
Compare majority and minority opinions in Pacific Typesetting Co.
v. International Typo. Union, (1923) 125 Wash. 273, 216 Pac. 358; compare,
Machinery Co. v. Toohey, (1921) 114 Misc. Rep. 185, 186 N. Y. S.95; and
Hotel & Railroad News Co. v. Lowenthal, (1922) 243 Mass. 317, 137 N. E.
534. 2
7Greenwood v. Building Trades Council of Sacramento, (1925) 71
Cal. App. 159, 169, 233 Pac. 823. See also, Carpenters' Union v. Citizens'
225, 164 N. E. 393; Saulsberry v. Coopers' InterCommittee, (1928) 333 Ill.
national Union, (1912) 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018; Burke v. Fay, (1908)
128 Mo. App. 690, 1070 S.W. 408; Graves v. McNulty, (1912) 13 Ohio N. P.
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The terms, "justification" and "motive," are sometimes used
interchangeably by the courts, although there is a very real distinction. As in the case of the test of motives, so in considering
the question of justification, a court is almost forced to interpret
the social and economic views of the disputants in terms of its
own social and economic views in order to arrive at its conclusion. While the test of justification is not as indefinite as the
test of motive, nevertheless it leaves some doubt that the end
result may not have been colored by the bias and prejudices of
the court. 28 A court ought not to allow itself to be consciously
placed in such a position. A lawful justification has been defined
as a "bona fide exercise of some right. '29 In some jurisdictions
justification has been related to self-interest, but this self-interest
must not be too remote. 30 The vagueness of the terminology used
is symptomatic of the weakness of the whole theory of justification in this connection. What is a bona fide exercise of a right and
what is self-interest? It has been held that these are questions
of law for the court to decide.3 1 Too often the degree of effective2
ness of the strike has affected the decision.
(N.S.) 110, 22 Ohio Dec. N. P. 425; Parker v. The Bricklayers' Union No.
1, (1889) 21 Ohio Law Bull. 223, 226, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 458; Union

Pacific R. Co. v. Reuf, (D. Neb. 1902) 120 Fed. 102; cf., Plant v. Woods,
(1900) 176 Mass. 492, 499, 57 N. E. 1011. See, Alfred W. Booth & Bro. v.
Burgess, (1906) 72 N. J. Eq. 181, 199, 65 Ati. 226, ("Whatever definition of
malice may be laid down, the weakness of these broad generalizations in my
judgment lies in the fact that they are practically useless.")
An attitude similar to that expressed in the cases above has often been
adopted by the courts in regard to the right of an employer to discharge

his employees. Harmon v. United Mine Workers, (1924) 166 Ark. 255, 258,
266 S. W. 84.
2SCarlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Ass'n, (1912) 305 I1. 331, 137 N. E.
222; Yankee Network v. Gibbs, (Mass. 1936) 3 N. E. (2d) 228; George
Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, (1911) 77 N. J. Eq. 219,
79 Att. 262; Welinsky v. Hillman, (App. Div. 1920) 185 N. Y. S. 257;
M. & M. Wood Working Co., Inc. v. Plywood & Veneer Workers, (D. Or.
1938) 23 F. Supp. 11, 17. See, however, the dissenting opinion of Holmes,
J., on the question of jurisdiction in Vegelahn v. Guntner, (1896) 167 Mass.
92, 44 N. E. 1077. See also, Scofes v. Helmar, (1933) 205 Ind. 596, 187
N. E. 662.
29Moreland Theatres Corp. v. Portland Moving Picture, etc., Union
(1932) 140 Or. 35, 12 P. (2d) 333; Kemp v. Division No. 241, (1912) 255
Ill. 213, 239, 99 N. E. 389; Minasian v. Osborne, (1911) 210 Mass. 250, 96
N. E. 1036; Driver v. Smith, (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 339, 104 Ati. 717; Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, (1927) 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E.
130; Brewing Co. v. International Union, (1911) 12 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 257,
24 Ohio Dec. N. P. 102; Mangum Electric Co. v. Border, (1923) 101 Okla.
64, 222 Pac. 1002, (not a labor relations case).
sOUnited Chain Theatres v. Philadelphia, etc., Union, (E. D. Pa., 1931)
50 F. (2d) 189; Dissenting opinion of Brandeis, 3., in Duplex Co. v. Deering,
(1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349.
3'Minasian v. Osborne, (1911) 210 Mass. 250, 96 N. E. 1036.
32
Folsom v. Lewis, (1911) 208 Mass. 336, 338, 94 N. E. 316; Connett
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Although a strike may be called lawfully, it may, nevertheless,
run afoul of the law because of the means and methods by which
it is conducted. It is generally held that strikers may "use such
means to render a strike effective as are not in themselves unlawful or inconsistent with the rights of others."33 These means
must be free from malicious falsehood, deceit, defamation, malice,
duress, force, intimidation, or actual injury to the property of the
employer. 34 Furthermore, the strikers must not obstruct the
means of ingress and egress to the property or business of the
complainant. 5 There has also been a general insistence on peacev. United Hatters of North America, (1909) 76 N. J.Eq. 202, 208, 74 Atl.
188.

33
Fulforth Co. v. Garment Workers, (1913) 15 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 353,
359, 27 Ohio Dec. 675; Minnesota Stove Co. v. Cavanaugh, (1915) 131 Minn.
458, 155 N. W. 638; Rogers v. Evarts, (1894) 17 N. Y. S. 264; Blumauer v.
Portland Moving Picture Machine Operators', (1933) 141 Or. 399, 17 Pac.
(2d) 1115; Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, (1928) 247 N. Y. 65,
159 N. E. 863; Kirmse v. Adler, (1933) 311 Pa. St. 78, 166 AtI. 566; Iron
Molders' Union No. 125 v. Allis-Chalmers Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1908) 166
Fed. 45. See also, Perkins, Campbell & Co. v. Rogg, (1892) 28 Ohio Law
Bull. 32, 11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 458; Langenberg Hat Co. v. United Cloth Hat
& Cap Makers, (E.D. Mo. 1920) 266 Fed. 127, 129, (the court lays down
the rule that the test of what means and methods striking employees may
lawfully adopt is: "Would any ordinary citizen be permitted to do the acts
complained of in this case if no strike, or labor dispute existed?" It is
submitted that what men do in normal circumstances is not a valid test of
what they may do in times of stress. To require the standard which this
court lays down is to disregard the situation that actually exists and would,
if generally adopted, prevent effective action by workers) ; Parker Paint &
Wall Paper Co. v. Local Union No. 813, (1921) 87 W. Va. 631, 639, 105
S. E. 911.
Whether the means adopted are unreasonable, that is, opposed to public
policy is a question of law for the court. Conners v. Connolly, (1913) 86
Conn.34 641, 86 Atl. 600.
Paramount Enterprises v. Mitchell, (1932) 105 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328;
McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., (1921) 151 Ga. 776, 108 S. E. 226;
Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local No. 782, (1922) 35 Idaho
418, 207 Pac. 132; Olympia Operating Co. v. Costello, (1932) 278 Mass.
135, 179 N. E. 804 (in this case an injunction was granted against picketing
because of false statements made by strikers and which the court held was
an unlawful means of conducting the strike. It would seem that the court
went further than it was justified in going. The court could have enjoined
the use of the false placards and allowed the picketing to continue but it is
possible that the court was influenced by the fact that the picketing had materially reduced the business of the employer) ; Bossert v. Dhuy, (1917)
221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582; Citizens' Co. v. Asheville Typographical
Union, (1924) 187 N. C. 42, 121 S.E. 31; Local Branch v. Solt, (1918) 8
Ohio App. 437, 28 Ohio C. C. 501; Jefferson v. Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks,
(1926) 287 Pa. St. 171, 134 Atl. 430; Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co.,
(N.D. Ohio, 1917) 240 Fed. 759.
In, Connett v. United Hatters of North America, (1909) 76 N. J.Eq.
202, 74 Atl. 188, the court held that it would take judicial notice of the
fact that a strike has been attended by riot, mobs, etc., for six months last
past. 3
aOssey v. Retail Clerks' Union, (1927) 326 Ill. 405, 158 N. E. 162;
Ex parte Heffron, (1914) 179 Mo. App. 639, 162 S.W. 652; Kenffel &
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ful tactics.3 6 The difficulty with this last requirement is that a
strike is generally the culmination of a difference of opinion
between the employer and his employees and tempers are at the
straining point. It is a time of passionate crisis. To require of
the striker the conduct of a gentleman engaged in an abstract
discussion at his club is to misunderstand the situation that actu7
ally exists.
Undoubtedly such things as malicious falsehood, deceit, violence and acts of a similar nature ought not to be condoned. It
is perfectly possible to conduct the most heated argument or dispute without resorting to means which are unfair and which may
result in an unfavorable public opinion. The reported cases vary
widely in their definitions as to what constitutes an unlawful act,
as to when an unlawful act becomes inconsistent with the rights of
others, and as to what constitutes coercion and intimidation.
Here again the courts fall into the error of using vague and indefinite terms. In fact, this very indefiniteness has brought about
a situation in which every labor dispute is an experiment in method
which may or may not meet the approval of the court.
Some courts have placed a further limitation upon the right
to strike. It has been held that if union employees are bound by
contract for a definite period of time, neither they nor the union
may call a strike until the expiration of the contract of employment, unless the employer has violated the contract. 38 This would
Esser v. International Ass'n of Machinists, (1922) 93 N. J. Eq. 429, 116 At.
9; Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, (1927) 245 N. Y. 260.
157 N. E. 130; Remington Rand v. Crofott, (1936) 248 App. Div. 356, 289
N. Y. S. 1025; Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council, (1920) 99 Or. 1, 192
Pac. 765; Mackall v. Ratchford, (D.W. Va. 1897) 82 Fed. 41; American
Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers, etc., Unions, (N.D. Ohio, 1898) 90
Fed. 608.
38
Southern California Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, (1921)
186 Cal. 604, 200 Pac. 1; Clemitt v. Watson, (1895) 14 Ind. App. 38, 42 N.
. 367; Aberon Bakery Co. v. Raimist, (1931) 141 Misc. Rep. 774, 254

N. Y. S. 38; Ioster Brewing Co. v. Giblon, (1903) 1 Ohio N. P. (N.S.)
377, 14 Ohio Dec. N. P. 305; In re, Sweitzer, (1917) 13 Okla. Cr. 154, 162
Pac. 1134; Pennsylvania Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers, (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1928) 28 Fed. (2d) 851; Pacific Coast Coal Co. v. Dist. No. 10, U. M.
W. A., (1922) 122 Wash. 423, 210 Pac. 953.
71Machinery Co. v. Toohey, (1921) 114 Misc. Rep. 185, 186 N. Y. S.
95; Great Northern Railway Co. v. Brosseau, (D. N.D. 1923) 286 Fed. 414.
asHardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse, (1914) 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657;
Pierce v. Stablemen's Union Local No. 8760, (1909) 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac.

324; Paramount Enterprises v. Mitchell, (1932) 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328;
Burgess v. Georgia, F. & A. Ry. Co., (1918) 148 Ga. 415, 96 S. E. 864;
Carpenters' Union v. Citizens Committee, (1928) 333 Ill. 225, 164 N. E.
393; Folsom v. Lewis, (1911) 208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316; Lohse Patent
Door Co. v. Fuelle, (1908) 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997; Rutan Co. v. Local
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seem to be sound. If contracts of employment are to be effective
instruments of industrial peace, they ought to receive the fullest
protection by the courts. However, where there is no existing
contract
"it is within the power of labor unions, and it is lawful for
them to instruct or order their members not to accept employment
with an individual, or to continue in such persons' employment,
where the action of the union is justifiable in the sense that it is
to promote the welfare of the members of the union." 9
Picketing by striking employees frequently has been enjoined
because the strike was called while their contracts of employment
were still operative.4 0 The reason given by the courts which adopt
this position is that "individuals may work for whom they please,
Union No. 4, (1925) 97 N. 3. Eq. 77, 128 Ati. 622; Spivak v. Wankofsky,
(1935) 155 Misc. Rep. 530, 278 N. Y. S. 562.
See, Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Ry. Co., (N.D. Ga., 1921)
271 Fed. 743, 744; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Switchmen's Union, (W.D.
N.Y. 1907) 158 Fed. 541, (held that if union officials try to have the members

of the union break their contracts of employment or urge them to leave their

employment, such action may be enjoined but if the workmen themselves
upon their own individual responsibility desire to breach their contract and
quit because of alleged grievances or any other reason, they may do so);
cf., F. C. Church Shoe Co. v. Turner, (1926) 218 Mo. App. 516, 279 S.W.
232; Kemp v. Division No. 241, (1912) 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389; Clemitt
v. Watson. (1895) 14 Ind. App. 38, 42 N. E. 367; Lundoff-Bicknell Co. v.
Smith, (1927) 24 Ohio App. 294, 156 N. E. 243.
See also, La France Co. v. Electrical Workers, (1923) 108 Oh. St. 61,
85, 89, 140 N. E. 899. Cf., Schwartz v. Driscoll, (1922) 217 Mich. 384,
186 N. W. 522, (the court indicates that apparently the obligations which are
imposed upon employees and labor unions are not always imposed upon
employers.) But see, Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local No.
782, (1922) 35 Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132; Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass

Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, (1899) 59 N. J.Eq. 49, 46 Atl. 208; Boyer v. Western
Union Tel. Co., (E.D. Mo. 1903) 124 Fed. 245.

See also, Laundry Co. v. Dickson, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 416, 419, 201
N. Y. S.173; Feller v. Local 144 International L. G. W. Union, (1937) 121
N. J.Eq. 452, 455, 191 Atl. 111, (undertakes to explain the basis for the
rule laid down in Laundry Co. v. Dickson, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 416, 201
N. Y.
S.173) ; Knudson v. Benn, (D. Minn. 1903) 123 Fed. 636, 638.
39
Seymour Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers', etc., Union, (1933) 163 Md.
687, 700, 164 AtI. 752. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin,

(1927) 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130; Local Branch v. Solt, (1918) 8 Ohio
App. 437, 28 Ohio C. C. 501.
In Rosenwasser Bros. v. Pepper, (1918) 104 Misc. Rep. 457, 574, 172
N. Y. S.310, the court qualified the right of a union to advise its members

to strike for any cause when the nation is at war on the ground that "the
life of our nation is dependent upon an uninterrupted production of those

things needed to successfully carry on the war in which our country is
engaged."
Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380, (1918) 19 Ariz. 379, 171 Pac. 121.
Contra: Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (E. D. Wis.

1894) 0 60 Fed. 803.
' Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture M. 0. Local No. 170, (1920)
282 Mo. 304, 221 S.W. 95; Rosenwasser Bros. v. Pepper, (1918) 104 Misc.
Rep. 457, 172 N. Y. S.310.
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and quit work when they please, provided they do not violate their
contract of employment." 41 While the language used by these
courts would seem to indicate that the employee under contract
for a definite term to his employer cannot leave before the expiration of that term except where the employer has himself
violated the contract, in actual practice it has meant that these
employees may leave their employment but they may not picket
the plant of their employer or interfere in any way with the
42
operation of his business.
THE STATUS OF A STRIKING EMPLOYEE

Many of the rights of strikers revolve about the status of the
striker and the employer. If the view is adopted that the strikers
lose their status as employees or even as striking employees as
soon as they go on a strike, then they become strangers to the
employer, with the result that they have no "legal interest or concern in the company and its new employees. '43 Thus, having no
inteiest in the employer's business, they have no right to interfere
in any way. The handicap thus imposed upon the striking employees by this view seriously impedes, or altogether destroys,
the effectiveness of the concerted action undertaken by them.
The more recent and the better view is that employees may strike
and not lose their status as employees. 4 4 Courts which maintain
4

Cohn v. Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers Union, (1917) 92 Conn. 161,
165, 101 Atl. 659.
42
Jensen v. Cooks' & Waiters' ,Union, (1905) 39 Wash. 531, 81 Pac. 1069.
43 Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, (D.
Nev. 1908) 159 Fed. 500, 519. See also, Hoster Brewing Co. v. Giblon,
(1903) 1 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 377, 14 Ohio Dec. N. P. 305; Fulforth Co. v.
Garment Workers, (1913) 15 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 353, 27 Ohio Dec. N. P.
675, (the court applied the same rule to employees on strike and employees
who had been locked out); Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Ry. Co.,
(N.D. Ga. 1921) 271 Fed. 743, (this federal case no longer represents the
point of view of the federal courts on this point since the adoption of the
Wagner Labor Relations Act, but serves to illustrate the view still held by
some courts.)
In the following cases the strikers were referred to as former employees
but no effort was made to deny them the right to continue the strike as long
as their methods and purposes were lawful. Jones v. Maher, (1909) 62
Misc. Rep. 388, 116 N. Y. S. 180; Statler Co. v. Employees' Alliance, (1914)
19 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 375, 27 Ohio Dec N. P. 178. Contra: Knudson v.
Benn, (D. Minn. 1903) 123 Fed. 636; Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local
Union, (W. D. Tenn. 1901) 111 Fed. 49.
Many of the courts which hold that an employee who goes on strike
thereby severs all connection with the employers and is to be treated as a
total stranger for some unaccountable reason, allow these "strangers" the
right to picket, although this right is denied to other "strangers" who have
never been employed by the particular employer.
14State v. Personett, (1923) 114 Kan. 680, 220 Pac. 520; Keith Theatre
v. Vachon, (1932) 134 Me. 392, 187 AtI. 692; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
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this position concede that strikers do have an interest in the employer's business and that their efforts to solve the differences
between themselves and their employer do not constitute meddling
or unwarranted interference with that business.
It is obvious that the practical differences between these two
views are considerable. Some courts have preferred to refer to
the status of strikers as that of striking employees." The end
result, however, is the same whether the strikers are considered
employees or striking employees. Regardless of whether or not
the striking worker is considered as remaining an employee in
every sense of the word or as acquiring the special status of striking employee, it is definitely certain that when he goes on strike
there is no intention on his part of renouncing definitively his
employment. His purpose is to hasten the solution of his differences with his employer. To construe such an action by the
employee as a final and complete severance of relations is completely to misunderstand the real situation. 48 Under the Wagner
Labor Relations Act, the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that strikers remain employees for the remedial purposes
specified in the Act. How long this relationship continues is not
47
made clear.
How long the status of "striking employee" should continue
is a question that is difficult to answer definitely. Certainly the
v. Northern Pacific R. Co., (E. D. Wis. 1894) 60 Fed. 803; Jeffrey-De Witt
Insulator Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1937)
91 F. (2d) 134.
4Restful Slipper Co. v. United Shoe & Leather Union, (1934) 116 N. J.
Eq. 521, 174 Atl. 543; Iron Molders' Union No. 125, etc. v. Allis-Chalmers
Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1908) 166 Fed. 45; Michaelson v. United States,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1923) 291 Fed. 940; National Labor Relations Board v.
Carlisle Lumber Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1937) 94 F. (2d) 138. In the
Michaelson case, supra, it was held that employees who are locked out by
their employer do not, on that account, lose their status as employees.
"6State v. Personett, (1923) 114 Kan. 680, 220 Pac. 520; Restful Slipper
Co. v. United Shoe & Leather Union, (1934) 116 N. J. Eq. 521, 174 Atl.
543; La France Co. v. Electrical Workers, (1923) 108 Oh. St. 61, 140 N. E.
899; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., (E. D. Wis.
1894) 60 Fed. 803. The same reasoning which has been applied to the case
of a strike has been applied to a lockout. The rule in one case ought to be
the same as in the other. There is no essential difference except that in the
one case the employees take the initiative and in the other case the employer
is the actor. See the opinion of Grosscup, J., in, Iron Molders' Union No.
135, etc. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1908) 116 Fed. 45, 52.
47National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,
(1938) 304 U. S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 861; Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1938) 94
F. (2d) 875. Cf., M. & M. Wood Working Co., Inc. v. Plywood & Veneer
Workers, (D. Or., 1938) 23 F. Supp. 11, 20, for an interpretation in connection with the Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act.
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status can be said to have changed when the strikers have obtained regular and substantially equivalent employment elsewhere,
or have ceased to be interested in being actively employed by the
employer against whom they went on strike. 48

The mere fact,

however, that strikebreakers or other workmen have been engaged to take the places of the strikers should not be considered
as changing the relationship, neither should the passage of a
considerable period of time, or the operation of the plant with a
49
full complement of employees, be held to effect a change.
SYMPATHETIC AND SIT-DOWN STRIKES

There are two special types of strikes that ought to be considered at this point. These are the sympathetic strike and the
sit-down strike. The so-called sympathetic strike has been employed upon a number of occasions by trade unions as an effective means of forcing a conclusion to a labor dispute in which the
strikers do not have a primary interest. It consists of a strike
by workers not directly affected by the principal strike, and who
have no dispute with their employer, as an aid to the principal
strikers.50 The courts have not generally looked with favor upon
such a strike. 51 The test which is usually applied is
"the extent to which those who co-operate have in point of
fact a common interest, and are justified in what they do by
honest motives to advance self-interest, as opposed to malicious
intent to injure the business or good will of another." 25
4
8Mooresville Cotton Mills, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,
(C.C.A.
9 4th Cir. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 61.
4 Moreland Theatres Corp. v. Portland Moving Pictures, etc., Union,
(1932) 140 Or. 35, 12 P. (2d) 333, (dissenting opinion of Belt, J.) ; JeffreyDe Witt Insulator Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 4th Cir.
1937) 91 F. (2d) 134. But see, Moore Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy,
(1923) 243 Mass. 554, 137 N. E. 919; Mode Novelty Co. v. Taylor, (1937)
122 N. J. Eq. 593, 195 Atl. 810, (the plant was operating normally; therefore the strikers were held to have no further interest in the matter) ; Yates
Hotel Co. v. Meyers, (1922) 195 N. Y. S. 558, (the court held the strikers
were no longer employees where the strike had lasted for more than a year
and the places of the strikers had been filled to the satisfaction of the employer) ; Moreland Theatres Corp. v. Portland Moving Picture, etc., Union,
(1932) 140 Or. 35, 12 P. (2d) 333; Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v.
Ry. Co., (N.D. Ga. 1921) 271 Fed. 743; Waitresses' Union, Local No. 249
v. Benish Restaurant Co. Inc., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1935) 6 F. (2d) 568; Dissenting opinion in Jeffrey-De Witt Insulator Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1937) 91 F. (2d) 134.
50"A strike in which the strikers made no demands on their own employers, but try to bring pressure against the employers of other workers on
strike." Webster's, New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1935) 2556.
5'Reynolds v. Davis, (1908) 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457; Foster v.
Retail Clerks' International Protective Ass'n, (1902) 39 Misc. Rep. 48, 55,
78 N. Y. S. 860; Public Baking Co. v. Stern, (1926) 127 Misc. Rep. 229,
215 N.
Y. S. 537.
152Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, (S.D. N.Y., 1928) 27 F. (2d) 560, 564.
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The test of common interest does not impose impossible conditions but the tests of motive and malicious intent to injure are
so vague as to leave much too broad a field of action to the court.
They are an invitation to the court to declare unlawful whatever
may not meet with its personal approval. Bad motives and
malicious intent can be read into almost any action, especially
when that action is part and parcel of a contest that is bound to
cause incidental damage, at least, to property and property rights.
Even if the test of common interest alone is imposed, a court
should nevertheless exercise considerable care in distinguishing
between the facts and its personal views. Every worker has a
definite interest in the well being of every other worker. A reduction or lag in the labor standards of one group of workers will
eventually affect the standards of all groups regardless of whether
or not they may be employed in the same industry or be members
of the same craft. This was clearly proved in the late depression.
Therefore, the active support of workers for each other, even by
means of a sympathetic strike, should not be disparaged so- long
as violence or acts directly conducive to violence are not indulged
8

in.5

The sit-down strike is of recent origin. A sit-down strike
occurs when the employers forcibly take and remain in physical
possession of the plant in which they have been working and attempt by this means to force the employer to terms. The slow-up
strike is a similar method of bringing to a head a dispute between
the employees and their employer. In this type of strike the employees continue to work but do so at such a slow pace as to
reduce production to an unprofitable basis. Both of these methods
have been held unlawful by the courts, and rightfully so.6 ' While
it is true that an employee has more than a casual interest in his
employer's business, it is also true that his interest does not approximate the right to appropriate, without permission, that business or the physical plant in which it is conducted. Our present
economic system does not admit that an employee has such an
53Rutan Co. v. Local Union No. 4, etc., (1925) 97 N. J. Eq. 77, 128 Atl.
622. But cf., Duplex Co. v. Deering, (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 474, 41 Sup. Ct.
65 L. Ed. 349.
172, 54

Ohio Leather Co. v. De Chant, (1937) 8 Ohio Opinions 31. 24 Ohio L.
Abs. 187; Welch v. State, (Ala. App. 1938) 183 So. 886; Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 155; Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp. v. Lodge 66, (1938) 295 Ill. App. 323, 14 N. E. (2d) 991; Cf. Houston
Funeral Home v. Boe, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 78 S. W. (2d) 1091, in which
the court held that injunction is not a remedy which can be used for the
purpose of recovering possession of property. However, it should be noted
that this case did not involve a labor controversy.
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interest which would permit him to take this step. Likewise in
the case of the slow-up, the employer is entitled to receive the
amount of work he has bargained for. If the employees feel
aggrieved, there are a number of steps they can take which are
both effective and sanctioned. To continue to report for work and
then to shirk that work is to weaken their case in the eyes of both
the public and the courts. Such conduct indicates that the very
employees who are complaining of unfair treatment at the hands
of their employer have themselves adopted the tactics of unfair
treatment.
The sit-down strike situation has been best summed up in
Ohio Leather Co. v. De Chant, in which the court said,
"Can it be said that the positions of employment of the defendants carry with them the right to possession of their employer's
plant?
"Manifestly the defendants have no vested claim to the plant,
nor to the right to occupy it because they had jobs therein.
"Their positions of employment do not carry with them the
right to property in which they work; and they, are asserting a
property right as against the plaintiff when they possess the
property.
"Ownership of property, without the right of possession there'
of, is an empty sham." 55
We have already noted that there is no longer any doubt of
the right of employees to organize into labor unions or similar
organizations. That they may organize for the purpose of improving their condition by collective bargaining is now universally
conceded. But there is a wide divergence of opinion between the
right to organize and (1) the validity of the means to be adopted
in obtaining the improved condition and (2) the legitimacy of
the ends sought.
PICKETING

The commonest and, apparently, one of the most effective
means of concluding a labor dispute with the employer, is the use
of pickets. For a long time a number of jurisdictions barred
picketing in connection with labor controversies, on the ground that
peaceful picketing is a contradiction in terms because picketing is
always coercive, and coercion is the sole reason for its use. The
fact that the picketing in any particular instance was actually
peaceful made no difference-it was still coercive and, therefore, not peaceful.56 In those jurisdictions in which picketing
55(1937)
8 Ohio Opinions 31, 32, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 187.
5
6A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, (1908)
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has been allowed, it has been allowed when it is peacefully conducted. 7 Of course, what is peaceful picketing is subject to
424, 83 N. E. 940, (since reversed by a statute legalizing picketing.
232 Ill.

It is strange how the spectres conjured up by some courts fail to materialize.
None of the dire consequences predicted by this court if picketing were

allowed, have come to pass since the statute legalizing picketing was
adopted) ; Clarage v. Luphringer, (1918) 202 Mich. 612, 168 N. W. 440;
Schwartz v. Cigar Makers International Union, (1922) 219 Mich. 589, 189
N. W. 55; Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Local No. 560, (1920) 91 N. J. Eq. 240,
109 Atl. 147, (this case does not represent the view of the New Jersey
courts today but it does state the position of those courts which still frown
upon picketing); Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council, (1920) 99 Or. 1,
192 Pac. 765, (in which picketing held unlawful, even though peaceable,
where the controversy is not between employer and employee. Cf., dissenting opinion, and see also, recent Oregon legislation) ; Phillips S. & T. P.
Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of I. S. & T. W., (S.D. Ohio, 1913) 208 Fed.
335, 338; Danz v. American Fed. of Musicians, Local 76, (1925) 133 Wash.
186, 233 Pac. 630, (however, this ruling has been changed by statute; see,
chap. 7, Laws Ex. Sess. 1933); Sterling Chain Theatres v. Central Labor
Council, (1930) 155 Wash. 217, 283 Pac. 1081, (a man carrying a banner
one hundred or more feet away from the place of business of the employer
was held to be a disseminator of information but not a picket). Cf., these
cases with Forstmann & Huffmann Co. v. United Front C. of T. Workers,
(1926) 99 N. J. Eq. 230, 234, 133 At. 202, (in which there is a very fine
statement with reference to the question of the right to picket, which all
courts4 would do well to study).
5 Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Machine Works, (1908) 131 Ga. 336,
62 S.E. 236; Scofes v. Helmar, (1933) 205 Ind. 596, 187 N. E. 662; Music
Hall Theatre v. Moving Picture M. 0. Local No. 165, (1933) 249 Ky. 639,
61 S. W. (2d) 283; Berry Foundry Co. v. International Moulders' Union,
(1914) 177 Mo. App. 84, 164 S. W. 245; Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke,
(1917) 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107; Connett v. United Hatters of North
America, (1909) 76 N. J. Eq. 202, 74 Atl. 188; Keuffel & Esser v. International Ass'n of Machinists, (1922) 93 N. J. Eq. 429, 431, 116 Atl. 9;
International Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, (1937) 122 N. J.Eq. 222, 193 AtI.
808; Goldfinger v. Feintuch, (1937) 276 N. Y. 281, 285, 11 N. E. (2d) 910;
Citizens' Co. v. Asheville Typographical Union, (1924) 187 N. C. 42, 121
S. E. 31; Fulforth Co. v. Garment Workers, (1913) 15 Ohio N. P. (N.S.)
353, 27 Ohio Dec. N. P. 675; La France Co. v. Electrical Workers, (1923)
108 Oh. St. 61, 140 N. E. 899; Ohio Leather Co. v. De Chant, (1937) 8
Ohio Opinions 31, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 187; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International
Ass'n, (1936) 155 Or. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090; Kirmse v. Adler, (1933) 311
Pa. St. 78, 166 At. 566; Bomes v. Providence Local No. 223, (1931) 51
R. I. 499, 155 Atl. 581; People v. Harris, (Colo. 1937) Labor and ,Unemployment Insurance Service, Prentice Hall, Inc., p. 19551, 19552; Phillips S. &
T. P. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, (S.D. Ohio, 1913) 208 Fed. 335.
See also, Buy-Wise Markets v. Winokur, (1938) 167 Misc. Rep. 235,
236, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 854; Stuyvesant Lunch & Bakery Corp. v. Reiner,
(1920) 110 Misc. Rep. 357, 181 N. Y. S. 212, 214 (it was held that picketing
even though "peaceable, may not be employed, when its purpose is in effect
a malicious and wanton interference with another's business or vocation."
Such a rule opens the door wide to decisions based wholly on each individual court's feeling as to whether the purpose is wanton and malicious.
The test is definitely too vague to be effective) ; and see, Brandt-Rosen v.
Golden, (1932) 143 Misc. Rep. 867, 256 N. Y. S.824, (contains an excellent
statement on the question of picketing). Olympia Operating Co. v. Costello,
(1932) 278 Mass. 125, 179 N. E. 804, (picketing was completely enjoined
because the billposters used by the union bore the legend that the strikers
had been locked out and the court found this to be a false statement) ; Starr
v. Laundry & Dry C. Workers' L. Union No. 101, (1936) 155 Or. 634,
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much difference of opinion. If the term "peaceful" is to be refined
down to its most pacific meaning, then there is something to be
said for those courts which hold all picketing unlawful. If, however, we are to take into consideration the underlying realities of
the typical situation in which picketing occurs, then the term
"peaceful" must connote any state of affairs in which the pickets
operate without resort to physical violence and without the use of
such numbers as to make it reasonably impossible to gain ingress
or egress to the business or property of the employer. Any further restrictions on the term must inevitably lead to a distortion
which bears no resemblance to the struggle between the parties.
It is necessary to bear in mind constantly the fact that men are
differing over what to them are deeply important issues. No
matter how much a court may differ over the value of the benefits
to be gained or the privileges to be lost, it should never lose sight
of the fact that its part in the dispute is that of an arbiter, and not
a participant. The use of the homely language of the street, including such a term as "scab," the use of epithets and invective,
should not be condemned because they are unbecoming a gentleman. The language and conduct of the drawing room cannot be
used as the measure of the language and conduct of a picket.""
63 P. (2d) 1104, (picketing merely to gratify a whim or caprice is not
permissible. Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, (1922)
151 Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781, dissenting opinion of Dibell, J.; Ex parte
Heffron, (1914) 179 Mo. App. 639, 162 S. W. 652; See also Forstmann &
Huffmann Co. v. United Front C. of T. Workers, (1926) 99 N. J.Eq. 230,
696, 133 Atl. 202, (contains an excellent statement on this question) ; Wise
Shoe v. Lowenthal, (1935) 266 N. Y. 264, 194 N. E. 749, expresses a more
reasonable view) ; Saltzman v. Employers' Local, (1937) 10 Ohio Opinions
6, 9, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 354; See also, Keith Theatre v. Vachon, (1936) 134 Me.
392, 187 Atl. 692, (picketing is not permissible even though peaceable where
it is 58
done by outsiders endeavoring to unionize a nonunion shop).
Machinery Co. v. Toohey, (1921) 114 Misc. Rep. 185, 189, 186 N. Y. S.
95, ("What language is permitted? What is prohibited? The nomenclature
of the strike is not the language of the parlor. Men become earnest and
excited and vigorous at such times. A vital principle is at stake. It is not
within the limits of human nature to remain calm and gentle under such
circumstances ....

Must laboring men be held down to a more stringent

rule? Must they be under constant restraint? Are they forced to be placid
in the hour of contention? It is well, perhaps, to do so, but does the law
demand it? I think not. Strikers may talk in their own language; the
plan, common, strong, everyday language of the laboring man"); Paylay
Hats, Inc. v. Zaritsky, (1934) 151 Misc. Rep. 569, 571, 271 N. Y. S.786.
Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, (1935) 2 Cal. (2d) 312, 41 P. (2d) 314,
(the use by picketers of grimaces and insulting gestures and the waving
of newspapers containing derogatory headlines was enjoined by the court) ;
Levy & Devaney v. International Pocketbook W. Union; (1932) 114 Conn.
319, 158 Atl. 795, (the court indicates its displeasure with black and
threatening looks on the part of picketers); Evening Times Printing &
Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, (1938) 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199
At. 599, (the use of sound trucks to announce the existence of a strike
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Picketing has on occasion been denied where the number of
pickets is deemed by the court to be excessive, that is, more than
the immediate purpose demands."
Sometimes it has been denied
where the court believes that the number of pickets is so large as
to act as an intimidating force upon non-striking employees, prospective employees or customers. 60 It is difficult to lay down a
rule as to how many pickets are a proper number, because the circumstances in each case are bound to vary. Generally, however, it
may be said that the number should bear a direct relation to the
area to be patrolled and the number of workmen remaining at
work or employed in spite of the strike.6 In any event, the means
was permitted); Jones v. Maher, (1909) 62 Misc. Rep. 388, 116 N. Y. S.
180, (the use of verbal abuse was held unlawful) ; Goldfinger v. Feintuch,
(1937) 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, (shouting and the use of loudspeakers by pickets have been deprecated) ; See also, Beaton v. Tarrant,
(1902) 102 Ill.
App. 124; Murdock v. Walker, (1892) 152 Pa. St. 595, 25
Atl. 492, (verbal abuse and ridicule were enjoined) ; Pacific Coast Coal Co.
v. Dist. No. 10, U. If.W. A., (1922) 122 Wash. 423, 210 Pac. 953, (the
court held that picketing must not be conducted in a boisterous fashion,
that pickets must adopt the position of missionaries and not annoy or harass
loyal60workers.)
Levy & Devaney v. International Pocketbook W. Union (1932), 114
Conn. 319, 158 A. 795, (35 employees, 20 pickets-but the court did not
merely enjoin the use of an excessive number of pickets-it enjoined all
picketing).
GOSouthern California Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, etc.,
(1921) 186 Cal. 604, 200 Pac. 1; Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Machine
Works, (1908) 131 Ga. 336, 62 S. E. 236; Beaton v. Tarrant, (1902) 102
Ill. App. 124; Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W. L. Union, (1905)
165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877; Keuffel & Esser v. International Ass'n of Machinists, (1922) 93 N. J.Eq. 429, 116 Atl. 9; Bayonne Textile Corp. v.
American Fed. of S. Workers, (1933) 114 N. J.Eq. 307, 168 Atl. 799,
(manifestly, the use of a large number of pickets cannot reasonably be

regarded as intended for a lawful purpose.) Goldfinger v. Feintuch, (1937)
276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910; Hoster Brewing Co. v. Giblon, (1903) 1
Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 377, 14 Ohio Dec. N. P. 305; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v.
International Ass'n, (1936) 155 Or. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090; Phillips S. & T.
P. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, (S.D. Ohio, 1913) 208 Fed. 335, 338, ("It
should be done ...

by such limited numbers as not to awaken the fear and

lead to the intimidation of workmen") ; American Steel Foundries v. TriCity Central Trades Council, (1921) 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L.
Ed. 189. In, R. A. Freed & Co. v. Doe, (1935) 283 N. Y. S. 186, the court
indicated its dissatisfaction with picketing that was conducted in such a way
as to cause crowds to collect. In, Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers'
Club, (1926) 99 N. J. Eq. 770, 134 Atl. 309, the court intimates that even
a small numLer of pickets may be intimidating. Iverson v. Dilno, (1911)
44 Mont. 270, 119 Pac. 719, the court held that large numbers of pickets
constituted an enjoinable nuisance under section 6162 of the Montana Code.
WlInternational Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove, (1930) 158 Md.
496, 148 Atl. 826; Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers'
Ass'n, (1899) 59 N. J. Eq. 49, 46 Atl. 298; Searle Mfg. Co. v. Terry, (1905)
56 Misc. Rep. 265, 106 N. Y. S. 438; Segenfeld v. Friedman, (1922) 117
Misc. Rep. 731, 733, 193 N. Y. S. 128, ("Nor is it material whether one or
several pickets be maintained. Right or wrong is not determined by mere
numerical considerations. The act of a single man, if right, is not made
wrong because it is performed by several men"); Great Northern Ry. Co.
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of ingress and egress to the shop ought not to be unreasonably
impaired. Whether mass picketing ought to be denied on the
ground that it serves to intimidate or coerce others, will be discussed in connection with the question of intimidation.
Picketing usually is employed by strikers for four reasons:
(1) to inform prospective employees, customers and prospective
customers, and the public, that a dispute exists between the employer and his employees; (2) to observe who the employees are
who still remain at work, who the prospective employees are,
and who the customers are, so that they can be approached then
or at some future time and induced to cease working for the employer and join with the strikers, not to seek employment with the
employer, and not to deal with the employer as a customer, respectively; (3) to maintain the morale of the strikers; (4) to
cause by means of (1), (2), and (3), a diminution in the shop
to compel him to
owner's business and a shortage of labor sufficient
62
seek to negotiate a settlement of the dispute.
v. Local G. F. L. of I. A. of M., (D. Mont. 1922) 283 Fed. 557, 562; Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Brosseau, (D. N. D. 1923) 286 Fed. 414, 418, ("The
impartial history of strikes teaches that there is as much danger to strikers
on the picket line from private detectives and sometimes from new employees, as there is of the same kind of wrong on the part of strikers against
new employees. My experience in the present strike clearly confirms that
view. The strikers on the picket line are entitled to have enough present
to shield them against the temptation of their adversaries to resort to violent
methods. They also need the same protection against trumped-up charges
or unfair evidence relative to any assaults that may occur on either side") ;
Mackall v. Ratchford, (D.W. Va. 1897) 82 Fed. 41. Cf., Jefferson & Indiana62 Coal Co. v. Marks, (1926) 287 Pa. St. 171, 134 Atl. 430.
Davis v. State, (1928) 200 Ind. 88, 161 N. E. 375; Music Hall Theatre
v. Moving Picture M. 0. Local No. 165, (1933) 249 K . 639, 61 S. W. (2d)
283; Keith Theatre v. Vachon, (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692; Berry
Foundry Co. v. International Moulders Union, (1914) 177 Mo. App. 84,
164 S. W. 245; W. A. Fletcher Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
(N.J. 1903) 55 Atl. 1077; Mills v. United States Printing Co., (1904)
99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. S. 185; Machinery Co. v. Toohey, (1921) 114
Misc. Rep. 185; 186 N. Y. S. 95; Citizens' Co. v. Asheville Typographical
Union, (1924) 187 N. C. 42, 121 S. E. 31; Bernstein v. Cleaners & Dyers
Ass'n, (1934) 31 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 433; La France Co. v. Electrical Workers, (1923) 108 Oh. St. 61, 140 N. E. 899; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, (1936) 155 Or. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090; Alaska S. S. Co. v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, (W.D. Wash. 1916) 236 Fed. 964.
See, Hammer v. Baum, (1930) 136 Misc. Rep. 490, 240 N. Y. S. 145,
Commercial House & Window Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, (1930) 240 N. Y. S.
797, (the place to picket is the employer's office and not the place in which
the employer works) ; cf., Local Union No. 313 v. Stathakis, (1918) 135
Ark. 86, 205 S. W. 450. See also, Paramount Enterprises v. Mitchell,
(1932) 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328, (contains a remarkable statement by a
court which does not hesitate to set down its bias and prejudice against
effective picketing) : Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local No.
782, (1922) 35 Idaho 418, 407 Pac. 132, (the court held pickets cannot be
used in front of or near the place of business of an employer who deals
directly with the public because such picketing is necessarily intimidating in
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Picketing frequently also is employed by outside unions in an
attempt to unionize a nonunion shop. There has been a sharp
cleavage of opinion among the courts as to the right of a union
to picket in such a situation. Many employers, in order to forestall unionization, enter into individual contracts with their employees, which forbid their joining a union while employed, while
other employers organize company unions and enter into exclusive contracts with them. In both of these situations, outside
unions frequently are enjoined from endeavoring to persuade the
employees to join the outside union. s3 The reason advanced is
that the action of the outside union constitutes an interference
with existing contracts of service and is, therefore, an unlawful
and unwarranted interference with the business of the employer
which a court of equity will enjoin. Some courts have made a
distinction between those situations in which the outside union,
with knowledge of the existing employment contracts, counsels
the employees to leave and those situations in which it has no
knowledge of such contracts. In the former case, the union has
been enjoined, while in the latter an injunction has been re61

fused.

Injunctions also have been issued against attempts by an outside union to obtain proselytes among nonunion workers in cases
character and there is an intimation that picketing might be allowed if the
employer conducts a business which does not come into direct contact with
the public such as a manufacturing plant) ; Ellis v. journeyman Barbers'
i. U. of A., (1922) 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v.
Ass'n, (1936) 155 Or. 652, 63 Pac. (2d) 1090.
International
63Hotel, Restaurant, etc., Local Union No. 181 v. Miller, (1938) 272
Ky. 471, 114 S. W. (2d) 501, (in this case the employer exhibited animosity
toward an outside union's attempt to unionize his employees but was very
helpful in the formation of a company union. It is strange that the employer-complainant objected so strenuously in one case and so ardently
blessed the other, unless, perhaps, his control over the company union made it
a valuable instrument in his hands) ; Mitnick v. Furniture Workers Union,
(1938) 124 N. J. Eq. 147, 200 AtI. 553; Third Ave. Ry. Co. v. Shea, (1919)
109 Misc. Rep. 18, 179 N. Y. S. 43; United Tailors v. Amalgamated Workers, (1927) 26 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 439.
64Tn the following cases the union knew the employees were under contract to their employer: Callan v. Exposition Cotton Mills, (1919) 149 Ga.
119, 99 S. E. 300, (contract by implication in this case). See, however,
Nusbaum v. Retail Clerks' Int. Protective Ass'n, (1922) 227 IIl. App. 206;
Vail-BalIou Press, Inc. v. Casey, (1925) 125 Misc. Rep. 689, 212 N. Y. S.
113; Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Fed. of F. F. H. W., (1931) 305
Pa. St. 206, 157 AtI. 588, (see dissenting opinion also) ; Delaware L. &
W. R. Co. v. Switchmen's Union, (W.D. N.Y. 1907), (the court held that
a union may counsel a strike even though the employees, its members were
under contract to their employer).
In the following cases the union did not know that the employees were
under contract to their employer: Piermont v. Schlesinger, (1921) 196 App.
Div. 658, 188 N. Y. S. 35; Parker v. The Bricklayers' Union No. 1, (1889)
21 Ohio Law Bul. 223, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 458.
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in which the employment is at will. The theory is that the action
of the union constitutes an unlawful interference with a property
right of the employer, the property right being the right of the
employer to the good will of his employees.65 An increasingly
large number of courts are inclining to the view that so long as
no contract exists between an employer and his employees, an
outside union is entitled to attempt to induce the employees, by
peaceful persuasion, either to join the union or to strike, or both.",
There can be no doubt that the failure of the trade union
movement to attain any real strength in this country is due, in
large part, to the fact that the efforts of unions to unionize nonunion plants have been placed under such severe restrictions by
many courts. A better and more reasonable attitude would seem
to be that a union may, by any means short of violence, malicious
falsehood, deceit, and acts of a similar nature, attempt to sell
itself to the employees of a particular employer whether under
contract or not.57 The employer has no real interest in the matter unless it can be said to be his interest to prevent his employees
from gathering sufficient strength to bargain with him on" a basis
that approximates equality. The courts should long ago have
denied him the right to interfere in the process of unionization on
the ground of insufficient interest.
65
1McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., (1921) 151 Ga. 776, 108 S. E.
226; Third Ave. Ry. Co. v. Shea, (1919) 109 Misc. Rep. 18, 179 N. Y. S.
43, (represents the point of view of a number of jurisdictions although it
no longer represents the position of the New York courts) ; Eagle Glass &
Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, (1917) 245 U. S. 275, 38 Sup. Ct. 80, 62 L. Ed. 286; cf.,
Patterson Glass Co. v. Thomas, (1919) 41 Cal. App. 559, 183 Pac. 190,
(where the employees were employed for an indefinite period either side
having the right to terminate the employment on seven days notice; this
was held to be a definite contract and not an employment at will and, therefore, an outside union could be enjoined from interfering). See also, La
France Co. v. Electrical Workers, (1923) 108 Oh. St. 61, 140 N. E. 899, (a
distinction is made on the basis that the strikers did not ask the employees
who had signed yellow dog contracts to continue at work and join the
union66 but asked them to quit their employment and join the union.)
Iron Molders' Union v. Greenwald Co., (1906) 4 Ohio N. P. (N.S.)
161, 16 Ohio Dec. 678; Pennsylvania Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers,
(C.C.A.
8th Circ. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 851.
67
1nterborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, (1928) 247 N. Y. 65, 159
N. E. 863. Contra: Vegelahn v. Guntner, (1896) 167 Mass. 108, 44 N. E.
1077; Machine & Iron Co. v. Willard, (1922) 242 Mass. 566, 136 N. E. 629.
See also, F. C. Church Shoe Co. v. Turner, (1926) 218 Mo. App. 516,
279 S. W. 232, (it was held that third parties may not seek to compel
the breaking of a contract entered into between an employer and its employees, but striking employees may take such action. The distinction which
the court makes does not seem to be reasonable.)
The same right has been granted to the employer, see, H. B. RosenthalEttlinger Co. v. Schlossberg, (1933) 149 Misc. Rep. 210, 266 N. Y. S. 762;
Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, (1937) 245 N. Y. 260, 157
N. E. 130.
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It may be contended that in many instances the employees, or
the majority of them, show no interest in the outside union and
that, therefore, the union is an intermeddler causing more harm
than good and that the employer has, under these circumstances,
a right to interfere."5 The answer to this is that very often employees fear to take any steps which may cost them their livelihood. Thus, knowing that their employer is opposed to the
unionization of his plant, they may well hesitate to express any
views or take any steps that will conflict with the views held by
the employer. The result is an apparent indifference or seeming opposition to unionization on the part of the employees, a position adopted by them as the better part of valor under the circumstances. This argument does not, of course, apply in every such
situation, but has been true often enough to be taken into consideration by the courts. One of the real values of an outside union
lies in the fact that its representatives are not in a position to be
economically intimidated by a particular employer when conducting negotiations or making demands.69 Employers have been
0SKeith Theatre v. Vachon, (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692; Elkind
& Sons v. Retail Clerks' International P. Ass'n, (1933) 114 N. J. Eq. 586,
169 Atl. 494; 218-220 Market Street Corp. v. Delicatessen, etc., Local 410,

(1935) 118 N. J. Eq. 448, 179 Atl. 689, (in which 80 employees "voluntarily"

signed a statement that they "deeply resented" the efforts of an outside
union in trying to unionize their employer's business) ; Stuyvesant Lunch &
Bakery Corp. v. Reiner, (1920) 110 Misc. Rep. 357, 181 N. Y. S. 212;
Brace Bros. v. Evans, (1888) 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 163; Culinary Workers' -Union
No. 331 v. Fuller, (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 105 S. W. (2d) 295; United
States v. Haggerty, (N.D. W.Va. 1902) 116 Fed. 510, (illustrates clearly
the bias which underlies the decisions of many courts on this question);
Montgomery v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1923) 293 Fed.
680; cf., Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v. Furniture W. I. Union, (D. N.J.
1934), 8 F. Supp. 209, (in which the court holds that the Norris-La Guardia
Act prevents interference by federal courts in situations of the type under
consideration) ; Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union, Local No. 148,
(1935) 184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d) 372, (cf., dissenting opinion). But see,
Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, (1936) 155 Or. 652, 669, 63 P.
(2d) 1090; cf., however, Crouch v. Central Labor Council, (1930) 134 Or.
612, 292 Pac. 729, (decided prior to the enactment of the state NorrisLa Guardia Act); cf., also, Jefferson & Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks,
(1926) 287 Pa. St. 171, 134 At. 430; People v. Kostka, (1886) 4 N. Y.
Cr. Rep. 429, 434, (contains a strange statement which has been the foundation of a number of similar decisions-this case is no longer the law of New
York); Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Fed. of F. F. H. W., (1931)
305 Pa. St. 206, 229, 157 Atl. 588, (dissenting opinion of Maxey, J.) ; American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A., (1936) 222 Wis. 338, 268
N. W. 250, (the court's decision was based on the Wisconsin Labor Code.
O"Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, (1936) 155 Or. 652, 667,
63 P. (2d) 1090, ("The mere fact that the employees are not complaining
against the terms and conditions of employment under which they are working is not conclusive. In many instances where sweat shop conditions
prevail-although not in the instant cases-the employee, through the greed
and avarice of capital, is bound down in abject physical and mental slavery.
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quick to realize this, as is illustrated by the large number of instances in which we find individual employer-employee contracts
and company unions. If this were not so, how else explain these
phenomena? Why have not the courts been as quick to realize
the same thing? Instead, the courts have talked in terms of inalienable rights, natural rights, liberty of contract, and other
equally vague and abstract terms.
Many courts have puzzled over whether picketing should be
permitted where no strike exists. The question usually arises
when an outside union has undertaken to unionize a particular
shop against the employer's wishes. It has also arisen in cases
in which the strikers picket the business of a customer of the
employer, the customer having refused a request of the strikers
to cease dealing with the employer until the dispute between him
and his employees, the strikers, is settled, and in those cases in
which strikers picket the homes of non-striking or of strikebreaking employees. The argument against permitting picketing where there is no strike in progress is that picketing is a
concomitant of a strike. Therefore, to picket a shop at which no
strike exists is an anomaly and should be enjoined as unlawful,
regardless of the peacefulness of the picketing and the truth of the
contentions of the pickets.7 0 Every day thousands of people make
statements to friends and strangers about the service, merchandise and policy of particular establishments. Often these statements are not complimentary, but as long as they state the truth
they are not actionable. Suppose these people should undertake
to make these statements in close proximity to the establishments
they are referring to. This would not make these statements unlawful or actionable. Yet courts have held that men may not
confederate to make these statements as pickets. Why? As long
as they state the truth there can be no harm for which the law
will compensate. By the same token, equity should not interfere
by injunction.

".

.

. Picketing without a strike is no more unlaw-

ful than a strike without picketing." 71

To proscribe picketing

It is idle to talk about the protest of the individual laborer under such conditions. How can an employee exercise freedom of thought and expression
when hungry children are dependent upon him for support? Protest against
terms and conditions of employment with some employers simply means that
the wage earner goes home without a job. It is through concerted action
and collective bargaining that the laborer hopes for some semblance of
economic freedom.")
7OKeith Theatre v. Vachon, (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692; Feller v.
Local 144 International L. G. W. Union, (1937) 121 N. J. Eq. 452, 191
Atl. 111; Brown & Son v. Mine Workers, (1925) 25 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 485.
7'Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc. v. Kramberg, (1929) 134 Misc. Rep. 841,
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under these circumstances is to limit the right of free speech
guaranteed under the federal constitution and all of the state
constitutions.
The right to picket the place of business of a patron of the
employer who is engaged in a dispute either with his employees
or with an outside union also has been denied on the ground that
no labor dispute exists between the patron and the pickets, and
that such picketing is too indirect an approach to the objective.72
This type of picketing is a comparative newcomer in the methodology of conducting a labor controversy. It should not be condemned without serious consideration. Strictly speaking, the
customer of an employer is not a primary party involved in a
labor dispute between the employer and his employees. But in
dealing with the employer, is not the customer lending his aid,
albeit indirectly, to the employer? If the pickets do no more than
publicize the fact that the customer patronizes the employer
against whom a strike is being conducted, this is only stating a
fact, and is no more unlawful than such a statement would be if
made in one's home to family or guests. He who deals in the
goods or services of another who is beset with an industrial dispute
should be willing to accept the inconveniences which may be a
concomitant of that dispute. He is, in fact, involved in that dispute by his connection with the employer.1 3
The picketing of the home of a workman employed in a shop
at which a strike is in progress has been denied on the theory
that the workman has a right to be secure and unmolested in his
home in exactly the same manner as any other citizen not concerned with the strike.7 4 The same reasoning that applies to the
844, 237 N. Y. S. 76. Williams v. Quill, (1938) 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d)
547; Moreland Theatres Corp. v. Portland Moving Picture, etc., Union,
(1932) 140 Or. 35, 12 P. (2d) 333, (dissenting opinion of Belt, J.) See
also, Foster v. Retail Clerks' International Protective Ass'n, (1902) 39
Misc.72Rep. 48, 56, 78 N. Y. S. 860.

.Mears Slayton Lumber Co. v. District Council, (1910) 156 Ill. App.
327; Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper
Guild, (1938) 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199 Atl. 599; Mlle. Reif, Inc. v. Randau,
(1937) 166 Misc. Rep. 247, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 515; Parker Paint & Wall
Paper3 Co. v. Local Union No. 813, (1921) 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S. E. 911.
7 Engelmever & Simon, (1933) 148 Misc. Rep. 621, 265 N. Y. S. 636;
Manhattan Steam Bakery & Schindler, (1937) 294 N. Y. S. 783, 250 App.
Div, 467, 468; cf., Gertz v. Randau, (1937) 162 Misc. Rep. 786, 295 N. Y. S.
871, (which seems to be contra.) See also, MIle. Reif, Inc. v. Randau,
(1937) 166 Misc. Rep. 247, 248, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 515; cf., Goldfinger v. Fein-

tuch, 4(1937) 276 N. Y. 281, 286, 11 N. E. (2d) 910.
7 Davis v. State, (1928) 200 Ind. 88, 161 N. E. 375; Baltic Mining Co.
v. Houghton, Circuit Judge, (1913) 177 Mich. 632, 144 N. W. 209; International Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, (1938) 123 N. J. Eq. 172, 196 Atl. 474;

MINNESOTA

LAW

REVIEW

picketing of the shop itself and of the place of the business of the
patron of the shop should apply here. The picketing ought to
be permitted. An abuse of the privilege is always subject to the
remedial processes of the courts.
The use of peaceful persuasion by strikers has been the subject of much discussion. Strikers have now generally been conceded the right to persuade non-strikers to cease working and
to join with them, so long as they do not interfere with any contract relations between the non-striker and the employer; the
purpose of the strike is lawful; the motives are good; the strike is
justifiable; and the persuasion is peaceful.75 The same rules are
applied where the strikers attempt to persuade those seeking employment to discontinue their efforts in that direction, and where
persuasion is addressed to customers and the general public not
Murdock v. Walker, (1893) 152 Pa. St. 595, 25 Atl. 492; R. R. Kitchen &
Co. v. Local Union No. 141, (1922) 91 W. Va. 65, 112 S. E. 198.
75Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse, (1914) 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657;
Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture Machine Operators Local No. 170,
(1920) 282 Mo. 304, 221 S. W. 95; W. & A. Fletcher Co. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists, (N.J. 1903) 55 Atl. 1077; Bayer v. Brotherhood of
Painters, (1931) 108 N. J. Eq. 257, 154 Atl. 759; cf., Johnston Harvester
Company v. Meinhardt, (1880) 60 How. Prac. 168, 172, 175; Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, (1916) 174 App. Div. 244, 160 N. Y. S. 279; Statler
Co. v. Employees' Alliance, (1914) 19 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 375, 27 Ohio Dec.
N. P. 178; American Fed. of Labor v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., (1909)
33 App. D. C. 83. See, however, F. C. Church Shoe Co. v. Turner, (1926)
218 Mo. App. 516, 279 S. W. 232; Connett v. United Hatters of North
America, (1909) 76 N. J. Eq. 202, 74 Atl. 188.
Southern California Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, (1921)
186 Cal. 604, 200 Pac. 1; Levy & Devaney v. International Pocketbook W.
Union, (1932) 114 Conn. 319, 158 Atl. 795; Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin &
Machine Works, (1908) 131 Ga. 336, 340, 62 S. E. 236, ("In many cases it
may be difficult to draw the line of demarcation between intimidation and
inoffensive persuasion") ; Burgess v. Georgia, (1918) 148 Ga. 417, 96 S.
E. 865; Minnesota Stove Co. v. Cavanaugh, (1915) 131 Minn. 458, 155 N. W.
638; Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1922) 151
Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781; Berry Foundry Co. v. International Moulders'
Union, (1914) 177 Mo. App. 84, 164 S. W. 245; Forstmann & Huffmann Co.
v. United Front C. of T. Workers, (1926) 99 N. J. Eq. 23Q, 133 At. 202;
cf., Frank v. Herold, (1901) 63 N. J. Eq. 443, 52 Atl. 152, (in which the
strikers were told to hire a hall and do their persuading there) ; Machinery
Co. v. Toohey, (1921) 114 Misc. Rep. 185, 186 N. Y. S. 95; Citizens' Co. v.
Asheville Typographical Union, (1924) 187 N. C. 42, 121 S. E. 31; Statler
Co. v. Employees' Alliance, (1914) 19 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 375, 27 Ohio
Dec. N. P. 178; La France Co. v. Electrical Workers, (1923) 108 0. S. 61,
140 N. E. 899; Kirmse v. Adler, (1933) 311 Pa. St. 78, 166 Atl. 566;
Levering v. Garrigues Co. v. Morin, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 284,

(under the Norris-La Guardia Act can encourage others to refuse to work) ;

Everett Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, (1906) 105 Va.
188, 53 S. E. 273; Pacific Coast Coal Co. v. Dist. No. 10, U. M. W. A.,
(1922) 122 Wash. 423, 210 Pac. 953. See, however, Sherry v. Perkins,
(1888) 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307, (the carrying of banners with inscriptions which were not false and which did not disparage the employer, was
prohibited.)
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to deal with the employer. Some jurisdictions have extended
these same rights to outside unions in their attempt to organize
76
a nonunion plant under similar conditions.
What does a court mean when it uses the term "peaceful persuasion ?" Again, like much of the terminology used in the field
of labor disputes, the term "peaceful persuasion" can mean and has
meant many different things to many different courts. Under a
strict construction, it has been held that men have a right to be
on the streets or in their homes without being molested by others.
Thus, if the person to whom the argument is being directed indicates an unwillingness to listen, or signifies that he is not convinced, he is not to be disturbed further no matter how peaceful.
the persuasive attempts may be. A second effort to persuade such
a person is construed by strict constructionist courts as an interference with the right of the individual to go freely about his
business. 77 Those courts which adopt a liberal view hold that
76
Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, (1920) 188 Ky.
477, 222 S. W. 1079; Schuster v. International Ass'n of Machinists, (1937)
293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50; International Pocketbook Workers'
Union v. Orlove, (1930) 158 Md. 496, 501, 148 AtI. 826; Commonwealth v.
Hunt, (1842) 4 Metc. (Mass.) 111; Beck v. Teamsters' Protective Union,
(1898) 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13; Johnston Harvester Company v. Meinhardt, (1880 N. Y.) 60 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 168, (an excellent decision);
Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, (1928) 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E.
863; O'Keefe v. Local 463, (1938) 277 N. Y. 300, 308, 14 N. E. (2d) 77,
("This court has frequently sustained the right of labor unions to interfere
by lawful means between an employer and his employees who are not members of the union where the purpose of such interference is solely to advance
the interest of the members of the union. We have not been oblivious of the
consequent hardship imposed, at times, upon individual employers or employees, but for hardship to the individual resulting from action reasonably
calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means the courts can give

no redress . . ."); Iron Molders' Union v. Greenwald Co., (1906) 4 Ohio
N. P. (N.S.) 161, 16 Ohio Dec. 678, (as long as no contract is violated) ;
Bomes v. Providence Local, No. 223, (1931) 51 R. I. 499, 155 At. 581;
Gassaway v. Borderland Coal Corp., (C.C.A. 7th Circ. 1921) 278 Fed.
56; L. L. Coryell & Son v. Petroleum Workers Union, (D. Minn. 1936) 19
F. Supp. 749, (decided on basis of Norris-La Guardia Act). Cf., however,
Moore v. Cooks', Waiters', etc., Union No. 402, (1919) 39 Cal. App. 538,
179 Pac. 417. See also, McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., (1921) 151
Ga. 776, 108 S. E. 226, (the court expressed concern lest the employees join
the union in such large numbers as would force the employer to consent to
the unionizing of its plants or would render it impossible to continue the
operation of its business) ; Nusbaum v. Retail Clerks' International Protective Ass'n, (1922) 227 IIl. App. 206; Machine & Iron Co. v. Willard, (1922)
242 Mass. 566, 136 N. E. 629, (the court held it unlawful to persuade employees under contract). But see, Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Fed.
of F. F. H. V.. (1931) 305 Pa. St. 206, 157 Atl. 588, (dissenting opinion
of Maxey,
J.)
*7 Keuffel & Esser v. International Ass'n of Machinists, (1922) 93 N. J.
Eq. 429, 116 At. 9, (cf., the dissenting opinion) ; Mills v. United States
Printing Co., (1904) 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. S. 185, 187; -Union Pacific
R. Co. v. Reuf, (D. Neb. 1902) 120 Fed. 102; American Steel Foundries v.
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the strikers or outside union organizers may try their hands at
persuasion as often as they think necessary and may even visit
the homes or places of business of the men they are trying to
convince of the validity of their cause.78 It has been well said
that
"fair, vigorous and repeated argument is legitimate. Repeated, for what fails to convince today may succeed on rehearing
tomorrow, even in a supreme court.. .. Human nature is everybe earnest, enthusiastic,
where alike, and every man is or ought' 7to
9
and fearless in his own, if good, cause.
Strikers and union organizers, so long as they do not trespass upon the property of the employer and so long as they do
not resort to conscious fraudulent statements, ought to be allowed to exercise their persuasive powers upon patrons, employees
and the general public alike. There can be no real harm in permitting a free discussion even though repeated many times. The
harm is in stifling argument, as this often leads those suppressed
into undesirable channels to achieve their ends.
Tied up with the quiestion of persuasion is the matter of the
use of publicity both by strikers and by outside unions. The
courts have treated this subject in much the same manner as they
have treated the question of persuasion. The problem is essentially the same and, therefore, the same rule that applies to persuasion should apply here. 80
Tri-City Central Trades Council, (1921) 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72,
66 L. Ed. 189. See also, Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union No.
125, (E.D. Wis. 1906) 150 Fed. 155, 162.
Northern Ry. Co. v. Local, (D. Mont. 1922) 283 F. 557.
78Great
79
1922) 283 F. 557, 563.
8 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Local, (D.Mont.
OTruax v. Bisbee Local No. 380, (1918) 19 Ariz. 379, 389, 171 Pac.
121; Jones v. State, (1926) 170 Ark. 863, 281 S. W. 663; J.F. Parkinson
Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, (1908) 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027, (contains
a discussion of the use of the word "unfair.") ; cf., Moore v. Cooks', Waiters', No. 31, (1935) 2 Cal. (2d) 312, 41 Pac. (2d) 314, (type of publicity used
was held unlawful) ; Paramount Enterprises v. Mitchell, (1932) 104 Fla.
407, 140 So. 328; Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local No. 782,
(1922) 35 Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132; American Cigar Co. v. Berger, (1921)
221 Ill. App. 332, (publicity used was held an act in contempt of the court's
injunctive order); Vulcan Detinning Co. v. St. Clair, (1924) 315 Ill. 40.
145 N. E. 657, (publicity used was held lawful) ; Schuster v. International
Ass'n of Machinists, (1937) 293 Ill. App. 177, 193, 194, 12 N. E. (2d) 50,
(contains an excellent statement) ; Ellis v. Journeyman Barbers' (1922) 194
Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111; My Maryland Lodge v. Adt., (1905) 100 Md.
238, 59 Atl. 721; Martineau v. Foley, (1918) 231 Mass. 220, 120 N. E. 445, (in
which the publication of false statements by the union about the employer
was deprecated by the court) ; Beck v. Teamsters' Protective Union, (1898)
118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13; Steffes v. Motion Picture Machine Operators'
Union, (1917) 136 Minn. 200, 161 N. W. 524, (the court discusses conditions
under which the use of the word "unfair" is lawful and when it is unlawful); Ex parte Heffron, (1914) 179 Mo. App. 639, 657, 162 S.W. 652;
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THE CLOSED SHOP

The struggle for the "closed shop," so-called, has received
varied treatment at the hands of the courts. There are two phases
to the problem. One of these is the attempt to unionize the business of an individual employer without any relation to the rest
of the industry of which this business may be a part. The other
phase is the attempt to unionize one or more shops in the same
industry as a part of a plan to unionize an entire industry in the
same locality or in a larger area. Some courts have made a distinction between the two situations, holding the first a lawful
purpose and the second unlawful. A clear statement of this position is found in Four Plating Co. v. Mlako, in which the court lays
down the principle that
"a distinction must be drawn between a closed shop in a single
factory, or group of factories, and a closed shop in substantially
an entire industry throughout a considerable area. And in the
latter case there is the further distinction between a closed shop
sought by a union as a protective measure, and one sought in
order to create a monopoly of labor. By the great weight of
authority, the last case is held to be contrary to public policy. As
to the question of a closed shop in substantially an entire industry,
based on motives intrinsically self-protective, the authorities are
conflicting. But the decisions are almost unanimous that a closed
shop in a single factory is consonant with public policy and

lawful." 81

Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed. of Labor, (1908) 37 Mont. 264, 276, 96

Pac. 127; Iverson v. Dilno, (1911) 44 Mont. 270, 111 Pac. 719, (use of
"unfair" upheld); Thomson Machinery Co. v. Brown, (1918) 89 N. J. Eq.
238, 108 Atl. 116; Perfect Laundry Co. v. Marsh, (1936) 120 N. J. Eq. 508,
186 AtI. 470; Federal Hats v. Golden, (1928) 223 App. Div. 701, 226 N. Y. S.
747; Nann v. Raimist, (1931) 255 N. Y. 307, 317, 174 N. E. 690; A. S. Beck
Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, (1934) 153 Misc. Rep. 363, 365, 274 N. Y. S. 946,
("False and misleading statements and representations made in the course
of peaceful picketing will likewise be enjoined"); McCormick v. Local
Union, (1911) 13 Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 545, 32 Ohio C. C. 165, (type of
publicity used was held bad); Driggs Dairy Farms v. Milk Drivers', etc.,
Union No. 361, (1935) 49 Ohio App. 303, 197 N. E. 250, (it was held that
a union could not publicize a violation by an employer of section 7 (a) of
the N. I. R. A., that that was the province of the public authorities) ; cf.,
Bernstein v. Cleaners & Dyers Ass'n, (1934) 31 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 433;
Bomes v. Providence Local, No. 223, (1931) 51 R. I. 499, 155 Atl. 581,
(dissenting opinion of Hahn, J.) ; United Chain Theatres v. Philadelphia
Moton Picture M. U. Union, (E.D. Pa. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 189; Levering &
Garrigues Co. v. Morin, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 284, (Under
the Norris La Guardia Act can give publicity to the facts in the controversy); Zaat v. Building Trades Council, (1933) 172 Wash. 445, 20 P.

(2d) 589, (Syll. 5: "Publication in union paper that proprietor of plumbing

shop was unfair to plumbing union held not actionable where dispute between
union and proprietor was pending"); Kimbel v. Lumber & Saw Mill Workers Union, (1937) 189 Wash. 416, 65 P. (2d) 1066.
81(1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 298, 300, 194 Atl. 53. Connors v. Connolly,
(1913) 86 Conn. 641, 86 AtI. 600, (held that unionization of an entire indus-
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The distinction here made by the court is based on whether or
not a monopoly would be created by a recognition of the demand
of the union. A number of jurisdictions have, however, refused
to make any such distinction. They hold that in any case a demand
for a closed shop is unlawful because its fulfillment would affect
the freedom of other individuals to pursue their lawful trades or
businesses without interference. 82
In the case of a demand for a closed shop in an entire industry or in an entire locality, the argument that such a shop would
prevent a nonunion workman or a member of a rival union from
obtaining employment in that industry, has some validity.83 When
the demand concerns only a single factory and the rest of the
industry is not unionized, it seems difficult to understand how a
monopoly will result. The argument seems based upon an ostensible desire to prevent an effective trade union movement, and
try of any considerable proportions in the community is bad); Baldwin

Lumber Co. v. Local No. 560, (1920) 91 N. J. Eq. 240, 109 Atl. 147, (an

attempt to unionize an entire industry in a county was held bad) ; Jordan's
Wearing Apparel v. Retail Sales C. Union, (N. J. 1937) 193 AtI. 806, (a
demand for a closed shop in one plant was held unlawful) ; see also, Canter
Sample Furniture House v. Retail Furniture E. L. No. 109, (1937) 122
N. J. Eq. 575, 591, 579, 196 Atl. 210; Polk v. Cleveland Ry. Co., (1925)
20 Ohio App. 317, 321, 151 N. E. 808. Cf., Exchange Bakery & Restaurant,
Inc. 82
v. Rifkin, (1927) 245 N. Y. 260, 263, 157 N. E. 130.
Sarros v. Nouris, (1927) 15 Del. Ch. 391, 138 AtI. 607; Keith Theatre
v. Vachon, (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692; Bausch Machine Tool Co. v.
Hill, (1918) 231 Mass. 30, 120 N. E. 188; cf., however, Armstrong Cork
& Insulation Co. v. Walsh, (1931) 276 Mass. 263, 177 N. E. 2; Roraback
v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1918) 140 Minn. 481, 168
N. W. 766, (an attempt to prevent the owner of a one employee business
from working is unlawful); Hoban v. Dempsey, (1914) 217 Mass. 166,
104 N. E. 717, (a strike or other compulsion exercised for the purpose of
obtaining a closed shop is unlawful but a voluntary and unforced agreement
for a closed shop is valid; cf., however, Zaat v. Building Trades Council,
(1933) 172 Wash. 445, 20 P. (2d) 589; Wasilewski v. Bakers' Union, Local
No. 64, (1935) 118 N. J. Eq. 349, 179 Atl. 284; International Ticket Co. v.
Wendrich, (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 222, 193 Atl. 808; cf., Bayonne Textile
Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers (1934), 116 N. J. Eq. 146, 157, 172
Atl. 551; Four Plating Co. v. Mako, (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 298, 301, 194 Atl.
53, (the court does not quite agree with the reasoning in the Hoban Case,
supra, with reference to the so-called compulsion of the employer. "Complainant argues that while an employer may, of his own free will, employ
only union men, and while he may voluntarily enter into a contract with the
union to that end, yet the union cannot 'compel' him to do so. Of course not.
Neither can it compel him to raise wages or shorten hours, and enter into
any contract whatever.

What is meant by 'compel'? . . . A labor union

offers an employer alternatives-higher wages, shorter hours, and a closed
shop, or a strike. He weighs the situation and chooses; in a legal sense, he
is not compelled.") See also, Freed & Co. v. Doe, (1935) 154 Misc. Rep.
644, 649, 278 N. Y. S. 68, (held that a closed shop demand made upon an
employer
of salespeople is unlawful).
83Connors v. Connolly, (1913) 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600. Cf., Williams
v. Quill, (1938) 277 N. Y. 1, 9, 12 N. E. (2d) 547; see also, O'Keefe v.
Local 463, (1938) 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77.
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the monopoly contention does not ring true in view of the usual
set of facts in this type of case.
The same diversity of opinion and the same reasoning which
has been noted in connection with attempts by unions to obtain a
closed shop also has been applied to agreements between employers and unions providing for a dosed shop. 4 There has been
a widespread misunderstanding of the reasons why unions find
it almost imperative to seek a closed shop.
The primary purpose of a trade union is the economic advancement of its members. Therefore, its efforts -naturally are bent
toward this goal. It is obvious that a shop in which the employees are partly union and partly nonunion is of little benefit
to the union. Such a situation permits the employer gradually
to replace the union employees with nonunion employees should
he find it to his benefit to do so. Such a division of strength
makes it a comparatively simple matter to sap the economic
strength of the union employees. The advantage is decidedly with
the employer. In a word, a shop in which the employees are both
union and nonunion is an open shop, with all of the advantages for
the employer and all of the disadvantages for the employees that
an open shop usually connotes. The end result can only mean
defeat and disintegration for the union. This is even more true
in the case of an entire industry throughout the country or of
an entire industry in a particular locality. One nonunion or open
shop employer in an industry which is otherwise unionized can
speedily demoralize that industry and destroy the uiion. While
the closed shop employers are bound by wage and hour agree8

4In the following cases closed shop contracts between employer and
union have been held illegal: Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Refining Works, (1920) 92 N. J. Eq. 131, 111 Atl. 376; Polk v.
Cleveland Ry. Co., (1925) 20 Ohio App. 317, 151 N. E. 808, (the contract
was held unlawful because it resulted in a monopoly).
In the following cases closed shop contracts between employer and union

have been held valid: Connors v. Connolly, (1913) 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl.

600, (the court indicates that if the question were before it it would probably
hold the contract valid if it did not affect a large sector of an industry or
an entire locality) ; Tracy v. Osborne, (1917) 226 Mass. 25, 114 N. E. 959:
cf., New England Wood Heel Co. v. Nolan, (1929) 268 Mass. 191, 167
N. E. 323; Smith v. Bowen, (1919) 232 Mass. 106, 121 N. E. 814, (a strike
to enforce a closed shop agreement was held legal but a strike in pursuance
of a closed shop demand without any such agreement was held illegal) ;
Williams v. Quill, (1938) 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d) 547; Local Branch v.
Solt, (1918) 8 Ohio App. 437, 28 Ohio C. C. 501; Powers v. journeymen
Bricklayers' Union No. 3, (1914) 130 Tenn. 643, 172 S. W. 284; National
Fireproofing Co. v. Mason. (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1909), 169 Fed. 259, 264: M. &
M. Wood Working Co., Inc. v. Plywood & Veneer Workers, (D. Or. 1938)
23 F. Supp. 11.
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ments with the union, the open shop employer may, because of his
superior bargaining power over his unorganized employees, force
down their wages and increase the number of working hours until he is in a position to undersell the closed shop establishments.
Such a situation cannot long exist. Eventually the union employers will rebel at the loss of business, and an effort will be
made either to force the union to reduce the standards attained, or
to oust it. Clearly a union which desires to justify itself must
sooner or later seek a closed shop. Experience indicates that no
union ever has successfully maintained itself over a long period
of time against the competition of nonunion or open shop employees.15
The argument sometimes is advanced that to permit a closed
shop is to permit the union to dominate and dictate the policies
8
-cofes v. Helmar, (1933) 205 Ind. 596, 187 N. E. 662; Ellis v.
Journeyman Barbers', (1922) 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111, (here is an
example of a situation which might easily lead to the destruction of the
union involved because other barber shops might be forced to discard union
employees and rules in order to compete with the complainant) ; see, Moore
Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy, (1923) 243 Mass. 554, 137 N. E. 919, (a
good example of what can happen to a union where conditions are such as
to sap its effectiveness) ; Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, (1928)
247 N. Y. 65, 79, 159 N. E. 863; see, Albro J. Newton Co. v. Erickson,
(1911) 70 Misc. Rep. 291, 127 N. Y. S. 949, (in which the point here made
is well illustrated but the court went off on a tangent caused by an overstressing of the rights of property); Goldfinger v. Feintuch, (1937) 276
N. Y. 281, 286, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, ("Where a manufacturer pays less than
union wages, both it and the retailers who sell its products are in a position
to undersell competitors who pay the higher scale and this may result in
unfair reduction of the wages of union members") ; Foundry Co. v. Molders'
Union, (1917) 20 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 161, 175, 28 Ohio Dec. N. P. 605;
Fuke v. Schwartz, (1931) 28 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 407, 410; Geo. B. Wallace
Co. v. International Ass'n (1936) 155 Or. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090. Cf., the
following cases: International Organization v. Red Jacket C. C. & C. Co.,
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 839; Duplex Co. v. Deering, (1921) 254
U. S.443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349; Foundries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council, (1921) 257 U. S.184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189; AlcoZander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, (E.D. Pa. 1929) 35 F. (2d)
203. In each of these cases it is quite obvious that the union was being
placed in a dangerously precarious position because of nonunion competition,
yet the courts prevented action by the unions to rectify the situation. Why?
See, Folsom v. Lewis, (1911) 208 Mass. 336, 338, 94 N. E. 316, ("Strengthening the forces of a labor union to put it in a better condition to enforce its
claims in controversies that may afterwards arise with employers, is not
enough to justify an attack upon the business of an employer by inducing
his employees to strike.")
In the following cases the closed shop demand was held lawful: Kemp
v. Division No. 241, (1912) 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389; International Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove, (1930) 158 Md. 496, 148 Ati. 826; Williams v. Quill, (1938) 277 N. Y. 1, 7, 12 N. E. (2d) 547; Harper v. Local
Union No. 520, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 48 S.W. (2d) 1033; Allis-Chalmers
Co. v. Iron Molders' Union No. 125, (E.D. Wis. 1906) 150 Fed. 155; Gill
Engraving Co. v. Doerr, (S.D. N.Y. 1914) 214 Fed. 111.
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which the employer must follow in conducting his business.80 It is
also said to be an unwarranted interference with the employer's
right, sometimes called inalienable, sometimes natural, and sometimes constitutional, to conduct his business without interference.8 7
Some courts have held that a closed shop interferes with the employer's right to the free flow of labor."8 These arguments have
no foundation in fact, and no reported case indicates sufficient
facts upon which any court has been justified in making such
assertions.
In many of the cases in which a closed shop is demanded or a
closed shop contract is entered into, nonunion workmen find
themselves facing the loss of their jobs, except in those instances
where the union is willing or the contract provides that they may
join the union within a specified period of time. The courts have
been divided by two conflicting points of view with the more
liberal approach slowly gaining the ascendancy. The older and
conservative view is that, although men have a right to organize
into labor unions, they have no right to insist that others must
do so. It is held that the refusal of any man to join the union
should not result in the loss of his right to labor. The view expressed by these courts has also been maintained even though the
nonunion employees are given an opportunity to join the union."
80
State v. Glidden, (1887) 55 Conn. 46, 8 Atl. 890; Sarros v. Nouris,

(1927) 15 Del. Ch. 391, 138 Atl. 607; Canter Sample Furniture House v.
Retail Furniture E. L. No. 109, (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 575, 196 Atl. 210;
Commonwealth v. Curran, (1869) 3 Pittsburgh Rep. (Pa.) 143; In re,
Higgins, (N.D. Tex., 1886) 27 Fed. 443; United States v. Weber, (W.D.
Va. 1902) 114 Fed. 950; Everett Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical
Union, (1906) 105 Va. 188, 53 S. E. 273. Contra: J. F. Parkinson Co. v.
Bldg. Trades Council, (1908) 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027. See also, Empire
Theatre Co. v. Cloke, (1917) 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107, (the court presents
a wholesome discussion of this contention and indicates its weakness and
invalidity
as a contention.)
87
Canter Sample Furniture House v. Retail Furniture, etc., Local No.
109, (1927) 122 N. J. Eq. 575, 196 Atl. 210.
18Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, (1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 Atl.
230; see also, Booth & Brother v. Burgess, (1906) 72 N. 3. Eq. 181, 194, 65
Atl. 226; cf., Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1908)89 166 Fed. 45, 49.
Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local No. 782, (1922) 35
Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132; Sutton v. Workmeister, (1911) 164 Ill. App. 105;
Keith Theatre v. Vachon, (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692; United Shoe
Machinery Corp. v. Fitzgerald, (1921) 237 Mass. 537, 130 N. E. 86;
Stuyvesant Lunch & Bakery Corp. v. Reiner, (1920) 110 Misc. Rep. 357,
181 N. Y. S. 212, (this case is probably no longer the law in New York
but it serves to illustrate the point) ; The Dayton Manufacturing Co. v.
The Metal Polishers, etc., Union, (1901) 8 Ohio N. P. 574, 11 Ohio Dec.
N. P. 643: see also, Tobin v. Shapiro, (Pa. 1938). Labor and Unemployment Insurance Service, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 19583: Donnelly Garment Co.
v. International Ladies' Garment Workers, (W.D. Mo. 1937) 21 F. Supp.
807; Crump v. Commonwealth, (1888) 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 620, (this case in-
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The courts which support this contention have held that an attempt to obtain a closed shop is an illegal conspiracy2 0 The liberal and better view is that if the demand is not for the sole purpose of preventing nonunion employees from working, and if
the employment of the nonunion employees is terminable at will,
neither the employer nor the nonunion employees have a cause of
action against the union either because of the demand for a closed
shop or because the employer has acceded to the demand. The
situation is treated as a case of legitimate competition between the
Thus, where the employees of
union and nonunion workmen.'
dicates the dangers of this position. It can easily be perverted into a club
against trade unionism). See, however, McNally v. Reynolds, (W.D. Wash.
1934) 7 F. Supp. 112. See also, American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. &
H. of A., (1936) 222 Wis. 338, 370, 268 N. W. 250, (the court, in discussing
the Wisconsin Labor Code, said: "The law plainly protects not the unorganized individuals constituting the employees, but the right of employees to act
in groups or associations. It deals with the collective effort of employees to
better their conditions, and it is only their activities in this direction that are
brought within the protection of the statute. The right of employees not to
organize and not to name bargaining agents is neither fostered nor protected.
Where the employees have neither organized and named their bargaining
representatives nor taken any steps so to organize, we see nothing in the act
which prohibits the employer selecting their bargaining agent by contract
with a labor union which is not subject to his domination. Such a step
rather than defeats the purpose of the code.")
promotes
9
OMoore v. Cooks', Waiters' & Waitresses' Union No. 402, (1917) 39
Cal. App. 538, 179 Pac. 417; Sutton v. Workmeister, (1911) 164 Ill. App.
105; Mayo v. Dean, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 554. Contra: J. F.
Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, (1908) 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac.
1027; George J. Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council,
(1917)
136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520.
91
Harmon v. United Mine Workers, (1924) 166 Ark. 255, 266 S.W.
84; Greenwood v. Building Trades Council, (1925) 71 Cal. App. 159, 233
Pac. 823; Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers', etc., Local Union No.
1, (1917) 92 Conn. 161, 101 A. 659; Kemp v. Division No. 241, (1912) 255
Ill. App. 213, 99 N. E. 389; Clemitt v. Watson, (1895) 14 Ind. App. 38,
42 N. E. 367; Minasian v. Osborne, (1911) 210 Mass. 250, 96 N. E. 1036;
Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663;
Construction Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades Council, (1917) 136 Minn.
167, 161 N. W. 520; cf., Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators'
Union, (1918) 140 Minn. 481, 486, 168 N. W. 766; State v. Employers of
Labor, (1918) 102 Neb. 768, 169 N. W. 717; Cyrus Currier & Sons v. International Molders' Union, (1921) 93 N. J.Eq. 61, 115 Atl. 66; Williams
v. Quill, (1938) 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d) 547; O'Keefe v. Local 463,
(1938) 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77; Parker v. The Bricklayers' Union
No. 1, (1889) 21 Ohio Law Bull. 223, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 458; Graves v.
McNulty, (1912) 13 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 110, 22 Ohio Dec. N. P. 425;
Duplex Co. v. Deering, (1921) 254 U. S.443, 480, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L.
Ed. 349, (dissenting opinion, Brandeis, J.) ; Levering & Garrigues Co. v.
Morrin, (C.C.A. 2d. Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 284. See also, Picket v. Walsh,
(1906) 192 Mass. 572, 582, 78 N. E. 753, (".... it is not legal even where he
wishes to do so, for an employer to agree with a union to discharge a nonunion workman for an arbitrary cause at the request of the union . .. A

fortiori a labor union cannot by a strike refuse to work with another workman for an arbitrary cause"); Davis v. United Portable Hoisting Engineers,
(1898) 28 App. Div. 396, 51 N. Y. S. 180; see also, People v. McFarlin,
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an establishment are both union and nonunion, it has been held
that the union employees may lawfully refuse to work with their
co-employees because they are objectionable to them, provided
their refusal does not violate their contracts with their employer,
and the employer has been held to be justified in discharging the
objectionable employees under these circumstances. The ground
for the objection by the union employees need not be stated. The
discharged employees are without recourse at law or in equity
unless a contract has been breached by their discharge.9 2
Since trade unions, being voluntary associations, may refuse
admission to membership without liability to the individual so
refused, it can be argued with some cogency that they would not
need to offer membership to nonunion employees, and still not
incur any liability to the nonunion workmen who may be discharged. The difficulty is that many courts would be prone to
construe such a situation as indicating that the real purpose of
the union was that of depriving the nonunion workmen of their
means of livelihood rather than that of seeking to better the
economic position of the union members, and that, therefore, the
action of the union was unlawful. The fact that an offer is made
by the union to admit the nonunion employees to union membership has been held by these courts to indicate that the purpose of
the union is justifiable because it is seeking the betterment of its
members. 3 The distinction does not seem to be warranted. In
(1904) 43 Misc. Rep. 591, 89 N. Y. S. 527.

Contra: Berry v. Donovan,

(1905) 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603; The State v. Donaldson, (1867) 32
N. J. L. 151; Kealey v. Faulkner, (1908) 7 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 49, 18 Ohio
Dec. 02N. P. 498.
See Notes 23, 75, 91, supra.
'-3 Schuster v. International Ass'n of Machinists, (1937) 293 Ill. App.

177, 200, 12 N. E. (2d) 50; Show v. Wheeler, (1873) 113 Mass. 179, 186,

(". . . the right of the members to instruct whom they choose in the mysteries of their trade cannot be denied"); Shinsky v. O'Neil, (1919) 232
Mass. 99, 121 N. E. 790; Mayer v. Journeymen Stone-Cutters' Ass'n, (1890)
47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 At. 492, (a trade union may require such qualifications
for membership and such formalities of election as it chooses) ; Cameron v.
International Alliance, (1935) 118 N. J. Eq. 11, 176 Atl. 692, (a trade union
may restrict its membership) ; Mills v. United States Printing Co., (1904)
99 App. Div. 605, 613, 91 N. Y. S. 185; cf., Park v. Hotel, etc. Employees,
(1919) 22 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 257, 30 Ohio Dec. N. P. 64; Miller v. Ruehl,
(1938) 166 Misc. Rep. 479, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 394; Longshore Printing &
Publishing Co. v. Howell, (1894) 26 Or. 527, 38 Pac. 547; Sheehan v.
Levy, (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) 215 S. W. 229; cf., however, Greenwood v.
Building Trades Council, (1925) 71 Cal. App. 159, 172, 233 Pac. 823. But
see, Sutton v. Workmeister, (1911) 164 Ill. App. 105; Fairbanks v. McDonald, (1914) 219 Mass. 291, 106 N. E. 1000; Kealey v. Faulkner, (1908)
7 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 49, 18 Ohio Dec. N. P. 498.
Where a union member fails to pay his dues and is dropped from union
membership as a result, it has been held that the union may attempt to corn-
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the vast majority of these cases, the purpose of the demand or the
contract is to strengthen the position of the union, which can then
advance the economic position of its members. If unions may
refuse admission to their membership rolls, they should be privileged to do so under any circumstances, not even excepting the
situation now under consideration. To hold otherwise is to read
into the purpose of a union motives which do not exist. It is a
rare case in which a union's purpose can truly be said to be, primarily, injury to an individual in his trade or business, and, secondarily, the betterment of its own members.
An analogous situation exists when a union intent upon forcing an employer into a closed shop agreement has ordered its members not to work on the same job with nonunion workmen, or not
to work with materials fabricated or delivered by nonunion workmen. The best examples occur most often in the building construction industry, in which union workmen have threatened to
stop or have stopped working because a sub-contractor employs
nonunion mechanics or because some of the materials to be incorporated into the building were made or handled by nonunion
workmen. The division of opinion in the reported decisions is
sharp. Such threats to strike or such strikes have been enjoined
as interfering with the free flow of labor to the employer, as attempting to create a monopoly in the labor market unlawfully
depriving the nonunion workman of his constitutional right of
liberty and property, as an illegal conspiracy, as an interference
with interstate commerce, as a boycott, and many other equally
heinous offenses. 94 However, a number of courts have held that
a threat to strike or a strike for such a purpose is within the
bounds of lawful action. The steps taken or threatened to be
taken are clearly within the realm of labor competition, and for
the obvious purpose of bettering the condition and bargaining
power of the members of the union.- The means and methods
pel the closed shop employer to discharge that employee for that reason. See,
McCormick v. Local Union, (1911) 13 Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 545, 32 Ohio
C. C. 165.
That an employer does not require an employee to join a company union
as a condition of obtaining employment is sufficient ground to deny relief
to an outside union whose members had been employed and discharged to
make way for a contract with a company controlled union. See, Sherman v.
Abeles,
94 (1934) 265 N. Y. 383, 193 N. E. 241.
Blandford v. Duthie, (1925) 147 Md. 388, 128 Atl. 138; Armstrong
Cork & Insulation Co. v. Walsh, (1931) 276 Mass. 263, 177 N. E. 2. Contra:
Meir v. Spear, (1910) 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988; J. F. Parkinson Co. v.
Building Trades Council, (1908) 154 Cal. 581, 98 P. 1027.
95Meir v. Spear, (1910) 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988; J. F. Parkinson
Co. v. Building Trades Council, (1908) 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027; Kemp
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used in conducting such a strike should, however, meet the same
requirements as in a strike for any other lawful purpose. Violence, coercion and intimidation must not be among the means
adopted. ' The limitation against the violation of existing contracts between the nonunion employees and their employers also
has been applied to this situation, even by those courts which hold
97
the action under consideration lawful.

As a general thing, trade union regulations and rules provide
that the members may not work with nonunion workmen or on
materials made or handled by nonunion workmen. The executive
heads are, usually, given the authority to order a strike when
such a situation is found to exist and remains unremedied. A
few courts have extended the strong arm of the injunction either
to prevent the ordering of such a strike or to prevent its- continuance if called. The reasoning behind such an exercise of the
injunctive power is indefensible, and is clearly a meddling with the
internal regulations of the union, which are, in themselves, quite
within the realm of lawful action. When a man joins the union
he consents to be governed by its rules and regulations. In obeying the call of the union official to cease working, he is only doing what he voluntarily agreed to do when he joined the union.
Thus it is not quite logical to say that he has been coerced into
striking. Yet these courts hold that the calling of such a strike
in accordance with the regulations of the union is in the exercise
of a coercive and intimidating influence upon the members of the
union, and, therefore, illegal and enjoinable. 8
v. Division No. 241, (1912) 255 Ill. 313, 99 N. E. 389; Ryan v. Hayes,
(1922) 243 Mass. 168, 137 N. E. 344; Iayer v. Journeymen Stone-Cutters'
Ass'n, (1890) 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 531, 20 At!. 492; Jersey City Printing Co.
v. Cassidy, (1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 Atl. 230; Bossert v. Dhuy, (1917)
221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582; Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co.,
WC.C.A. 7th Cir. 1908) 166 Fed. 45. Contra: Purvis v. Local No. 500,
(1906) 214 Pa. St. 348, 63 Atl. 585; Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1930) 40 F. (2d) 189; cf.. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, (C.C.A.
2d. Cir., 1934) 71 F. (2d) 284.
The same right was allowed to employers in Atkins v. Fletcher Co.,
(1903) 65 N. J. Eq. 658, 55 Atl. 1074.
0J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, (1908) 154 Cal. 581,
98 Pac. 1027; People v. Harris, (Colo. 1937). Labor and Unemployment
Insurance Service, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 19551.
9'7Commonwealth v. Hunt, (1842) 4 Metc. (Mass.) 111. Cf., Church
Shoe Co. v. Turner, (1926) 218 Mo. App. 516, 279 S. W. 232, (it was held
lawful for a union to attempt to persuade employees to leave their employ
in violation of a contract between the union to which the employees belonged
and the employer.)
-,Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Refining Works,
(1920) 92 N. J. Eq. 131, 111 Atl. 376; Yates Hotel Co. v. Meyers, (1922)
195 N. Y. S. 558. See also, Journeymen v. Master Horseshoers, (1912) 13
Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 297, 23 Ohio Dec. N. P. 338, (an employers' association,
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"PUBLIC INTEREST" EMPLOYERS

There are two other fact situations which, although they come
within the same classification, should be mentioned specially.
These are the situations in which common carriers in interstate
commerce and receivers of insolvent businesses are concerned.
In the former the federal courts, before which this problem has
been presented almost exclusively, have held that the union employees may run afoul of the interstate commerce act in exercising
their right to strike or in refusing to work with nonunion employees or carry goods handled by nonunion workmen. It is
argued that men who enter the service of such an employer do so
with the knowledge of the great obligations which these carriers
are bound to execute and that they, as employees, are bound to see
that these obligations are met. 9 More recently it has been held
that if the union gives a reasonable notice of the intention to strike,
it can exercise that right. 0 0 The real question, however, is how
effective can that strike be made? If it were effective enough to
diminish the supply of labor to the point of impairing carrier
movements, the courts would probably frown upon it even today
as an interference with the paramount rights of the public, regardless of whether the methods pursued were peaceable or not.
in accordance with its rules, ordered a lockout of union employees under
pain of expulsion from the association if the order was not obeyed. The
court enjoined the enforcement of the order.) Contra: Meir v. Spear,
(1910) 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988; People v. Harris, (Colo. 1938). Labor
and Unemployment Insurance Service, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 19551; Seymour Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers', etc., Union, (1933) 163 Md. 687, 164 At.
752; New Jersey Printing Co. v. Local No. 26, (1924) 96 N. J. Eq. 632,
126 Atl. 399; note also the language in Cameron v. International Alliance,
(1936) 119 N. J. Eq. 577, 585, 183 Atl. 157; Bossert v. Dhuy, (1917) 221
N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582; see also, Lundoff-Bicknell Co. v. Smith, (1927)
24 Ohio App. 294, 156 N. E. 243; National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason
Builders'
Ass'n, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1909) 169 Fed. 259.
9
1New York Lumber Trade Association v. Lacey, (1935) 154 Misc. Rep.
747, 277 N. Y. S. 519; Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., (N.D.
Ohio, 1893) 54 Fed. 730, 746; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern
Pacific R. Co., (E.D. Wis. 1894) 60 Fed. 803, (the court reasons in terms
of the mentality that conceived the English Statutes of Laborers) ; cf.,
Wabash R. Co. v. Hannahan, (E.D. Mo. 1903) 121 Fed. 562; Southern California Ry. Co. v. Rutherford, (S.D. Cal. 1894) 62 Fed. 796; Montgomery
v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 680; cf., also,
Foss v. Portland Terminal Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1923) 287 Fed. 33, (in this
case the court refused an injunction against a strike even though the strike
would be a breach of an agreement entered into under the Transportation
Act of 1920 upon the ground that the Clayton Act, section 20, forbade the
injunction) ; Duplex Co. v. Deering, (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172,
65 L. Ed. 349; but see, M. & M. Wood Working Co. v. Plywood & Veneer
Workers, (D. Or. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 11, 16.
lOOFarmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., (E.D. Wis.'
1894) 60 Fed. 803.
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Although the Railway Labor Act, as amended, provides machinery
for the peaceable settlement of railway labor disputes, it does not
take away the right to strike in the event that an agreement is not
reached under it. Yet most of the questions which plagued the
courts before the act still remain to be solved, especially the
question of how far the employees may go toward making their
strike effective.
Undoubtedly employees of hospitals, of telephone, water, gas
and electric companies, and of railway, mining and similar industries, are in a position to cause considerably more harm to the
general public by an effective strike than are the employees of
other industries. But the harm caused is a matter of degree,
and the fact that the public is more likely to be affected in one
case than another is small reason to deny to these employees the
same rights which are conceded to employees in other industries.
To deny them the right to strike after arbitration has failed,
would be to make a sham of their right of collective bargaining.
To deprive them of the means of making the strike effective
would be, in effect, to deprive them of the right to strike. However, one limitation should be placed upon the right to strike in
what we may call the essential service industries; namely, that
a reasonable notice be given of the time when it is proposed to
commence the strike. More than this should not be demanded.''
Perhaps at this point it would be well to discuss briefly the
position of government employees in connection with the right
to organize, to strike, and to take other similar action. Undoubtedly, such employees should be allowed to organize freely.
But it is not quite so clear that the right to strike under any circumstances and under all conditions should not be circumscribed.
The position of government employees may be compared to that
101jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, (1937) 252 App. Div. 581, 300
N. Y. S. 1111; Foss v. Portland Terminal Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1923) 287
Fed. 33. The courts will probably always find means of preventing a strike
in an essential service industry from becoming too effective on the ground
of the injury to the public which may occur by reason of a long drawn out
struggle between employer and employee. See Burgess Bros. Co. v. Stewart,
(1921) 114 Misc. Rep. 673, 187 N. Y. S. 873; Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co., (N.D. Ohio, 1917) 240 Fed. 759.
See also, Driver v. Smith, (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 339, 345, 104 Atl. 717,
("No support ...

can be found ...

for the proposition in an action strictly

between individuals, the court will or can deny to a party legal or equitable
relief to which he is clearly entitled, merely because the effect of the granting
of such relief will be to embarrass the party against whom the relief is
granted in the performance of war work. So long as the courts are open the
rights of parties must be determined by the existing law") ; cf., Rosenwasser
Bros. v. Pepper, (1918) 104 Misc. Rep. 457, 172 N. Y. S. 310.
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of employees in the essential service industries, although this
comparison is not altogether apt. The right to strike should not be
denied to these workers for the obvious reason that such a denial
could be enforced only with considerable difficulty, if at all, and
for the further reason that to deny them this right would be to
relegate them to a status incompatible with the prevailing ideas
and ideals of industrial democracy. Nevertheless, if we are to
avoid the possibility of chaos, which may readily result when the
government of any political subdivision ceases to function or has
its functioning seriously impaired because of a strike of its employees, it would appear to be the better policy to provide legislation setting up machinery for arbitration of whatever disputes
may arise. Such legislation should be so drawn as to allow both
for a speedy determination of such disputes and for a board of
arbitrators on which labor would be adequately represented. In
the event of the failure of arbitration, then the employees should
be permitted to strike after giving reasonable notice of their
intention to do so. The same means and methods in the conduct
of their strike should be allowed these employees as are permitted
to striking employees of ordinary business houses.
In those cases in which an operating receiver of an insolvent
business has been concerned, the courts seldom have failed to
issue an injunction against the actions or proposed actions of the
employees. Although the courts have recognized that the employees of a business operated by a receiver have a right to
strike, somehow or other these employees never have seemed to
be able to conduct themselves or their strikes in such a manner
or to have such purposes as would meet the approval of the
court. 2 It is a strange commentary upon the processes of the
judicial mind.
COMPETING UNIONS

Several interesting problems are raised by contests between
unions competing for the right to represent the workers in a
particular plant or industry. The most usual situation is one in
which one union has obtained a closed shop contract with the
employer, and the rival union, by picketing the employer's plant
and using placards and other means of publicity, attempts to
bring enough pressure to bear on the employees to leave their
10 21n re, Higgins, (N.D. Tex. 1886) 27 Fed. 443; Arthur v. Oakes,

(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1894) 63 Fed. 310; ,United States v. Weber, (W.D. Va.
1902) 114 Fed. 950; Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Ry. Co., (N.D.

Ga. 1921) 271 Fed. 743.
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union and join the rival union, and upon the employer to break
his contract with the rival. If the contract were one directly
with each individual employee, the great majority of the courts,
as we have already seen, would unhesitatingly condemn such
action upon the part of the rival union as an attempt to cause the
breach of a contract and would stamp the actions of the picketers
as unlawful. But the contract here is with the union, and the
courts generally permit the picketing if unaccompanied by fraudulent misstatements or violence, even though it may result in a
breach of the contract between the employer and the union of his
employees. 03 It is difficult to observe any reason for the distinction which the courts make. The contention on the part of the
employer that his business is being damaged as a result of the
picketing and that as an innocent party in the contest between
the two unions he ought to be protected, is often not sufficient to
cause the court to act in his behalf. 04 The result does not seem
just except in a case in which the employer has entered into a
contract with one union as against another, considering it the
lesser of two evils, and has forced a majority of his employees to
join the union of his, the employer's, choice, or leave his employ.
In any other situation where both unions are outside unions, one
union ought not to be permitted to attempt, by means of the picket
line and other forms of publicity, to cause a breach of the contract relation existing between the employer and the other union.
To permit such a result lessens the value of such contracts and
will eventually make them meaningless.'
103J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, (1932) 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509;
De Agostina v. Holmden, (1935) 157 Misc. Rep. 819, 285 N. Y. S.909. Cf.,
Church Shoe Co. v. Turner, (1926) 218 Mo. App. 516, 528, 279 S.W. 232;
see, Trommer v. Brotherhood of Brewery Workers, (1938) 167 Misc. Rep.
197, 199, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 782, (The court distinguished the case upon the

ground that the quarrel was not between rival unions but between two fac-

tions within one union and, therefore, "The principle that 'resulting injury
is incidental, and must be endured' by an innocent party who finds himself

between two quarreling labor organizations is not applicable ...

"

The

picketing
was enjoined.)
04
N. & R. Theaters, Inc. v. Basson, (1925) 127 Misc. Rep. 271, 215
N. Y. S. 157; Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, (1932) 259 N. Y. 405, 182

N. E. 62, (note also the dissenting opinion). But see, Plant v. Woods,

(1900) 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011. See also, Graves v. McNulty, (1912)
13 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 110, 22 Ohio Dec. N. P. 425.
i0o'Wolchak v. Wiseman, (1932) 145 Misc. Rep. 268, 259 N. Y. S.225.
The point of view represented by this case is perhaps no longer the view of

the New York courts, but there is some validity to its claim.

See,

Buy-Wise Markets v. Winokur, (1938) 167 Misc. Rep. 235, 2 N. Y. S. (2d)
854; Erdman v. Mitchell, (1903) 207 Pa. St. 79, 56 Ati. 327. See also,

Peninsular and Occidental Steamship Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 411.
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INJUNCTIONS

The favorite legal weapon of the employer in resolving his differences with his employees or with outside unions has been the
injunction, and the courts have not been slow to respond. The
application of the injunctive processes of equity is a product of
the nineteenth century. Countless strikes have been successfully
broken by the issuance of injunctions so sweeping in their terms
as to leave the defendants with no recourse except to go back to
work upon the employer's terms, or to seek other employment,
or to discontinue their efforts to unionize the employer's business
if the defendants happen to be an outside union. 10'
Prior to the Norris-La Guardia Act, and even now in those
states which have not adopted similar legislation, the familiar
procedure was for the employer to sue for a temporary restraining order, using as his principal, and in many cases his sole, evidence, affidavits which were sometimes answered by counteraffidavits. As evidence, these affidavits possess small merit. In
many cases the deponents are professional strikebreakers and
private guards, whose business it is to see that the affidavits are
strong enough to gain the end sought. Truth is a minor consideration. Long before the Norris Act, courts were beginning
106 Local Union No. 313 v. Stathakis, (1918) 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W.
450; Moore v. Cooks', Waiters' and Waitresses' Union, No. 402, (1919) 39
Cal. App. 538, 541, 179 Pac. 417, (in which the court uses the customary
preface to a strike-breaking injunction) ; Levy & Devaney v. International
Pocketbook W. Union, (1932) 114 Conn. 319, 158 Atl. 795; Illinois Malleable Iron Co. v. Michalek, (1917) 279 Ill. 221, 116 N. E. 714; Shaughnessey
v. Jordan, (1916) 184 Ind. 499, 111 N. E. 622; Ellis v. Journeyman Barbers',
(1922) 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111; United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Fitzgerald, (1921) 237 Mass. 537, 130 N. E. 86; Jensen v. St. Paul Motion
Picture Machine Operators' Local Union, (1935) 194 Minn. 58, 259 N. W.
811; Grimes v. Durnin, (1921) 80 N. H. 145, 114 Atl. 273; Connett v.
United Hatters of North America, (1909) 76 N. J. Eq. 202, 74 Atl. 188;
Thomson Machinery Co. v. Brown, (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 238, 108 Atl. 116;
Yates Hotel Co. v. Meyers, (1922) 195 N. Y. S. 558; see also, Hellman v.
Salesmen's Ass'n, (1919) 23 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 177, (this is not a strike
case but it serves to illustrate the point) ; Crouch v. Central Labor Council,
(1930) 134 Or. 612, 293 Pac. 729; Bomes v. Providence Local No. 223,
(1931) 51 R. I. 499, 506, 155 AtI. 581, (but see the dissenting opinion of
Hahn J.); Charleston Dry Dock & Machine Co. v. O'Rourke, (E.D. S.C.
1921) 274 Fed. 811; Bedford Co. v. Stone Cutters' Ass'n, (1927) 274 U. S.
37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916; cf., (dissent by Brandeis, J.); St.
Germain v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, (1917) 97 Wash. 282,
166 Pac. 665; Kitchen & Co. v. Local Union, (1922) 91 W. Va. 65, 112
S. E. 198. See, the dissenting opinion in A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago
Typographical Union No. 16, (1908) 232 Ill. 424, 438, 83 N. E. 940, ("It
amounts to nothing to assert that laborers may organize for the purpose
of bettering their condition in life while denying to them the right to do
anything as an organization except those acts which could be as well done
without organization.")
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to rebel, and a growing minority were casting doubtful eyes upon
the entire procedure. 0 7 Aside from the abuse mentioned, there
is the further question as to whether or not a court of equity
should step in when it has not been definitely shown that the
local police authorities were unable or unwilling to cope with the
situation. The question of keeping the peace where a strike or
labor dispute exists is essentially a police job, and not the duty of
a court of equity. 08 It is safe to say that the Norris-La Guardia
Act did little more than codify the attitude of the more liberal
07

Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers' Club, (1926)

99 N. J. Eq. 770,

134 Atl. 309; Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, (1938) 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199 Atl. 599; Pre 'Catelan, Inc. v.
International F. &W (1921) 114 Misc. Rep. 662, 188 N. Y. S. 29; Altman
v. Schlesinger, (19235 204 App. Div. 513, 198 N. Y. S. 128; Eagle Glass
& Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, (1917) 245 U. S. 275, 38 Sup. Ct. 80, 62 L. Ed. 286;
United States v. Weirton Steel Co., (D. Del. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 255. 264,
("A preliminary injunction should not be awarded on ex parte affidavits
unless in a clear case." This in the face of the Norris La-Guardia Act
enacted in 1932) ; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Local, (D. Mont. 1922) 283
Fed. 557. But see, Master Weavers' Institute v. Associated S. Workers'
Local, (1934) 116 N. J. Eq. 502, 174 Ati. 437. Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Brosseau, (D. N. D. 1923) 286 Fed. 414, (contains an excellent indictment
of the practice of granting preliminary injunctions upon affidavits in strike
cases.)

luSSegenfeld v. Friedman, (1922) 117 Misc. Rep. 731, 732, 193 N. Y. S.
128, ("While a court of equity will always use its powers to prevent the
infliction of irremediable damages, there should not be imposed upon it the
ordinary performance of police duty ....
A court of equity is not a police
station.") Mauker v. Bakers', etc., International Union, (1927) 129 Misc.
Rep. 516, 221 N. Y. S. 106; Statler Co. v. Employees' Alliance, (1914) 19
Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 375, 378, 27 Ohio Dec. N. P. 178; cf., Fulforth Co. v.
Garment Workers, (1913) 15 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 353, 27 Ohio Dec. N. P.
675; Lipoff v. ,United Food Workers' Industrial Union, (Pa. 1938), Labor
and Unemployment Ins. Service, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19561, 19564; KnappMonarch Co. v. Anderson, (E.D. Ill. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 332, (decided on the
basis of the Norris La-Guardia Act; Newton v. Laclede Steel Co., (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1935) 80 F. (2d) 636, (this case was decided after the adoption of
the Norris La-Guardia Act); -eintz Mfg. Co. v. Local No. 515, (E.D. Pa.
1937) 20 F. Supp. 116; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers',
etc., Unions, (N.D. Ohio 1898) 90 Fed. 598. See also, Great Northern Ry.
Co. v. Brosseau, (D. N.D. 1923) 286 Fed. 414, 418, ("The difference in the
civil life habits of England and the United States results in widely different
effects from the same statute (the court points out that section 20 of the
Clayton Act and section 2 of the English Trades Dispute Act of 1906 are
alike) in the two countries. In Great Britain strikers and the new employees are a part of the common life of the community. They mingle
freely with one another. The opportunities for peaceful persuasion are a
part of the daily intercourse. There the private armed detective is unknown . . . in the rare cases in which they (the police) are called out to
repress riots in connection with strikes, use nothing but their hand arms.
In such a field the right of peaceful persuasion is natural and easy. It results sometimes in violent words, occasionally in violent acts with fists, and
more rarely with bricks. The policemen, however, are quite equal to coping
with such a situation. Guilty parties are promptly arrested, tried, and, if
found guilty, promptly punished. The writ of injunction in strike cases has
been unknown in England during the period when it has attained such universal use with us.")
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courts. The effectiveness of the Act, as we shall see, depends
in no small measure upon the attitude of the courts toward the
view it represents.
By the great weight of authority it is held that the basis for
the exercise of the injunctive powers of a court of equity in labor
disputes is the actual or threatened interference with the property
rights of the complainant. 10 9 This insistence by courts of equity
upon safeguarding the rights of property as against the social,
economic and moral rights of the individual is a strange commentary upon the failure of courts of equity to adapt equity
jurisprudence to the prevailing world of realities. Out of this
exaggerated attempt to maintain the inviolability of property
rights at all costs has come the definition of the labor of a working
man as property and of a man's trade or business as property."'
109In re Wood, (1924) 194 Cal. 49, 227 Pac. 908; Economy Cleaners v.
Green, (Del. 1936) 184 Atl. 225; Mears Slayton Lumber Co. v. District
Council, (1910) 156 Ill. App. 327; Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine
Operators' Union, (1922) 151 Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781; Interborough
Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, (1928) 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863; Riggs v.
Cincinnati Waiters Alliance Local, (1898) 5 Ohio N. P. 386, 8 Ohio
Dec. N. P. 565; Fulforth Co. v. Garment Workers, (1913) 15 Ohio N. P.
(N.S.) 353, 27 Ohio Dec. N. P. 675; cf., Wills v. Restaurant Employees,
(1927) 26 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 435, 437; Bledsoe v. Wesley, (Tex. Civ. App.
1929) 22 S. W. (2d) 718, (not a labor relations case) ; Gompers v. Buck's
Stove & Range Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797;
Gassaway v. Borderland Coal Corp., (C.C.A., 7th Cir. 1921) 278 Fed. 56;
Commercial Bindery & Print Co. v. Tacoma Typographical Union No. 170,
(1915) 85 Wash. 234, 147 Pac. 1143.
It is a strange commentary upon the limitations which have been foisted
upon equity jurisprudence "that a court of equity is without jurisdiction to
protect by injunction mere personal rights," but does not lack jurisdiction
to protect property rights. James R. Kirby Post No. 50 v. American Legion,
(1927) 258 Mass. 434, 155 N. E. 462. But see, Brace Bros. v. Evans, (1888)
5 Pa. Co. Ct. 163, 167; cf., Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 368,
374, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254, (". . . the law of property was not
appropriate for dealing with the forces beneath social unrest; that in this
vast struggle it was unwise to throw the power of the state on one side or
the other according to principles deduced from that law; that the problem
of the control and conduct of industry demanded a solution of its own; and
that, pending the ascertainment of new principles to govern industry; it was
wiser for the state not to interfere in industrial struggles by the issuance
of an injunction .... Nor is a state obliged to protect all property rights by
injunction merely because it protects some, even if the attending circumstances are in some respects similar. . . . Instances are numerous where
protection to property by way of injunction has been refused solely on the
ground that serious public inconvenience would result from restraining the
act complained of." Dissenting opinion, Brandeis. J.) See also, West v.
Chastian, (Ga. 1938) 198 S. E. 736, (the court holds that an injunction should
not issue to prevent the consummation of a bare threat which, if followed
up by an overt act, will work irreparable injury. But this is not a labor
relations case. Would the court have come to the same conclusion if a
labor 0dispute had been involved?)
1" Bogni v. Perotti, (1916) 224 Mass. 152, 154, 112 N. E. 853; Baldwin
v. Escanaba Liquor Dealers' Ass'n, (1911) 165 Mich. 98, 130 N. W. 214;
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The result of this attitude has been scores of injunctions, both
temporary and permanent, in which the restraints imposed have
been so broad as to prevent any action upon the part of those
affected, whether that action is lawful or not."' The amount of
evidence deemed necessary to obtain a temporary restraining
order has varied, depending upon the particular court, but in many
instances an injunction has been granted upon what can almost be
termed a lack of evidence. The courts have been too much influenced by the fact that the employer-complainant has a large
capital investment at stake. They have given too little attention
to the fact that the employees have their entire immediate future
at stake. The result has been that the rights of an employer to
conduct his business as he pleases, to a free flow of labor, and to
have no one interfere with his business, especially when the intruder so-called happens to be an employee or an outside trade
union, have been built up into a veritable Verdun against the
attempt of the workingman to make some progress in the contest
for more equal bargaining powers. It has taken the combined
Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663; Feller

v. Local 144, (1937) 121 N. J. Eq. 452, 453, 191 Atl. 111; cf., the dissenting
opinion in Keuffel & Esser v. International Ass'n of Machinists, (1922) 93
N. J. Eq. 429, 116 Atl. 9; International Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, (1937)
122 N. J. Eq. 222; Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc., (1927) 245 N. Y.
260, 265, 157 N. E. 130; Parker v. The Bricklayers' Union No. 1, (1889) 21
Ohio Law Bull. 223, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 458; Hoster Brewing Co. v.
Giblon, (1903) 1 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 377, 379, 14 Ohio Dec. N. P. 305;
Park v. Hotel, etc., Employees, (1919) 22 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 257, 30 Ohio
Dec. N. P. 64; Moreland Theatres Corp. v. Portland Moving Picture, etc.,
Union, (1932) 140 Or. 35, 12 P. (2d) 333; Erdman v. Mitchell, (1903) 207
Pa. St. 79, 91, 56 Atl. 327; Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield
Miners Union No. 220, (D. Nev. 1908) 159 Fed. 500, 515; Duplex Co. v.
Deering, (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349; Cole v.
Atlanta Terminal Co., (N.D. Ga. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 131, 132, ("The right
given by the act (Railway Labor Act) to employees to negotiate by freely
chosen representatives was held to be in the nature of a property right") ;
Railway Employees' Cooperative Ass'n v. Ry. Co., (D. Ga. 1938) 22 F.
Supp. 510, (the Railway Labor Act, as amended, creates a property right
in the employees, the interference with which may be enjoined) ; State v.
Stewart, (1887) 59 Vt. 273, 289, 9 Atl. 559; St. Germain v. Bakery &
Confectionery Workers' Union, (1917) 97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac. 665. If the
right to labor is a property right, and therefore amendable to protection by
a court of equity, it is difficult to reconcile such a view with that expressed
in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Local G. F. L. of I. A. of M., (D. Mont.
1922) 283 Fed. 557, 569, ("Society has not yet progressed to insure work,
or to recognize a substantial interest in a job had. . .

."

Contra: Robison

v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local No. 782, (1922) 35 Idaho 418, 207
Pac. 132; Aberon Bakery Co. v. Raimist, (1931) 141 Misc. Rep. 774, 776,
254 N. Y. S. 38, ("Since labor is performed by human beings, it is not an
article of commerce separate and apart from the laborer who performs it")
see also, Clayton Act, section 6, 38 Stat at L. 731.
"'See cases in note 106. supra.
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assaults of the few progressive courts and of legislation to lower
the barriers even a little.
The injunction is a harsh remedy. "The interference of a
court of equity in labor disputes either against employer or
laborer, should be exercised sparingly and with caution.""' It
is difficult to lay down exact rules which a court of equity may
follow in arriving at a just conclusion. However, the following
general rules should be adhered to if some degree of moderation is to be exercised by the courts. Surmise and suspicion are
not enough upon which to base an injunction. The injunctive
process should not be allowed to deteriorate into a means of
coercing employees and breaking strikes with which the court does
not happen to be in sympathy. It should not be used to restrain
orderly picketing where it is exercised in good faith.1 3 Neither
should the courts visit the depradations of unknown individuals
upon the strikers without strong proof that the unknown persons
are both connected with and their actions approved and sanctioned by the strikers."-, Injunctions pendente lite should not be
granted if the relief would be the same as that ultimately granted
if the complainant succeeds at the trial and where the complainant's right to an injunction is doubtful."' No temporary
12Moran v. Lasette, (1927) 221 App. Div. 118, 121, 223 N. Y. S. 283.
'International Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove, (1930) 158 Md.
496, 148 Atl. 826, (an injunction cannot be founded on a supposition);
Segenfeld v. Friedman, (1922) 117 Misc. Rep. 731, 193 N. Y. S. 128, (a
court of equity should not enjoin orderly picketing); La Rose v. Possehl,
(1935) 156 Misc. Rep. 476, 477, 282 N. Y. S. 332; McCormick v. Loan
Union, (1911) 13 Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 545, 554, 32 Ohio C. C. 165 (the
court states the problem very well) ; Lundoff-Bicknell Co. v. Smith, (1927)
App. 294, 304, 156 N. E. 243.
24 Ohio
1 4Machinery Co. v. Toohey, (1931) 114 Misc. Rep. 185, 186 N. Y. S.
95; J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, (1932) 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509;
Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union, (E.D. Mich. 1934)
6 F. Supp. 164. See also, Thomas Russell & Sons v. Stampers, etc., Union,
(1907) 57 Misc. Rep. 96, 102, 107 N. Y. S.303; Morton v. Brotherhood,
(1912) 13 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 311, 23 Ohio Dec. N. P. 222; cf., Southern
California Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, (1921) 186 Cal. 604,
200 Pac. 1. See also, Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,
(1920) 188 Ky. 477, 222 S. W. 1079, (the court held that the injunction
should issue not against the union but against the guilty members of the
union who were the parties to the enjoinable action.)
"' Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1918) 140
Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766; Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Local No. 560, (1920)
91 N. J.Eq. 240, 244, 109 Atl. 147; Cohen v. United Garment Workers of
America, (1901) 35 Misc. Rep. 748, 72 N. Y. S.341; Butterick Publishing
Co. v. Typographical .Union No. 6, (1906) 50 Misc. Rep. 1, 100 N. Y. S.
292; Brace Bros. v. Evans, (1888) 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 163, 166; McNally v.
Reynolds, (W.D. Wash. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 112; United States v. Republic
Oil Refining Co., (D. N.J. 1934) 75 F. (2d) 897, (not a labor case.) See,
however, White v. Coeur D'Alene Big Creek Mining Co., (1936) 56 Idaho
282, 55 P. (2d) 720; My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, (1905) 100 Md. 238, 59
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injunction ought to issue if the evidence is disputed; even on
a hearing for a permanent injunction, the evidence should be
clear, certain and convincing."'
Furthermore, the threatened injury should not be too remote
and speculative. Courts should be wary of issuing temporary injunctions in labor disputes merely to preserve the status quo
because, even when an injunction is carefully worded, its effect
is to destroy the status quo. An injunction should never be
issued with the thought in mind that even if it enjoins actions
in which the defendants are no longer indulging, it can do no
harm because it only enjoins unlawful actions. 117 The reason for
the issuance of an injunction is to prevent an injury which threatens irreparable damage when there is no adequate remedy at law
to compensate for the expected damage. If the defendants are not
Atl. 721; Baltic Mining Co. v. Houghton, Circuit Judge, (1913) 177 Mich.

632, 144 N. W. 209. But cf., Emporia Loan & Investment Co. v. Dailey,
(1935) 141 Kan. 845, 44 P. (2d) 288.
Suttin v. Unity Button Works, Inc., (1932) 144 Misc. Rep. 784, 785,
258 N. Y. S. 863; Houston Funeral Home v. Boe, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
78 S. W. (2d) 1091. To the same effect as Houston Funeral Home v.
Boe, supra, see, Independent Workers of Clayton Mark & Co. v. Beman,
(N.D. Ill. 1936) 13 F. Supp. 627; Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Rothensies,
(E.D. Pa. 1935) 13 F. Supp. 321.
",'Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers, (1934) 116
N. J.Eq. 146, 172 Atl. 551; Decorative Stone Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council,
(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 123; United States v. Weirton Steel
Co., (D. Del. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 255. But see, My Maryland Lodge v. Adt,
(1905) 100 Md. 238, 59 Atl. 721; Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co.
v. American Newspaper Guild, (1938) 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199 Atl. 599; United
Traction Co. v. Droogan, (1921) 115 Misc. Rep. 672, 189 N. Y. S.39.
117General Leather Products Co., Inc. v. Luggage & T. M. Union,
(1936) 119 N. J.Eq. 432, 433, 183 Atl. 165, ("Does the abandonment of the
strike constitute a defense? ... An injunction is a preventative remedy; not
a punishment for past wrongs. An injunction will be denied when it appears, even at final hearing that a change in conditions pending the suit
renders an injunction unnecessary to protect complainant"); Reynolds v.
Everett, (1894) 144 N. Y. 189, 39 N. E. 72; see also, Ladner v. Siegel,
(1930) 298 Pa. 487, 148 Atl. 699; Commercial Bindery & Print Co. v.
Tacoma Typographical Union No. 170, (1915) 85 Wash. 234, 174 Pac. 1143.
Cf., however, Piano and Organ Workers v. Piano and Organ Supply Co.,
(1906) 124 Ill. App. 353, (a temporary injunction was made permanent
although the troubles which brought about the issuance of the temporary
order were wholly over); Church Shoe Co. v. Turner, (1926) 218 Mo.
App. 516, 279 S. W. 232; Martin v. McFall, (1903) 65 N. J. Eq. 91, 92,
55 Atl. 465, ("I cannot say that complainant is in no danger of being injured. Besides, if McFall and his agents, etc., do not intend to do the
things forbidden by the restraining order, then the order will do them no
harm"): J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, (1932) 260 N. Y. 315, 319, 183 N. E.
509, ("In spite of evidence that long before the case came to trial the defendant had ceased to employ these canvassers, the court was not bound to
accept belated repentance or belated caution as a sufficient guaranty that the
plaintiff's business would not be injured in similar fashion in the future.
It might, in its discretion, grant protection by an injunction broad enough
to achieve that purpose.")
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threatening any act, or have discontinued the threat to do the
act, which it is alleged will cause irreparable damage, an injunction ought not to issue, because the court's authority is based
upon the proof that the act is threatened. A restraining order
should be molded to fit the particular situation before the court
and should go no further than the proofs require. 118 For the
court to go further than this is to lay itself open to the charge
that it is indulging in strikebreaking. The use of general and
vague terms and broad restraints is an improper exercise of the
injunctive power. Injunctions in labor disputes are generally
addressed to workingmen. The terms used should, therefore,
be so clear and definite as to leave no room for doubt." 9
Where the end sought or the means used by the strikers or
outside union are unlawful, and the damage has already been done
at the time the injunction is sued for, the proper remedy is at law
for damages. The injunction is a protective and preventative
remedy and not a compensatory remedy.12 To issue an injunction in such a situation is to use the injunctive process to punish.
and not to prevent and protect. An injunction should never issue.
unless two factors coincide: the probability that certain acts will
occur, and their wrongfulness. 12 In those cases where the dam118International Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove, (1930) 158 Md.
496, 148 AtI. 826; Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney, (1920) 236 Mass. 310,
128 N. E. 429; Ex parte Heffron, (1914) 179 Mo. App. 639, 162 S. W. 652;
Master Weavers' Institute v. Associated S. Workers' Local, (1934) 116 N.J.
Eq. 502, 174 Atl. 437; Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin,
(1927) 245 N. Y. 260,268, 157 N. E. 130; 3. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, (1932)
260 N. Y. 315, 321, 183 N. E. 509; Wise Shoe Co. v. Lowenthal, (1935)
266 N. Y. 264, 194 N. E. 749; Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Fed. of F.
F. H. W., (1931) 305 Pa. St. 206, 157 Atl. 588, (see the concurring opinion
of Kephart, J.) ; Gasaway v. Borderland Coal Corp., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1921)
278 F.9 56, 62.
"1 Roesch Enamel Range Co. v. Carbine, (1928) 247 Ill. App. 248, 249,
("An injunction should be so worded that the party enjoined may know from
a reading of the order what he is restrained from doing") ; International
Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove, (1930) 158 Md. 496, 148 At. 826;
Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild,
(1938) 124 N. 3. Eq. 71, 199 AtI. 599; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Brosseau,
(D. N.D. 1923) 286 Fed. 414, 415, ("Injunctions are addressed to laymen.
They ought to be so brief and plain that laymen can understand them. They
ought to be framed in the fewest possible words. The order should not
express the bias or violence of a party to such a controversy or his attorney.")
120Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, (1927) 245 N. Y.
260, 157 N. E. 130; Bledsoe v. Wesley, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 22 S. W.
(2d) 718, (not a labor case) ; McFarland Co. v. O'Brien, (N.D. Ohio, 1925)
6 F. (2d) 1016, 1018.
"21Central Cotton Garment Manufacturers Ass'n v. International Ladies'
Garment Workers Union, (1935) 280 Ill. App. 168, 180; Armstrong Cork &
Insulation Co. v. Walsh, (1931) 276 Mass. 263, 177 N. E. 2; Rissler v.
Plumbers' Local No. 326, (1931) 109 N. J. Eq. 91, 156 Atl. 498; Reynolds
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age has already been done one of these two factors is absent.
A court of equity should not act to enjoin the commission of
a crime or a libel as such. Although the courts generally have
enjoined acts which are also crimes when property rights are endangered, such matters are more properly within the function of
the local police authorities, and unless it is clearly shown that they
either cannot control the situation or will not act, a court of equity
should not intervene. This is the position adopted by the NorrisLa Guardia Act and several of the more progressive courts, and is
eminently to be preferred.

1 22

144 N. Y. 189, 39 N. E. 72; Interborough Rapid Transit
Co. v. Lavin, (1928) 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863; De Agostina v. Holmden,
(1935) 157 Misc. Rep. 819, 285 N. Y. S. 909; Rhodes Bros. Co. v. Musicians P. U. Local No. 198, (1915) 37 R. I. 281, 92 Atl. 641.

v. Everett, (1894)

There is some doub as ,to the propriety of the action taken by the court

in Hotel & Railroad News Co. v. Leventhal, (1922) 243 Mass. 317, 322, 137

N. E. 534; Mode Novelty Co. v. Taylor, (1937) 122 N. J.Eq. 593, 195 Atl.
819, (the court issued an injunction upon the spurious argument that as the
employer had succeeded in filling the places formerly occupied by the
strikers the strike was terminated and it was unnecessary to consider the
merits of the dispute and that as picketing is a concomitant of a strike and
the strike was terminated, the picketing would be enjoined); Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield M. U. No. 220, (D. Nev. 1908) 159 Fed.
510. See also, Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Beale, (S.D. Ohio 1922)
282 Fed. 934, (it was held that after an injunction had issued, the court
would not order deputy marshals to guard the property of the complainant
in anticipation of future threatened violations of the injunction.")
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d)
284, (Syll. 3: "Power to grant injunction is not an inherent attribute of
jurisdiction over a subject so as to render void a statute withholding power
to grant injunction") ; Shell Oil Co. v. Stiffler, (1935) 87 Utah 176, 48 P.
(2d) 503, (the granting or refusing of either a temporary or permanent
injunction rests in the discretion of the court, especially where the case
isdoubtful.) See also, Nann v. Raimist, (1931) 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E.
Christenson v. Nielson, (1936) 88 Utah 336, 54 P. (2d) 430.
690; 122
Lietzman v. Radio Broadcasting Station W. C. F. L., (1935) 282 I11.
App. 203; Garside v. Hollywood, (1914) 88 Misc. Rep. 311, 313, 150 N. Y. S.
647; McCormick v. Local Union, (1911) 13 Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 545, 554,32
Ohio C. C. 165, ("If some of the courts which have issued injunctions in
labor troubles were inquired of as to the source of their power to go to
the lengths they have gone in some cases in restraining, by injunction,
breaches of the peace and violations of the criminal law generally, they
might be compelled to answer 'we got it by accretion-by the gradual wearing away of the power of the executive branch of the government as aided
by the regular criminal courts, and a corresponding increase in power, by
accretion, on the part of courts of equity, to substitute the injunction for
the neglect of duty on the part of executive officers and in the place of jury
trials in the regular criminal courts' ") ; Morton v. Brotherhood, (1912)
13 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 311, 23 Ohio Dec. N. P. 222; Coeur D' Alene Consolidatcd & Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, (D. Idaho, 1892) 51 Fed. 260;
Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, (S.D. N.Y. 1914) 214 Fed. 111. See also,
40, 145 N. E. 657. Cf.,
Vulcan Detinning Co. v. St. Clair, (1924) 315 Ill.
Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Machine Works, (1908) 131 Ga. 336, 62
S. E. 236; In re Wood, (1924) 194 Cal. 49, 55, 227 Pac. 908. See also,
Beck v. Teamsters' Protective Union. (1898) 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13;
Hoster Brewing Co. v. Giblon, (1903) 1 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 377, 14 Ohio
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The reason for all of these precautions is plain. The moral
effect of an injunction upon the community cannot be underestimated. It gives the impression that the strikers have violated the
law. Nothing will more quickly dissipate whatever good will the
community may have towards the strikers than such an impression.

123

"... when men attempt to assert what they claim to be their
rights in good faith, in a decent, orderly way, without resort to
violence and within the law, their interests are as sacred as those
of the plaintiff, and a court of equity should see to it that they
124 are
not improperly interfered with by the writ of injunction."
It is generally held that an injunction reaches all who are
named parties to the action whether or not these parties have been
served with process or summons, whether or not they have entered
Dec. N. P. 305. But see, Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup.
66 L. Ed. 254.
Ct. 124,
123
Searle Mfg. Co. v. Terry, (1905) 56 Misc. Rep. 265, 106 N. Y. S.
438; Machinery Co. v. Toohey, (1921) 114 Misc. Rep. 185, 196, 186 N. Y. S.
95, ("Many publicists and some jurists have taken the position that injunctions ought never to issue in labor disputes .... I should not want to
go quite to that length. Lawlessness and violence ought, perhaps, in an extreme case, to be restrained by injunction; but the courts should not carelessly cast the weight of their mandates into the strife between employers
and employees. .

.

. In an evenly balanced, bitter, long-drawn out labor

struggle, an edict of the court, leveled at the strikers, shakes the morale of the
workingmen. This is not the purpose of an injunction, although it is
frequently, and perhaps generally, the purpose of the employer, who seeks
it. The function of an injunctive order in a labor dispute is to restrain lawlessness, when there is lawlessness, and when this is likely to cause irreparable damage. When there is no lawlessness, and no proper grounds to
apprehend it, there should be no injunction. The courts do not take sides
in this ceaseless struggle between capital and labor. They stand indifferent. They intervene only when the law is trampled upon. They interpose the arm of authority only to restrain those who invade the rights
of others. .

.

. The moral effect of an injunctive order in such cases is

tremendous. At once it gives the impression in the community that the
strikers have violated the law. The court seems to have taken a hand in
the struggle. This is the laymen's view. The injunction, thus shaping
public opinion, is often decisive. . . . In exercising its discretion the court
cannot shut its eyes to this aspect of the case or ignore the far-reaching
psychic effect of its mandate") ; Kirmse v. Adler, (1933) 311 Pa. 78, 83,
166 Atl. 566. See also, Vulcan Detinning Co. v. St. Clair, (1924) 315 Ill.
40, 44, 145 N. E. 657; Reardon, Inc. v. Caton, (1919) 189 App. Div. 501,
178 N. Y. S. 713; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, (1936) 155
Or. 652, 668, 63 P. (2d) 1090; Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood of
Painters, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 16.
In a number of instances courts have granted an injunction against a
labor union on the ground that an action for damages at law might prove
unprofitable because of the pecuniary weakness of the union. But see,
Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380, (1918) 19 Ariz. 379, 393, 171 Pac. 121;
Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed. of Labor, (1908) 37 Mont. 264, 276, 96
Pac. 127.
124Reardon, Inc. v. Caton, (1919) 189 App. Div. 501, 511, 178 N. Y. S.
713.
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an appearance, and whether or not they have answered. The
decree also binds all who have notice of it whether or not they are
parties to the action in which the decree was issued. Thus one
does not have to be a party to the action to be in contempt of
court for violating the injunctive order. All that is necessary is
that the violator know that there is such an order; this knowledge
is sufficient to bring him within the scope of its restraints.12 5 There
have been a number of attempts to attack injunctive orders collaterally, especially in proceedings for contempt of such an order,
but such collateral attacks never have been permitted. It is the
universal rule that the proper method of attacking a restraining
order is by an appeal from the order. In other words, the ques126
tion must be raised directly and not collaterally.
Very often the question arises as to whether a trade union can
be considered an entity for the purpose of service of process
upon it and whether it can be enjoined as a party to a labor dispute.
Unincorporated trade union associations are not generally considered entities separate and apart from their members for any
purpose except when so declared by statute.12 7 A union, there12
Mears, Slayton Lumber Co. v. District Council, (1910) 156 Ill. App.
327; Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. Lodge 66, (1938) 295 IIl. App. 323, 14

N. E. (2d) 991; Borden's Farm Products Co. Inc. v. Sterbinsky, (1922) 117
Misc. Rep. 585, 588, 192 N. Y. S. 757; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire
Drawers', etc., Unions, (N.D. Ohio 1898) 90 Fed. 598; Forrest v. United
States, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1922) 277 Fed. 873; Bittner v. West VirginiaPittsburgh Coal Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 652, (Syll. 2:
"Officers of labor unions are not bound by decree of injunction issued twelve
years previously against their predecessors in office and determining rights
of parties as of that time.")
r2Armstrong v. Superior Court of California, (1916) 173 Cal. 341, 159
Pac. 1176; Lyon & Healy v. Piano, 0. & Al. I. W. International Union,
(1919) 289 Ill. 176, 124 N. E. 443; Shaughnessey v. Jordan, (1916) 185
Ind. 499, Ill N. E. 622; Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Humphrey, (1907) 132 Wis.
587, 112 N. W. 1095. For an excellent study of the whole problem of the
use of the injunction in labor disputes see, Frankfurter and Greene, The
Labor Injunction (1930).
127
Carpenters' Union v. Citizens' Committee, (1928) 333 Ill. 225, 164
N. E. 393; Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W. L. Union, (1905) 165
Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877; Diamond Block Coal Co. v. ,United Mine Workers,
(1920) 188 Ky. 477, 222 S. W. 1079; Picket v. Walsh, (1906) 192 Mass.
572, 78 N. E. 753; Citizens' Co. v. Asheville Typographical Union, (1924)
187 N. C. 42, 121 S. E. 31; Statler Co. v. Employers' Alliance, (1914) 19
Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 375, 27 Ohio Dec. N. P. 178; Powers v. Journeymen
Bricklayers' Union No. 3, (1914) 130 Tenn. 643, 172 S. W. 284; AllisChalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union No. 125, (E.D. Wis. 1906) 150 Fed.
155; American Fed. of Labor v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., (1909) 33 App.
D. C. 83; West v. Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co., (1927) 103 W. Va. 417, 137
S. E. 654. But see, Tannenbaum v. Hofbauer, (1931) 142 Misc. Rep. 120,
121, 253 N. Y. S. 90, ("A labor union is a legal entity") ; Christian v. International Ass'n of Machinists, (E.D. Ky. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 481; Dean v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, (W.D. La. 1936) 17 F. Supp. 748.
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fore, not being a proper party to an action except by virtue of a
statute, cannot be held subject to a restraining order, nor can it be
held in contempt of such an order. The opposite result is reached,
however, where, by statute, trade union associations are either
recognized as entities separate and apart from their members or
where the power is granted to the association to sue in its own
128

named or be sued by the association name.
123Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W. L. Union, (1905) 165
Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877; Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,
(1920) 188 Ky. 477, 222 S. W. 1079; cf., Unkovich v. New York Central
R. Co., (1933) 114 N. J. Eq. 448, 168 Atl. 867, (unincorporated trade union
suable in its established name in equity without the necessity of a statute) ;
Statler Co. v. Employees' Alliance, (1914) 19 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 375. 27
Ohio Dec. N. P. 178, (the union cannot be sued in its accustomed name
but under section 11257 of the General Code, if a sufficient number of the
members of the union have been served with summons so as to be fairly
represented, the cause made against those served and before the court will
bind them and the other members of the union) ; West v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co., (1927) 103 W. Va. 417, 137 S. E. 654; but see, St. Germain v.
Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, (1917) 97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac.
665, (it was held that a judgment may be rendered against an unincorporated
union as such, even though there was no permitting statute, where some of
its members were present and defended the action, and the membership was
so large as to preclude summoning all the inembers-cf., the dissenting
opinion.)
Armstrong v. Superior Court, (1916) 173 Cal. 341, 159 Pac. 1176;
O'Jay Spread Co. v. Hicks, (1938) 185 Ga. 507, 195 S. E. 564; Karges
Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W. L. Union, (1905) 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E.
877; Wilson v. Airline Coal Co., (1933) 215 Iowa 855, 246 N. IV. 753;
St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union, (1905) 94 Minn. 351,
102 N. W. 725; Elk Laundry Co. v. A. F. of L., General Drivers Union,
(Minn. 1937), Labor and Unemployment Insurance Service, Prentice-Hall,
Inc., p. 19550. Varnado v. Whitney, (1933) 166 Miss. 663, 147 So. 479
(The union was here held suable in its association name although there was
no statute which expressly changed the common law rule with regard to
the suability in their own names of unincorporated associations. There was,
however, a statute which recognized the legal entity of such an association,
granted it rights, and imposed liabilities on it and this statute, the court
held, impliedly authorized unions to sue and be sued in their association
name); Aalco Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Laundry, etc., Local, (Mo. App.
1938) 113 S. W. (2d) 1081, (a statute in which the word "corporation" is
used as including all associations having any power or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships does not apply to a trades union and
the union is, therefore, not a suable entity within the meaning of the
statute) ; cf., Syz v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, (Mo. App. 1930) 24
S. V. (2d) 1080; cf., also, Wiehtuechter v. Miller, (1918) 276 Mo. 322,
208 S. W. 39; Hagan v. Bricklayers', etc., Union No. 28, (1932) 143 Misc.
Rep. 591, 256 N. Y. S. 898, (on the question of service of summons);
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., (1921) 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct.
570, 66 L. Ed. 975, (unincorporated labor unions are recognized as distinct
entities by numerous acts of Congress, and are suable as such in the federal
courts upon process served on their principal officers and their strike funds
are subject to execution); Gaunt v. Lloyds America of San Antonio,
(W.D. Tex. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 787; Trustees of Wisconsin State Fed. of
Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., (1933) 215 Wis. 623, 256 N. W. 56.
Christian v. International Ass'n of Machinists, (E.D. Ky. 1925) 7 Fed.
(2d) 481, (an individual member of a union is not such a representative of
the union as to allow service of process upon him to be sufficient to subject
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The reports are filled with actions for contempt of injunctive
orders. Although it is a well established principle that the power to
punish for contempt of a restraining order should be used "sparingly and with great caution and deliberation," the courts have
129
honored the rule more in its breach than in its observance.
Some courts have held the officers of a union liable for contempt
of a restraining order where the actual -violation of the order has
been committed by the rank and file members of the union, on the
ground that the officers did not prevent the violation when they
could have done so especially where, although the violators were
under their control, they refrained from using, in good faith, the
necessary means of preventing the acts which were deemed
violations.""
The difficulty with this reasoning is, first, the determination of
what is good faith, and, second, punishment by the court for what
can be considered, at best, only an indirect contempt. If the officers of the union assent to and ratify the acts of those who violate the order or take part in those acts, there can be no doubt that
they should be subject to contempt proceedings. They should not,
however, be required to exercise the functions of a policing officer and have their actions judged by the court's view of what it
may consider good faith. Such a rule is to be condemned for its
vagueness and its far-reaching implications. There have also been
a number of decisions holding that a union engaged in conducting
a strike is responsible for all of the lawlessness arising out of the
strike if such lawlessness could have been avoided by reasonable
discipline upon the members by publicly counselling that peaceful
means alone be used, by protesting against and disavowing lawanother member not so served to a personal judgment); McNally v.
Reynolds, (XV.D. Wash. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 112, (labor union held qualified

to act as representative of the employees for collective bargaining purposes
with employer where statute provided that the word "person" extends to
partnerships and corporations, and, therefore, includes labor unions);
Singleton v. Order of Ry. Conductors of America, (S.D. Ili. 1935) 9 F.
Supp. 417, (service of process on secretary and treasurer of a local of an
international union held insufficient to confer jurisdiction in damage action
against the international union) ; Trustees of Wisconsin State Federation
of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., (Wis. 1934) 256 N. W. 56, (under the
Wisconsin Labor Code, a local union was held a proper party plaintiff to
a complaint against the employer of its members alleging that the employer
was interfering with the attempt of those employees to organize.) See
also, Warren, Corporate Advantages Without Incorporation (1929).
129Phillips S. & T. P. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, (S.D. Ohio, 1913)
208 Fed. 335, 338. It has been held that a contempt can be shown by
circumstantial evidence, United States v. Taliaferro, (W.D. Va. 1922) 290
Fed. 214.
13OPhillips S. & T. P. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, (S.D. Ohio, 1913)
208 Fed. 335.
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lessness, by taking such measures as may be at hand to assist in
preventing or punishing such lawlessness, and by doing all these
things unequivocally and in good faith. The same rule has been
The rule may
applied to hold the union's officers liable also.'
have some validity if it is clear that the lawlessness is caused by the
strikers with the knowledge and consent of the union, or its officers,
or if those acts have been ratified by the union, or its officers, but
lacking such evidence, it should have2 -no application. Courts sometimes fail to make this distinction. '
"'Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Retail Clerks', (E.D. Mo. 1918)
250 Fed. 890; Cyrus Currier & Sons v. International Molders' Union, (1921)
93 N. J. Eq. 61, 115 Atl. 66, (the unlawful acts of the financial secretary
of an unincorporated union in persuading complainants' employees to enter
the union, and thereby break their contract of employment, and in using
violence and intimidation in so doing, were charged to the union, and it was
enjoined.)
"'2Local Union No. 313 v. Stathakis, (1918) 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W.
450; Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, (1908) 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac.
1027; Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, (1906) 220 Ill. 355, 77 N. E. 176,
(the court failed to make the distinction between unlawful acts ordered or
ratified by the union and its officers and those acts committed on the sole
initiative of some of the members of the union; but see the dissenting
opinion in which the distinction is made) ; Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W. L. Union, (1905) 165 Ind. 425, 430, 77 N. E. 877; Scofes v.
Helmar, (1933) 205 Ind. 596, 187 N. E. 662; Bayonne Textile Corp. v,
American Fed. of S. Workers, (1934) 116 N. J. Eq. 146, 172,Atl. 551;
Michaels v. Hillman, (1920) 112 Misc. Rep. 395, 183 N. Y. S. 195, (liability
for unlawful conduct of a strike may extend to a union but not to the individual members who were not specially connected with the unlawful acts) ;
Tannenbaum v. Hofbauer, (1931) 142 Misc. Rep. 120, 121, 253 N. Y. S. 90;
Paylay Hats, Inc. v. Zaritsky, (1934) 151 Misc. Rep. 569, 271 N. Y. S. 786;
Perkins, Campbell & Co. v. Rogg, (1892) 28 Ohio Law Bull. 32, 11 Ohio Dec.
Rep. 585, (contains a good statement); cf., Mace v. Carpenters & Joiners,
(1933) 31 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 17, 24; Morton v. Brotherhood, (1912) 13 Ohio
N. P. (N.S.) 311, 23 Ohio Dec. N. P. 222, (the court refused to enjoin the
union because of the acts of its members) ; cf., The Dayton Manufacturing
Co. v. The Metal Polishers, etc., Union, (1901) 8 Ohio N. P. 574, 11 Ohio
Dec. N. P. 643; Park v. Hotel, etc., Employees, (1919) 22 Ohio N. P. (N.S.)
257, 286, 30 Ohio Dec. N. P. 64; Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union No. 220, (D. Nev. 1908) 159 Fed. 500, (See Syll. 11
for a good statement); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., (1921) 259
U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975, (contains a good statement with
reference to the liability of the national union body for local union activities); see also, Coronado Co. v. United Mine Workers, (1925) 268 U. S.
295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551, 69 L. Ed. 963; Aluminum Castings Co. v. Local No.
84, (W.D. N.Y. 1912) 197 Fed. 221, (union will not be enjoined because of
unlawful acts of its individual members which neither the officers nor
strike committee of the union directed or approved, unless those acts were
committed in carrying out the orders of the union or its committees.)
See also, Clarkson v. Laiblan, (1919) 202 Mo. App. 682, 216 S. W.
1029, (The officers and members of a labor union are bound by the acts of
the business agent of the union when he acts within the scope of his
authority as such business agent); Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders'
Union No. 125, (E.D. Wis. 1906) 150 Fed. 155, 184, ("Being members of
the picketing combination, the act of any one picket is technically the act
of all, but this will not make them liable to more than a nominal fine");
Lawlor v. Loewe, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1911) 187 Fed. 522.
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No court has more clearly stated the considerations which should
govern in this situation than did the court in Great Northern Rail-way Co. v. Brosseau."' In discussing the problem, the court
said,
"Why should wrongs and crimes, whether done by hotheads
in the union or by vicious outsiders, who claim to be their friends,
be seized upon as an index of the character of the union or its
officers? Why not deal with such wrongs and crimes as we do
in other fields of life? Why not treat them as the acts of those who
do them, or aid and abet such doers? Why. . . impute their misdeeds to the striking union and its officers by a presumption which
belies the known facts as well as the policy which common sense
would dictate to the union and its officers as the only course for
them to pursue? Just legal administration can give but one answer
to these questions."' 3 4
TERMINATION OF A STRIKE

When is a strike terminated? The question usually arises in
a situation in which a strike has been in existence for an extended
period and the employer is desirous of putting an end to the accompanying picketing and publicity. The answer to the question assumes an even larger importance in those jurisdictions in which
picketing is held to be a concomitant of a strike, so that if the strike
is terminated the picketing must also end. A number of courts have
held that a strike is terminated when the places of the strikers have
been filled with competent men, and the employer's business is operating in a normal manner and to a normal extent. Does this mean
that the labor dispute can be terminated by a decision of the employer that it no longer affects him because he has succeeded in employing as many fill-in workers as he desires? It is a curious doctrine
that places the economic disposition of his striking workers into the
hands of the employer. Neither the mere lapse of time nor the
success of the employer in the filling of the places of the striking
employees should be the decisive factors in the determination of
this question. Lapse of time does not dissolve a labor dispute
and, by no stretch of the imagination, should the employer be
given the right to decide when the dispute shall end. So much
power in the hands of the employer means destruction of whatever
rights workmen may now possess. The better view would seem
to be that a strike is necessarily terminated only when the employer
and the strikers come to an agreement, or when the striking em'33(D. N.D. 1923) 286 Fed. 414.
"1Ibid,p. 423. Cf., Phillips S. & T. P. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n,
(S.D. Ohio 1913) 298 Fed. 335, 337.
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ployees abandon the strike, or when the business of the employer
is permanently discontinued. This latter does not mean that the
employer may close his plant for a short period and then reopen it
with strikebreakers and claim that the labor dispute has terminated,
nor does it mean that a change in ownership of the business will
terminate the strike. To hold otherwise would be to open the doors
to a fraud upon the rights of the strikers, and would indicate a complete misunderstanding of the nature of a labor dispute which
is a dispute concerning the conditions and terms of employment.
It is apparent that the issues of terms and conditions of employment remain, regardless of who may, at the moment, be the employer or owner of the plant.1 5
COERCION AND INTIMIDATION

One of the most frequently quoted statements found in the
reported cases is that strikers and pickets may not use violence,
coercion or intimidation in their conduct of a strike. Such conduct has been held to outlaw a strike which has been lawfully
begun. A number of injunctions, both temporary and permanent,
have been issued on the ground that the strikers or pickets, as the
case may be, have indulged in acts conducive to violence, coercion
or intimidation."8' It is interesting to examine what the courts
have held constitutes violence, coercion and intimidation.
Picketing has been held to be synonymous with violence if
conducted with "misleading signs, false statements and publicity,
veiled threats by words and acts and insidious propaganda."'3 7
Unless the court means that such words and acts can lead to violence, the statement is incredibly naive, and yet many courts have
affirmed this position."" The assumption that such words or acts
may lead to violence, and that the strike, therefore, should be
enjoined, is unwarranted. Misleading signs, false statements
and the like, are most unlikely in and of themselves to cause violence. If violence appears, it is for reasons more provoking.
It is suggested that perhaps the reason behind decisions like these
"35Moore Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy, (1923) 243 Mass. 554, 137
N. E. 919; Mode Novelty Co. v. Taylor, (1937) 122 N. J.Eq. 593, 195 AtI.
819; Yates Hotel Co. v. Meyers, (1922) 195 N. Y. S. 558; Moreland
Theatres Corp. v. Portland Moving Picture, etc., Union, (1932) 140 Or. 35, 12
Pac. (2d) 333; Carter v. Fortney, (N.D. W. Va. 1909) 170 Fed. 463; DailOverland
Co. v. Willys-Overland, Inc., (N.D. Ohio, 1919) 263 Fed. 171.
'1 6See Note 34, supra.
137Esco Operating Corp. v. Kaplan, (1932) 144 Misc. Rep. 646, 650,
258 N. Y. S. 303.
138Ellis v. Journeyman Barbers', (1922) 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. XV. 111.

JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD TRADE UNIONS

is, in many cases, the fact that the court is more concerned because
the employer is losing business because of the strike, is having difficulty in replacing his striking employees or in keeping employees
at work, than it is with the underlying purpose of the strike. That
this is so is indicated by such statements as that appearing in
J'Vilner v. Bless, in which the court said that "the purpose of the
dissemination of the false or misleading information, was to injure
plaintiff's business and so to coerce him to employ members of the
defendant's local only ....

,13' The court seems to ignore the fact

that even if the information is false and misleading, the primary
purpose of the union is to win the dispute. Damage to and coercion, so-called, of the employer, if they occur, are incidental. It
should be borne in mind that the dissemination of the information is not the purpose.
It has been said that a test of whether coercion or intimidation exists is, "Were the acts of the pickets, and those aiding them,
reasonably calculated to constrain, overcome the will, destroy
freedom of action, coerce the volition, by putting the workmen in
fear of injury by violent means?.'14o As is the case with most
tests, to state it is relatively simple, but to apply it is proportionately difficult. Who is to determine whether the acts were
reasonably calculated to constrain and coerce? How and by
what means is this to be determined? Furthermore, at what
point may it be said that the will is overcome, or that volition is
overcome? Can it be said that if the methods adopted by the
strikers prove effective, the chances are that they are coercive? A
number of decisions seem to point this conclusion.
A number of courts have held that to constitute intimidation
it is not necessary that there should be any direct threat-an intimidating attitude upon the part of strikers or pickets is sufficient. " ' How are we to determine when an attitude is intimidating? Who is to make that determination? Certainly, an attitude
1-11(1926) 243 N. Y. 544, 544, 154 N. E. 598.
140(E.D. Wis. 1906) 150 Fed. 155, 179.
l4lLetvy & Devaney v. International Pocketbook Workers Union, (1932)
114 Conn. 319, 158 AtI. 795; Carpenters' Union v. Citizens' Committee,
(1928) 333 Ill. 225, 247, 164 N. E. 393; Beck v. Teamsters' Protective
Union, (1898) 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13; Parker v. The Bricklayers'
Union No. 1, (1889) 21 Ohio Law Bull. 223, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 458;
Blumauer v. Portland Moving Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1933)
141 Or. 399, 17 P. (2d) 1115; cf., Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International
Ass'n, (1936) 155 Or. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090; Brace Bros. v. Evans, (1888)
5 Pa. Co. Ct. 163, ("The use of the word 'boycott' is in itself a threat") ;
American Fed. of Labor v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., (1909) 33 App. D. C.
83.

MINNESOTA

LAW REVIEW

that is intimidating to one may not be so to another. Some courts
have attempted to solve this dilemna, by adopting the standard of
the timid man. 14 2

This would seem to indicate that almost any

act may be intimidating. Many courts have held that violence is
not necessarily an attribute of intimidation or coercion. One may
be intimidated, they say, even if the acts of the strikers or pickets
are outwardly perfectly peaceful, even though not a word is
uttered. Placards and circulars and the mere physical number
of those picketing, persistent efforts by strikers to convince
others of the justness of their cause, the calling of harsh names,
have, under this view, been held to cause sufficient coercion upon
which to base a decree for an injunction. 143 Strangely enough,
2
' 4 lnternational
Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove, (1930) 158 Md.

496, 148 Atl. 826, (female workers involved); Searle Mfg. Co. v. Terry,
(1905) 56 Misc. Rep. 265, 106 N. Y. S. 438, (timid person test used);
Yablonowitz v. Korn, (1923) 205 App. Div. 440, 199 N . Y. S. 769, (female
customers involved); Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Hansen, (N.D.
Cal. 1905) 144 Fed. 1011, (timid person) ; Kolley v. Robinson, (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1911) 187 Fed. 415, (timid person) ; King v. Weiss & Lesh Mfg. Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1920) 266 Fed. 257, (distinction of race stressed).
143Local Union No. 313 v. Stathakis, (1918) 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W.
450; Southern California Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, (1921)
186 Cal. 604, 200 Pac. 1; Lisse v. Local Union, (1935) 2 Cal. (2d) 312,
41 P. (2d) 314; Levy & Devaney v. International Pocketbook Workers'
Union, (1932) 114 Conn. 319, 158 Atl. 795; Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin &
Machine Works, (1908) 131 Ga. 336, 62 S. E. 236; Robison v. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees, Local No. 782, (1922) 35 Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132,
(the mere stationing of pickets in front of or near the complainant's place
of business was held intimidating) ; Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated
W. L. Union, (1905) 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877; cf., Dehan v. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees, (La. App. 1935) 159 So. 637, (Under the Louisiana
Anti-Injunction Act, the handing to passersby on the street of circulars and
the placing of a sign near the employer's place of business was held to be
not intimidating) ; Sherry v. Perkins, (1888) 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307,
(this case is an excellent illustration of the rule) ; Densten Hair Co. v.
United Leather Workers, (1921) 237 Mass. 199, 129 N. E. 450; Steffes
v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1917) 136 Minn. 200, 161
N. W. 524; Barr v. Essex Trades Council (1894), 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 A.
881; A. Fink & Son v. Butchers Union No. 422, (1915) 84 N. J.Eq. 638,
95 Atl. 182, (a fantastic decision); Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers'
Club, (1926) 99 N. J.Eq. 770, 134 Atl. 309, (this case is a good illustration
of the lengths to which some courts will go in finding intimidation) ; Blakely
Laundry Co. v. Cleaners' & Dyers' Union Local, (1933) 11 N. J.Misc. 915,
169 Atl. 451, (picketing is intimidation) ; Wilner v. Bless, (1926) 245 N. Y.
544, 154 N. E. 598, (false circulars and signs considered coercive); Esco
Operating Corp. v. Kaplan, (1932) 144 Misc. Rep. 646, 650, 258 N. Y. S.
303; Goldfinger v. Feintuch, (1937) 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910;
Hoster Brewing Co. v. Giblon, (1903) 1 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 377, 14 Ohio
Dec. N. P. 305; Crouch v. Central Labor Council, (1930) 134 Or. 612,
293 Pac. 729, (a single female picket bearing a placard held intimidating) ;
Webb v. Cooks', Waiters' & Waitresses' Union No. 748, (Tex. Civ. App.
1938) 205 S.W. 465; Kolley v. Robinson, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1911) 187 Fed.
415; Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Retail Clerks', (E.D. Mo. 1918) 250
Fed. 890, (the reasoning in this case reaches the stage of absurdity) ; KnappMonarch Co. v. Anderson, (E.D. I1. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 332, (Syll. 7: "Nor-
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rarely has it been held intimidation or coercion on the part of an
employer to lock out his employees, to blacklist them, to force
them to sign individual nonunion contracts as a condition of continued employment, or to force the establishment of a company
144
controlled and financed union.
ris Anti-Injunction Act was not intended to deprive federal courts of jurisprudence to restrain, if necessary, picketing of coercive, intimidating character"); Crump v. Commonwealth, (1888) 84 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620.
See, International Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove, (1930) 158
Md. 496, 509, 148 Atl. 826, ("Difficulty arises, of course, in drawing a line

between coercion and mere persuasion. And the zeal of pickets is always
likely to carry them too far, whatever the line. . . .The court, upon a
showing of excesses being committed in particular cases, can adapt its orders
to the particular needs shown."). See also, dissenting opinion of Holmes, J.,
in Vegelahn v. Guntner, (1896) 167 Mass. 92, 105, 44 N. E. 1077;
Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture Operators' Union Local No. 170,
(1920) 282 Mo. 304, 221 S. W. 95, (this case is a good example of how the
same facts may be differently interpreted and colored by the judges' personal
economic philosophies-see the majority and minority opinions.).
Cf., the decision in Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke, (1917) 53 Mont. 183,
193, 163 P. 107, (in which the court beautifully points out the fallacies in
the decisions on this question). See also, Four Plating Co. v. Mako, (1937)
122 N. J.Eq. 298, 194 Atl. 53, (contains an able discussion on the question
of compulsion); but see, Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v.
American Newspaper Guild, (1937) 122 N. J.Eq. 545, 195 Atl. 378, (a
threat of a secondary boycott was held to constitute coercion and intimidation) ; Wasserstein v. Beim, (1937) 163 Misc. Rep. 160, 294 N. Y. S.
439, 441; Foundry Co. v. Molders' Union, (1917) 20 Ohio N. P. (N.S.)
161, 28 Ohio Dec. N. P. 605, (contains an excellent discussion on this
issue) ; Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council, (1920) 99 Or. 1, 192 Pac.
765, (the dissenting opinion presents the question clearly and well) ; Geo. B.
Wallace Co v. International Ass'n, (1936) 155 Or. 652, 662, 63 P. (2d)
1090; Kirmse v. Adler, (1933) 311 Pa. St. 78, 166 Atl. 566. See People v.
Harris, (Colo. 1937) Labor and Unemployment Insurance Service, PrenticeHall, Inc., p. 19551.
"4'Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Ass'n, (1915) 221 Mass.
554, 559, 109 N. E. 643, ("A combination to blacklist is the counter weapon
to a combination to boycott, and is open to similar legal objections, when
directed against persons with whom those combining have no trade dispute,
or when the concerted action coerces the individual members, by implied
threats or otherwise, to withhold employment from those whom ordinarily
they would employ") ; State v. Daniels, (1912) 118 Minn. 155, 161, 136 N. W.
584, (This case presents an excellent statement of the issue but there is room
for doubt as to whether the court reached a proper conclusion. The court
indicates that the employee would have to voice some objection to the
action of the employer in requiring that he agree not to join a union as a
condition of contifiued employment. How many employees will be foolhardy
enough to voice or even intimate an objection, especially when his situation
is such that: "As a rule, his daily wage is needed for the daily wants of
himself and family, and nothing is left for the morrow. To sustain life he
must needs obtain or retain employment on whatever terms it may be offered") ; Sinsheimer v. United Garment Workers, (1894) 77 Hun. 215, 28
N. Y. S.321; La Rose v. Possehl, (1935) 156 Misc. Rep. 476, 282 N. Y. S.
332; see the dissenting opinion of Wanamaker, J., Jackson, Chief of
Police v. Berger, (1915) 92 Ohio St. 130, 149, 110 N. E. 732; State v.
Stewart, (1887) 59 Vt. 273, 9 Atl. 559; Trustees of Wisconsin State Federation of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., (1934) 215 Wis. 623, 256 N. W.
56, (Wisconsin Labor Code held to prevent coercion and interference by the
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It is an impossible task to attempt to state a rule by which
it can be determined what acts or words of men or organizations
are sufficiently intimidating or coercive to cause a court of equity
to exercise its injunctive powers. All that can be said properly
is that the evidence should indicate a more or less continuous
series of violent acts, or a very strong probability of violence in
the immediate future as the result of words or acts, which violence
cannot be controlled by the local police authorities or which they
refuse to control. Mass picketing in and of itself should never be
held to constitute intimidation. The number of pickets should
be diminished by court order only if they actually obstruct ingress and egress to the business picketed or interfere with the
reasonable use by other citizens of the streets. To go further
than this is to facilitate into the consideration of these cases the
admission to those elements which unconsciously and sometimes
consciously allow the court to substitute its social and economic
views for those of the litigants. Justice cannot even be approximated under such conditions.
CONSPIRACY

The use of the doctrine of conspiracy has been widespread in
industrial controversies. A large number of cases involving
labor disputes have turned upon whether or not the striking employees or the outside union have entered into an unlawful conemployer with the efforts of his employees to choose their own representa-

tives for collective bargaining purposes.)

Callan v. Exposition Cotton Mills, (1919) 149 Ga. 119, 99 S. E. 300,
(It is not intimidation or coercion when an employer requires his employees
to refrain from organizing as a condition of continued employment-it is
merely good business practice. But it is a conspiracy and coercion of the
employer if an outside union tries to organize the employees) ; Willner v.
Silverman, (1909) 109 Md. 341, 71 Atl. 962, (the blacklisting of discharged
employees by a combination of employers was not considered to constitute
intimidation or coercion of those employees); In re, Opinion of Justices,
(1929) 267 Mass. 607, 166 N. E. 401, (It is not intimidation or coercion
of prospective employees for the employer to require that as a condition of

their employment they must purchase stock in the employer's business);
Bradley v. Pierson, (1892) 148 Pa. St. 502, 24 Atl. 65; Borderland Coal
Corp. v. International United Mine Workers, (D. Ind. 1921) 275 Fed.
871, (for an employer to eject employees who have joined a union from
their company owned homes in order to destroy an attempt to unionize the
employer's business is not coercion but for the union to send food and
clothing to these people is a part of an unlawful conspiracy); Nolan v.

Farmington Shoe-Mfg. Co., (D. Mass. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 906. Cf., Virginia
Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 641,
(aff'd 300 U. S. 515, 57 Sup. Ct. 592, 81 L. Ed. 789 (1937). Also see,
Coppage v. Kansas, (1915) 236 U. S.1, 15, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441,
("We do not mean to say, therefore, that a state may not properly exert its
police power to prevent coercion on the part of employers towards employees,
or vice versa.")
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spiracy to gain their ends. The term has been loosely used and
much unsound rea-uning has been the result. A conspiracy is
generally defined as " 'a combination of two or more persons by
some concerted action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose or to accomplish a purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means.' "5' It is apparent that the
determination of what is an unlawful purpose or what are unlawful means, gives a broad field of action to the court in arriving at
a decision. The test is entirely too vague.
Almost every action by strikers or by an outside union has, at
one time or another, been held an unlawful conspiracy. The doctrine has had its principal use as a preventative of possible injury
to the property rights of the employer. The courts have not been
overly reluctant to label the actions of strikers a conspiracy whenever it was apparent that the strike was proving effective. All
too frequently, courts have declared that the combination of
strikers was formed to injure the plaintiff's business and is, therefore, an illegal conspiracy which should be enjoined. 14 A survey
WHellman v. Salesmen's Ass'n, (1919) 23 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 177,
180. See also, Meir v. Speer, (1910) 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988. (In this
case it was held that if the purpose of the unions' action and the means
adopted to obtain that purpose are both lawful, the result is neither a conspiracy nor a boycott) ; Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, (1908)
154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027; Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, (1907) 53
Fla. 969, 43 So. 590; Franklin ,Union, No. 4 v. People, (1906) 220 Ill. 355,
376, 77 N. E. 176; Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated VV. L. Union,
(1905) 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877; New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, (1914) 218 Mass. 198, 203, 105 N. E. 885; Lindsay & Co. v. Montana
Fed. of Labor, (1908) 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127; Reform Club of Masons
v. Laborers' Union Protective Society, (1899) 29 Misc. Rep. 247, 60 N. Y. S.
388, (refusal of members of one union to work with members of another
does not amount to a conspiracy) ; Albro J. Newton Co. v. Erickson, (1911)
70 Misc. Rep. 291, 126 N. Y. S. 949; Longshore Printing & Publishing Co.
v. Howell, (1894) 26 Or. 527, 38 Pac. 547; Bausbach v. Reiff, (1914) 244
Pa. St. 559, 91 Atl. 224; American Fed. of Labor v. Buck's Stove & Range
Co., (1909) 33 App. D. C. 83; Alaska S. S. Co. v. International Longshoremen's Association, (W.D. Wash. 1916) 236 Fed. 964.
International Organization v. Red Jacket C. C. & C. Co., (C.C.A. 4th
Cir. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 839, (an attempt to unionize a coal mine was held a
conspiracy to restrain and interfere with interstate commerce-such a result
would no longer be possible in view of the Wagner Act.) See also, United
Leather Workers v. Herkert, (1924) 265 U. S. 457, 44 Sup. Ct. 623, 68
L. Ed. 1104; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, (1933) 289 U. S. 103.
53 Sup. Ct. 549, 77 L. Ed. 1062; United States v. Railway Employees'
Department, American Federation of Labor, (N.D. Ill. 1922) 283 Fed. 479,
(section 20, of the Clayton Act, does not prohibit an injunction against an
unlawful conspiracy.)
14GEllis v. Journeyman Barbers', (1922) 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W.
111; Plant v. XVoods, (1900) 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011; Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663; A. Fink & Son v.
Butchers' Union, (1915) 84 N. J. Eq. 638, 95 Ati. 182, (this case is worth
reading if for no other reason than as an exposition of the strong prejudices
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of all of the thousands of strikes in the last fifty years would indicate beyond doubt that in the overwhelming majority of instances
the concert of action on the part of striking employees or of
members of an outside union was for the primary purpose of what
they believed would better their own condition. There are few
instances in which the primary purpose of the employees was to
injure their employer's business. In fact the instances are so rare
as not to be worthy of consideration.
We come then to a consideration of the second part of the test
of a conspiracy, "to accomplish a purpose; not in itself criminal
or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means." Here again when
we examine the reported decisions we find that almost every
means adopted by striking employees or an outside union has, at
one time or another, been held unlawful. Thus it has been held
unlawful for an outside union to picket a nonunion employer because his method of doing business is such as to destroy all the
gains which the union has made in the way of shorter working
hours. 14? It has been held an unlawful act to picket an employer
who refuses to renew a closed shop contract.14 8 There are a number of other instances of the same type. 4 '
Strangely enough, although it is an enjoinable conspiracy if
the actions of the workmen tend to injure or damage the employer's property or business, it has been held not to be a conspiracy for employers to combine to destroy a union.'50
The whole doctrine of conspiracy as it is applied to labor disputes is in need of reconsideration. Its use should definitely be
which rule some courts); National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders'
Ass'n, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1909) 169 Fed. 259, 265. Cf., Lindsay & Co. v.
Montana & Co. v. Montana Fed. of Labor, (1908) 37 Mont. 264, 96 P. 127.
147Hellman v. Salesmen's Ass'n, (1919) 23 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 177. In,
Moore v. Cooks', Waiters' & Waitresses', 'Union No. 402, (1919) 39 Cal.
App. 538, 179 Pac. 417, (picketing for the purpose of obtaining a closed
shop was held to be an unlawful conspiracy.)
'48Cooks', etc., Local Union v. Papageorge, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 230
S. W. 1086, 149. Moropoulos v. C. H. & 0. B. Fuller Co., (1921) 186
Cal. 679, 200 P. 601; Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W. L. Union,
(1905) 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877; Commonwealth v. Hunt, (1942) 4 Metc.
(Mass.) 111; Hellman v. Salesmen's Ass'n, (1919) 23 Ohio N. P. (N.S.)
177; Wachowski v. Lutz, (1924) 184 Wis. 584, 201 N. W. 234.
' 9 0Boyer v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (E.D. Mo. 1903); Kitchen
& Co. v. Local Union No. 141, (1922) 91 W. Va. 65, 112 S. E. 108, (an
extraordinary decision). See also, Nolan v. Farmington Shoe-Mfg. Co.,
(D. Mass. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 906, (in this case although it was denied the
purpose of the employer was to materially affect the union, but the court
held this was lawful) ; cf., Carpenters' Union v. Citizens' Committee, (1928)
333 Ill. 225, 164 N. E. 393, (it was held that for third parties to compel or

induce the employer to boycott and refuse to employ members of the union
was an illegal conspiracy.)
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restricted to those cases in which it is clear that the primary and
perhaps sole purpose of the act is to injure, and in which the
means adopted in the attempt to gain the end sought are violent
or will, in all probability, lead to violence. This must not be confused with actions adopted by the workers to make their strike
effective which are certain to injure the employer incidentally. 15 1
1
7'
Meir v. Speer, (1910) 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 998; Robison v. Hotel
& Restaurant Employees, Local No. 782, (1922) 35 Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132;
Kemp v. Division No. 241, (1912) 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389; Vegelahn
v. Guntner, (1896) 167 Mass. 108, 44 N. E. 1077, (see the dissenting opinion
of Holmes, J., for a lucid discussion of this question) ; Berry v. Donovan,
(1905) 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603, (in this case the court stated the correct
rule but applied it incorrectly; cf., the dissenting opinion of Holmes, J.) ;
Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1922) 151 Minn.
220, 186 N. W. 781, (the court seems to have failed to make the distinction) ; Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture Machine Operators' Local
No. 170, (1920) 282 Mo. 304, 221 S.W. 95, (the court failed to make the
proper distinction; cf., the dissenting opinion); Empire Theatre Co. v.
Cloke, (1917) 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107; New York Central Iron Works
Co. v. Breman, (1907) 105 N. Y. S. 865, (this case is a good example of
confusion in the court's mind between incidental injury caused in furthering
a definite goal of self-betterment and injury caused for injury's sake);
Kirmse v. Adler, (1933) 311 Pa. St. 78, 85, 166 Atl. 566; cf., Jefferson &
Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks, (1927) 287 Pa. St. 171, 134 Atl. 430; Levering
& Garrigues Co. v. MIorrin, (1933) 289 U. S. 103, 107, 53 Sup. Ct. 549, 77
L. Ed. 1062.
Schwarcz v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, (1910) 68
M isc. Rep. 528, 534, 124 N. Y. S. 968, (illustrates a vicious doctrine that has
found widespread acceptance in labor controversies, "The purpose to be

considered is its immediate, not its ulterior, purpose.

.

.

."

The doctrine

permits a court too much leeway) ; Grandview Dairy, Inc. v. O'Leary,
(1936) 158 Misc. Rep. 791, 285 N. Y. S. 841, (the court held that the defendant union's real purpose in trying to unionize the complainant's business
was to destroy the business because the union was not making a simultaneous
attempt to unionize all of the dairies in the community. The fallacy here is
that the better part of wisdom would dictate that a drive to unionize one
plant at a time would be easier and hold more chance of ultimate success.
It is often sheer folly to attempt to unionize an entire industry at one fell
swoop. The recent unionization of the automobile industry is a good example of the step by step plan of unionizing an entire industry. The court's
view seems to be either all or none-this is an unjustifiable and an unfair
treatment of the union and its members); cf., Overseas Storage Co. v.
Chlopsek, (1924) 209 App. Div. 834, 204 N. Y. S. 845; 'Vebb v. Cooks',
Waiters', and Waitresses' Union No. 748, (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 205 S.W.
465, (the court confuses the means of attaining the objective with the
objective); National Fireproof Co. v. Mason Builders' Ass'n, (C.C.A. 2d
Cir. 1909) 169 Fed. 259, 265, ("It is not enough to establish illegality in an
agreement between certain persons to show that it works harm to others. An
agreement entered into for the primary purpose of promoting the interests of
the parties is not rendered illegal by the fact that it may incidentally injure
third persons. Conversely, an agreement entered into for the primary
purpose of injuring another is not rendered legal by the fact that it may incidentally benefit the parties. As a general rule it may be stated that, when
the chief object of a combination is to injure or oppress third persons, it is
a conspiracy; but that when such injury or oppression is merely incidental
to the carrying out of lawful purpose, it is not a conspiracy. . . ." The
statement of the rule is a simple matter-but how apply it? Who is to
determine when the damage is incidental and when it is the primary purpose?
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There is a vast difference between a primary purpose for a lawful end, in the accomplishment of which injury occurs to another,
and a primary purpose of injury to another. In addition, there
must be no confusion between the adoption of peaceful means in
the furtherance of a lawful purpose which will probably cause
a loss of business to the employer, and the adoption of means
which are violent or will, in all probability, lead to violence. The
former should receive the sanction of an enlightened court, the
latter should receive its censure. What is a lawful purpose has in
the past rested upon what, in the court's opinion, is a lawful
purpose. Any purpose should be held lawful which the employees, or outside union, in good faith, believe to be for the betterment of their terms and conditions of employment. The determination of good faith should not be difficult. The words and acts
of the strikers or outside union, and the surrounding circumstances, can be used as fairly adequate guides.
BoycoTTs
The problem of the boycott, primary and secondary, like the
problem of conspiracy, has had a large place in the field of labor
litigation. Many courts make no distinction between primary and
secondary boycotts and hold all boycotts illegal. 152 Other courts
have made a distinction and have held primary boycotts valid
under certain circumstances and secondary boycotts illegal under
any circumstances, while still other courts have held both primary
and secondary boycotts lawful under certain conditions.5 3
It is apparent that personal views will enter largely in the determination and
often to the detriment of the worker as the recorded decisions indicate.)
lS2Ellis v. Journeyman Barbers', (1922) 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111;
Olympia Operating Co. v. Costello, (1932) 278 Mass. 125, 130, 179 N. E.
804; Baldwin v. Escanaba Liquor Dealers' Ass'n, (1911) 165 Mich. 98, 130
N. W. 214; Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W.
663; Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture Machine Operators' 'Union
Local No. 170, (1920) 282 Mo. 304, 221 S. W. 95; A. Fink & Son v.
Butchers' Union No. 422, (1915) 84 N. J. Eq. 638, 95 Atl. 182, (primary
boycott held unlawful); cf., Perfect Laundry Co. v. March, (1926) 120
N. J. Eq. 508, 186 At. 470, (primary boycott held lawful) ; Greenfield v.
Central Labor Council, (1922) 104 Or. 235, 207 Pac. 168, (primary boycott
illegal-there have been decisions on this point since the recent enactment
of modern labor legislation in the state and the position taken by the court
is probably no longer valid) ; Sheehan v. Levy, (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) 215
S. W. 229.
"'5To the effect that a primary boycott is lawful and a secondary boycott unlawful, see: Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local No.
782, (1922) 35 Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132, (primary boycott held lawful); Wilson v. Hey; (1908) 232 Ill. 389, 83 N. E. 928, (threat of a secondary boycott
held unlawful); Blandford v. Duthie, (1925) 147 Md. 388, 128 Atl. 138,
(a secondary boycott held unlawful) ; cf., International Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove, (1930) 158 Md. 496, 148 Atl. 826, (a threat to attempt
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The reasoning employed by the courts in both conspiracy and
boycott cases has an underlying unity. They have employed both

doctrines primarily to protect and safeguard business and property
rights from damage.1 5 4

They are often considered together be-

a secondary boycott is not unlawful); Plant v. Woods, (1900) 176 Mass.
492, 57 N. E. 1011, (see the dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., in which he
declares the boycott lawful) ; New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern,
(1914) 218 Mass. 198, 105 N. E. 885, (secondary boycott unlawful) ; Lohse
Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, (1908) 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997, (secondary
boycott held an unlawful conspiracy) ; Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, (1938) 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199 AtI.
599; McCormick v. Local Union, (1911) 13 Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 545, 32
Ohio C. C. 165, (primary boycott lawful) ; Packing Co. v. Butchers' Union,
(1916) 18 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 457, 30 Ohio Dec. N. P. 438, (secondary boycott unlawful); see, however, Brown & Son v. Mine Workers, (1925) 25
Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 485, (a primary boycott held illegal); d., Wiley
v. Retail Clerks' Union, (1934) 32 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 257; Clark
Lunch Co. v. Waiters' Local, (1926) 22 Ohio App. 265, 271, 154 N. E.
362; Wills v. Restaurant Employees, (1927) 26 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 435, (a
primary boycott held unlawful where the conflict was one of white workmen against colored workmen); Beckerman v. Bakery Union, (1931) 28
Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 550, (secondary boycott held illegal); McAllister v.
Building Trades Council, (1938) 12 Ohio Opinions 179, (the court approves
a particular type of secondary boycott) ; Lawlor v. Loewe, (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1911) 187 Fed. 522, (threat of a secondary boycott held unlawful) ; United
Chain Theatres v. Philadelphia Moving Picture Machine Operators' Union,
(E.D. Pa. 1913) 50 F. (2d) 189, (primary boycott held lawful but secondary
boycott held unlawful); Pacific Typesetting Co. v. International Typographical Union, (1923) 125 Wash. 273, 283, 216 Pac. 358; Parker Paint &
Wall Paper Co. v. Local Union No. 813, (1921) 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S. E.
911, (secondary boycott unlawful) ; Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union
Local No. 5, (1936) 222 Wis. 383, 268 N. W. 270.
To the effect that both primary and secondary boycotts are lawful, see:
Union Labor Hospital Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., (1910) 159
Cal. 551, 112 Pac. 886, (In this case we have the strange situation of an
employer threatening his employees with discharge if they continue to
patronize a certain storekeeper. The action of the employer was held lawful) ; Lisse v. Local Union, (1935) 2 Cal. (2d) 312, 41 P. (2d) 314; Empire
Theatre Co. v. Cloke, (1917) 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107; Manhattan Steam
Bakery v. Schindler, (1937) 250 App. Div. 467, 294 N. Y. S. 783; contra:
Commercial House & Window Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, (1930) 138 Misc.
Rep. 512, 240 N. Y. S. 797; see also, Foster v. Retail Clerk's International
Protective Ass'n, (1902) 39 Misc. Rep. 48, 78 N. Y. S. 860, (a primary
boycott is lawful) ; Grandview Dairy, Inc. v. O'Leary, (1936) 158 Misc.
Rep. 791, 285 N. Y. S. 841; cf., Goldfinger v. Feintuch, (1937) 276 N. Y.
281, 286, 11 N. E. (2d) 910; cf., also, Schlang v. Ladies' Waist Makers'
Union, (1910) 67 Misc. Rep. 221, 124 N. Y. S. 289.
Loewe v. California State Fed. of Labor, (N.D. Cal. 1911) 189 Fed.
714, (the court held that it was no defense to a suit to restrain a boycott
that the
defendants acted in accordance with the rules of their trade union.)
154Lietzman Radio Broadcasting Station W. C. F. L., (1935) 282 11.
203; Ellis v. Journeyman Barbers', (1922) 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111;
Bull v. International Alliance, (1925) 119 Kan. 713, 241 Pac. 459; My
Maryland Lodge v. Adt, (1905) 100 Md. 238, 59 AtI. 721; Martineau v.
Foley, (1918) 231 Mass. 220, 120 N. E. 445; Baldwin v. Escanaba Liquor
Dealers' Ass'n, (1911) 165 Mich. 98, 130 N. W. 214; Gray v. Building
Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn. 171, 182, 97 N. V. 663; New York Central
Iron Works Co. v. Breman, (1907) 105 N. Y. S. 865; Foundry Co. v.
Molders' Union, (1917) 20 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 161, 28 Ohio Dec. N. P. 605;
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cause in many cases the principal contention of the complainant
is that the striking employees of the outside union have undertaken
a conspiracy to boycott him.
A primary boycott exists when a combination of persons refuses to purchase another's merchandise or to employ his services
and attempts to persuade others to do likewise. A secondary
boycott has been defined as the existence of a
"combination of several persons for the purpose of causing
loss to plaintiffs by causing others, against their will, to withdraw
from these plaintiffs their beneficial business intercourse through
threats that, unless a compliance with their demands be made, the
persons forming the combination will cause loss or injury to
him. 155
The distinction which many courts have attempted to make
Purvis v. Local No. 500, (1906) 214 Pa. 348, 63 AtI. 585. But see, Willner
v. Silverman, (1909) 109 Md. 341, 355, 71 Atl. 962.
Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 342, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L.
Ed. 254, (see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes: "By calling a
business 'property' you make it seem like land, and lead up to the conclusion that a statute cannot substantially cut down the advantages of ownership existing before the statute was passed. An established business no
doubt may have pecuniary value and commonly is protected by law against

various unjustified injuries. But you cannot give it definiteness of contour
by calling it a thing. It is a course of conduct and like other conduct is
subject to substantial modification according to time and circumstances both
in itself and in regard to what shall justify doing it a harm. I cannot
understand the notion that it would be unconstitutional to authorize boycotts and the like in aid of the employees' or employers' interest by statute
when the same result has been reached constitutionally without statute by
courts....")
155
Packing Co. v. Butchers' Union, (1916) 18 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 457,
460, 30 Ohio Dec. N. P. 438. For other definitions of a secondary boycott
see, Meir v. Speer, (1910) 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, (1909) 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324; Paramount Enterprises v.
Mitchell, (1932) 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328; Lietzman v. Radio Broadcasting
Station W. C. F. L., (1935) 282 Ill. App. 203; Ellis v. Journeyman Barbers,'
(1922) 104 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111; My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, (1905)
100 Md. 238, 59 Atl. 721; Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn.
171, 97 N. W. 663; Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., (N.D. Ohio,
1893) 54 Fed. 730; Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct.
124, 66 L. Ed. 254.

Blumenthal v. Feintuch, (1934) 153 Misc. Rep. 40, 273 N. Y. S. 660, (it
was held that trade union placards appealing to the public not to buy certain
foods but which did not mention the names of the customers of the manufacturer of the foods and no effort to intimidate or injure the manufacturer's
customers did not constitute an illegal secondary boycott even though by
coincidence the complainant was the only manufacturer of such products) ;
Engelmeyer v. Simon, (1933) 148 Misc. Rep. 621, 265 N. Y. S. 636, (picketing of places of business of some of the complainant's customers, and
bearing placards which requested sympathizers to purchase bread with the
union label on it was held not to amount to a secondary boycott).
For definitions of a primary boycott see, Pierce v. Stablemen's Union,

(1909) 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324; Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed. of Labor,
(1908) 37 Mont. 264, 272, 96 Pac. 127; Mills v. United States Printing Co.,
(1904) 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. S. 185.
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between what is a lawful and what is an unlawful primary boycott is based upon the primary purpose of the boycott. These
courts contend that if the primary purpose is to do irreparable injury to the complainant, the boycott is illegal; but, if the primary
purpose is to better the conditions of the boycotters as laborers,
and not to do irreparable injury, the boycott is lawful even though
incidental damage results.51
Once again the question presents
itself: What standards are to be used to determine when the primary purpose is to do irreparable damage and when the damage
is only incidental to the lawful primary purpose? This difficulty
is by no means imaginary. The end result has been that in those
jurisdictions in which the above mentioned rule prevails there is
no certainty as to when a set of actions may be enjoined'as an unlawful boycott and when they may be upheld as lawful. The
decision, therefore, rests, for the most part, with the personal
predilections of the court. It is obvious that if the court happens
to have a broad social philosophy the acts will be sustained as in
the lawful exercise of their rights by the workers and the damage
will be only incidental and damnum absque injuria. If, however,
the court should happen to be of a conservative turn of mind,
the primary purpose is apt to be declared to be to cause injury to
the employer and the acts restrained as unlawful. This is evidently not a satisfactory situation.
Obviously, workmen and trade unions will consistently adopt
such means as, in their opinion, are effective to gain their ends.
The primary purpose in most strikes by employees or attempts
by an outside union to unionize the business of a particular employer, is to better the conditions of the workers. It is not logical to suppose that employees or unions would sacrifice the security
of everyday work or the funds and energies of the union, as the
case may be, in order to satisfy a whim to injure the employer.'
Unless the employer is affected, the strikers might as well abandon
their efforts and seek other fields of endeavor. It is quite unlikely
to suppose that one who refuses to accede to the demands of another will change his mind merely out of the goodness of his heart.
Men are more willing to discuss terms of settlement when their
pocketbooks are affected. This is true in all other fields of life
I"0 Rosen v. United Shoe & Leather Workers' Union, (1926) 287 I1.
App. Div. 49, 4 N.E. (2d) 507; Overseas Storage Co. v. Chlopsek, (1924) 209

App. Div. 834, 204 N. Y. S. 845. For a fine statement which cuts clear
through to the heart of the problem, see, Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed. of
I-abor,7 (1908) 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127.
'5 Reardon, Inc. v. Caton, (1919) 189 App. Div. 501, 178 N. Y. S. 713.
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--why should it not be true in the field of labor relations? To
avoid facing the very real problem posed is not to solve it. Because the means employed is effective or because the loss is great,
does this make the primary purpose unlawful, or, if lawful, does
it make the means unlawful?
The affirmative answer given by many of the courts to this
question is obviously a screen behind which lies the real reason."'
Witness the argument expressed in Packing Co. v. Butchers'
Union, which clearly is not the moving reason for the result
reached by the court :109

"The method employed is thoroughly un-American and contrary to the spirit of our Constitution and Bill of Rights, which
grants unto every man a free and unrestricted opportunity to enter
into the limitless field of lawful trade and business. . ..",60
It is apparent that the court is merely sparring with the real problem; because an act may be un-American does not necessarily
make it unlawful. Furthermore, who is to determine what acts are
un-American, and upon what basis is this determination to be made?
The constitution and the bill of rights were drawn by immigrants
or the sons of immigrants. However, some courts have been
courageous enough to give the real reason behind their decisions
-namely, that they have no particular personal desire to see the
strike succeed. In Martin v. McFall, the court held that the acts
15STruax v. Corrigan, (1918) 20 Ariz. 7, 176 Pac. 570, (reversed in,
Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254,
on the ground that statute involved was unconstitutional but the chances are
that a similar statute would be upheld today) ; cf., State v. Glidden, (1887) 55
Conn. 46, 8 AtI. 890, (in which the court held that if the boycott did not
seriously affect the employer it was not criminal but if it meant ruin to him,
then it was criminal) ; McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., (1921) 151 Ga.
776, 108 S.E. 226, (the actions adopted by the outside union were proving
effective and were, therefore, enjoined as intimidating and coercive) ; Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local No. 782, (1922) 35 Idaho 418,
429, 207 Pac. 132; cf., Nusbaum v. Retail Clerks' International Protective
Ass'n, (1922) 227 Ill. App. 206; Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W.
L. Union, (1905) 165 Ind. 421, 431, 75 N. E. 877; Picket v. Walsh, (1906)
192 Mass. 572, 581, 78 N. E. 753; Martin v. McFall, (1903) 65 N. J. Eq.
91, 85 Atl. 465, (the court recognizes the principle but refuses to adhere
to it) ; Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council, (1920) 99 Or. 1, 192 Pac.
765, (see the dissenting opinion for a fine presentation of the problem.)
On the question of the effectiveness of strikers' actions, see, AllisChalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, (E.D. Wis. 1906) 150 Fed. 155, 171;
Hellman v. Salesmen's Ass'n, (1919) 23 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 177, (the picketing was apparently effective and the court enjoined it even though the
ultimate purpose of the pickets was good. The court, in its effort to safeguard property rights, confused incidental damages with the purpose);
Longshore Printing & Publishing Co. v. Howell, (1894) 26 Or. 527, 38 Pac.
547, (confusion here of incidental damage and purpose.)
159(1916) 18 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 457, 30 Ohio Dec. N. P. 438.
16OPacking Co. v. Butchers' Union, (1916) 18 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 457,
462, 30 Ohio Dec. N. P. 438.
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of the defendants constituted an unlawful boycott where they
attempted to "induce or compel complainant to adopt a particular
mode of doing business by persuading or inducing other persons
not to deal with him," because it "is one of the most usual, and in
fact almost the only means by which the defendants can enforce
their demands, I cannot say that complainant is in no danger of
being injured."'6 1
Within the past few years the primary boycott has been more
generally accepted by the courts as a legitimate instrument in the
conduct of a labor dispute. It is difficult to see why it is not perfectly lawful for a labor union or striking employees to publish
the fact that an employer is unfair to labor, and to advise their
friends and the public not to patronize such an employer." 2 The
very same thing is done many times each day by untold numbers
of individuals in social discourse when they advise friends and
relatives not to patronize a particular merchant or buy a particular article because either the merchant or the article, or both, do not
meet with the approval of the speaker. No one has ever suggested that the giving of such advice is enjoinable.163
The secondary boycott still bears the imprint of illegality in
almost every jurisdiction in this country. Many courts feel that
"While direct picketing of an employer permits its customers to
decide whether they wish to aid the union or not, intimidation of
the customers themselves amounts to a coercion of their judgment;
and the law never countenances coercion." 1 64 Others have held
1f1(1903) 65 N. J.Eq. 91, 92, 55 Atl. 465.
170 Ark. 863, 281 S. W. 663; Parkinson Co.
v. Buildiniz Trades Council, (1908) 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027, (the court
dcfines the meaning and implication of the word "unfair"); Lietzman v.
Radio Broadcasting Station W. C. F. L., (1935) 282 Ill. App. 203; Steffes
v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1917) 136 Minn. 200, 161
N. WV.524; cf., Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union,
(1922) 151 Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781; Root v. Anderson, (Mo. App. 1918)
207 S. W. 255; Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed. of Labor, (1908) 37 Mont.
.264, 96 Pac. 127; Perfect Laundry Co. v. Marsch, (1936) 120 N. J. Eq.
508, 186 Atl. 470; Blumenthal v. Feintuch, (1934) 153 Misc. Rep. 40, 273
N. Y. S. 660; Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Retail Clerks', (E.D. Mo.
1918) 250 Fed. 890. Contra: Moore v. Cooks', Waiters' & Waitresses'
Union No. 402, (1919) 39 Cal. App. 538; see also, People v. Armentrout,
(Cal. 1931) 1 Pac. (2d) 556, (in which an anti-picketing and boycotting
ordinance was involved) ; cf., these cases with Lisse v. Local Union (1935)
2 Cal. (2d) 312, 41 P. (2d) 314, in which a secondary boycott was held
lawful; Reynolds v. Davis, (1908) 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457.
10oHeitkemper v. Central Labor Council, (1920) 99 Or. 1, 192 Pac. 765,
(see the dissenting opinion of Bennett, J.)
-64Grandview Dairy, Inc. v. O'Leary, (1936) 158 Misc. Rep. 791, 793,
285 N. Y. S. 841. See also, Anderson v. Lind Mfg. Co. v. Carpenters' District Council, (1923) 308 I1. 488, 139 N. E. 887; Picket v. Wash, (1906)
192 Mass. 572, 587, 78 N. E. 753; Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture
16-Jones v. State, (1926)
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that the secondary boycott raises the question as to whether or not
the strikers shall be permitted to destroy the business of a third
party in order thereby to gain their contention with their employer. 6"" But the principle involved is broader than this. It
was well put in Manhattan Steam Bakery v. Schindler, where the
court held that
"... though it be sometimes called a secondary boycott, peaceful picketing in front of the premises of a customer of an employer, with a sign stating that the employer is fairly under the ban
of the employees' union, is likewise lawful. There is a definite
industrial relation between the sale of plaintiff's
products and the
6
aims and objects of defendants' union.'

6

There can be little doubt that one who undertakes to market
goods produced by an employer engaged in a dispute with his
employees or an outside union is a participant in that dispute.
His dealings with the employer are as effective, in their way, as
strikebreakers are in theirs in minimizing the effect of a strike.
This for the reason that strikes generally remain unsettled until
one side or the other feels that it is too costly, pecuniarily, to continue. Strikebreakers have been used many times in the past successfully to break a strike. If the employer can keep the ranks of
his employees filled, he is seldom much concerned whether the
strike is settled or not. Its effect upon him in that case is usually
negligible. 67 So, if he can continue to sell his merchandise or servOperators' Local No. 170, (1920) 282 Mo. 304, 221 S.W. 95; Goldfinger v.
Feintuch, (1937) 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910; The Dayton Manufacturing Co. v. The Metal Polishers, etc., Union, (1901) 8 Ohio N. P.
574, 11 Ohio Dec. N. P. 643. But see, Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke, (1917)
53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107; Manhattan Steam Bakery v. Schindler, (1937)
250 App.
Div. 467, 468, 294 N. Y. S.783.
165Picket v. Walsh, (1906) 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753; New England
Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, (1914) 218 Mass. 198, 105 N. E. 885; Lohse
v. Fuelle, (1908) 215 Mo. 421, 114 S.W. 997; Goldfinger v. Feintuch, (1937)
276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910; Packing Co. v. Butchers' Union, (1916)
18 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 457, 30 Ohio Dec. N. P. 438; O'Brien v. Fackenthal,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 389; Parker Paint & Wall Paper Co. v.
Local Union No. 813, (1921) 87 WAF.
Va. 631, 105 S.E. 911.
166(1937) 250 App. Div. 467, 468, 294 N. Y. S.783. See also, Goldfinger
v. Feintuch, (1937) 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, in which the court
apparently places a limitation upon the right to picket a third party's place
of business by holding that it may be done where the retailer, who is being
picketed, is in unity of interest with the nonunion manufacturer whose goods
the retailer sells. See, Weil & Co. v. Doe, (1938) 168 Misc. Rep. 211, 5
N. Y. S. (2d) 559, for a definition and application of the term "unity of
interest." See also, Atlantic Refining Co. v. Cohen, (Pa. 1938) Labor and
Unemployment Insurance Service, Pretice-Hall, Inc., p. 19632. Cf., however, Mitnick v. Furniture Workers' Union, (1938) 124 N. J. Eq. 147, 200
Atl. 553.
167Moore Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy, (1923) 243 Mass. 554, 137
N. E. 919; Mode Novelty Co. v. Taylor, (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 593, 195
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ice without diminution, the chances of his being willing to discuss
a settlement are small. Why? Because the strike has not really
affected him-he has gained his point and he has not suffered a
loss of business. If a survey were to be made of all of the cases
in which an employer has come into court asking for an injunction
against his striking employees, or against the importunities of an
outside union, it would be noted that in most instances the action
was not initiated until the strike became effective, that is, until
it was noticeable to the employer that his business was being
affected financially. Thus it would seem that as long as a secondary boycott is peaceably conducted it should be sustained as
having a direct relation to the dispute between the employer and
his employees. Obviously, in this situation as in all of the others,
violence, or acts from which violence will in all probability spring,
should not be countenanced.
Very often, in the consideration of the conspiracy and boycott
questions, the court is met with the argument that since one individual may abstain from trading with the employer, regardless of
his motive and without responsibility for any injury to the employer's business by reason of such abstinence, so he may lawfully
combine with others to accomplish the same purpose. That is,
what one may lawfully do alone he may lawfully combine to do
with others. A number of courts have unequivocally denied the
validity of this contention. Thus it was held in State v. Donaldson that
"In the natural position of things, each man acting as an
individual, there would be no coercion; if a single employee
should demand the discharge of a co-employee, the employer
would retain his freedom, for he could entertain or repeal the
requisition without embarrassment to his concerns; but in the
presence of a coalition of his employees ... in most cases, he must
submit, under pain of often the most ruinous losses, to the conditions imposed on his necessities." ' 6
Atl. 819. See also, Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, (E.D. Wis.
1906) 150 Fed. 155, 171.
1s(1867) 32 N. J. L. 151, 155. See also, State v. Glidden, (1887) 55
Conn. 46, 8 Atl. 890; Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, (1907) 53 Fla.
969, 974, 43 So. 690; Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, (1911) 220 Ill. 355,
77 N. E. 176; Burnham v. Dowd, (1914) 217 Mass. 351, 358, 104 N. E.
841; cf., the dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., in, Vegelahn v. Guntner,
(1896) 167 Mass. 108, 44 N. E. 1077; Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle,
(1908) 215 Mo. 421, 144 S.W. 997; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, (1894)
53 N. 3. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881; cf., Alfred W. Booth & Brother v. Burgess,
(1906) 72 N. J.Eq. 181, 65 Atl. 226; cf., also, New Jersey Painting Co. v.
Local No. 26, (1924) 96 N. J.Eq. 632, 126 Atl. 399; Webb v. Cooks', etc.,
Union No. 748, (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 205 S. WV. 465; Loewe v. California
State Federation of Labor, (N.D. Cal. 1905) 139 Fed. 71; cf., Union Pacific
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Comment is hardly necessary. It is apparent that this line of argument is well suited to block effective action upon the part of the
workers. The more reasonable point of view would seem to be
that two or more persons may agree to do together what each one
of them may lawfully do alone. 119 It is suggested that any other
view leads to a result that is logically unsupportable and out of
harmony with the needs and demands of an industrial age in which
effective action is not always synonymous with individual action.
CONTRACTS WITH UNIONS

As the principle of collective bargaining gains headway, we
find an increasing number of instances in which employer and
trade union have found it more satisfactory to negotiate rather
complete contracts covering all phases of the terms and conditions of employment. An added impetus has been given to such
contracts by the Wagner Act and similar state legislation. The
question sometimes arises in the enforcement of these contracts
as to whether or not they lack mutuality. It has been uniformly
held that such a contract is not unilateral, does not lack mutuality,
170
and is valid.
R. Co. v. Reuf, (D. Neb. 1902) 120 Fed. 102, (this case is contra to the
Loewe Case, supra.) ; but see, Bedford Co. v. Stone Cutters' Ass'n, (1927)
274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916.
l191Meir v. Speer, (1910) 96 Ark. 618, 1.32 S. W. 988; Kemp v. Division
No. 241, (1912) 255 Ill. 213, 223, 99 N. E. 389; Karges Furniture
Co. v. Amalgamated W. L. Union, (1905) 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877,
(The difficulty is what test to apply in determining whether the purpose
in view is unlawful. There is also a further difficulty-who is to make this
determination?) ; Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musician's Ass'n, (1912) 118 Minn. 410, 136 N. W. 1092; Lindsay & Co. v.
Montana Fed. of Labor, (1908) 37 Mont. 264, 273, 96 Pac. 127; National
Protective Ass'n of Steam Fitters v. Cumming, (1902) 170 N. Y. 315, 321,
63 N. E. 369; Rosenwasser Bros. v. Pepper, (1918) 104 Misc. Rep. 457, 172
N. Y. S. 310; cf., however, Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin,
(1927) 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130; McCormick v. Local Union, (1911)
13 Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 545, 32 Ohio C. C. 165; Fulforth Co. v. Garment
Workers, (1913) 15 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 353, 27 Ohio Dec. N. P. 675;
but see, Salesmen's Ass'n, (1919) 23 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 177; Wabash R.
Co. v. Hannahan, (E.D. Mo. 1903) 121 Fed. 563; Jensen v. Cooks' & Waiters'
Union,
(1905) 39 Wash. 531, 81 Pac. 1069.
17 OCapra v. Local Lodge No. 273, (1938) 102 Colo. 63, 76 P. (2d) 738;
Gregg v. Starks, (1920) 188 Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459; Mississippi Theatres
Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local Union, (1936) 174 Miss. 439, 164 So. 887;
Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.. (1934) 126 Neb. 493, 496, 253 N. W.
694; Goldman v. Cohen, (1928) 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y. S. 311, (contract to employ workers sent by the union as needed by the employer is
enforceable but cannot prevent the employer from moving his factory to a
comparatively distant location, thereby making it difficult for the union to
send workers unless the contract contains a clause forbidding the removal
of the factory) ; see also, Farulla v. Freundlich, Inc., (1934) 152 Misc. Rep.
761, 274 N. Y. S. 228; Leveranz v. Home Brewing Co., (1922) 24 Ohio
N. P. (N.S.) 193; Goldstein v. International Ladies' Garment Workers'
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"Legislatures and courts recognize the right of labor unions
to enter into lawful contracts on behalf of their members with the
employer for the purpose of promoting the welfare of their members, and in furtherance thereof such agreements should be clothed
with legal sanction and afforded this
reciprocal protection in their
17 1
lawful contractual undertakings.'

The principal reason for approving such contracts is that they
tend to promote industrial peace and, therefore, are to be welcomed as an enlightened method of dealing with the difficult problems of labor relations' 7 2 To hold them invalid would be a
calamitous step backward.
It has also been held generally that such contracts may be
enforced by individual members of the union, by the union both
at law and in equity by an injunction to prevent its breach by
the employer, and by the employer both at law and in equity to
3
prevent its breach by the unionY.

Union, (1938) 328 Pa. St. 385, 196 Atl. 43, (the court granted a negative

decree enjoining the employer-defendant from pursuing at any other place
than Philadelphia the business which he conducted and which, ,under the
contract between the employer and the union, was to remain in Philadelphia
during the life of the contract) ; Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, (1928)
157 Tenn. 461, 9 S. W. (2d) 692; Harper v. Local Union, (Tex. Civ. App.
1932) 48 S. W.
Airline Coal Co.,
& T. P. Ry. Co.,
Coal Co., (1904)
See also, W.

(2d) 1033, (an excellent decision.) Contra: Wilson v.
(1933) 215 Iowa 855, 246 N. W. 753; Hudson v. C. N. 0.
(1913) 152 Ky. 711, 154 S. W. 47; Burnetta v. Marceline
180 Mo. 241, 79 S.W. 136.
A. Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, (1917) 227 Mass. 382,

390, 116 N. E. 801; Meltzer v. Kaminer, (1927) 131 Misc. Rep. 813, 227
N. Y. S.459, (where there is a contract between a union and an employer
for definite period the officers of the union will be enjoined from calling a
strike before the expiration of the contract if the reason for the proposed
strike is to violate one of the terms of the contract) ; Nederlandsch Amer.
S. M. v. Stevedores', etc., Society, (E.D. La. 1920) 265 Fed. 397, (union is
responsible to the employer for the action of a number of its members in
refusing to work in accordance with the terms of a contract between the
union and the employer); Railroad Co. v. Webb, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1933)
64 F. (2d) 902, 903, (since the enactment of the Wagner Act, this decision
is no longer representative of any federal court view but it still represents
a point of view held in some state jurisdictions; West v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co., (1927) 103 W. Va. 417, 422, 137 S.E. 654.
In, World Trading Corp. v. Kolchin, (1938) 166 Misc. Rep. 854, 2
N. Y. S. (2d) 195, it was held that although a local union changes its name
and severs its connection with the parent union and transfers its allegiance
to another parent union, it did not thereby become a different entity, and
its rights under a contract executed prior to the change of allegiance were
not destroyed. Cf., M. & M. Wood Working Co., Inc. v. Plywood & Veneer
Workers,
(D. Or. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 11.
17 'Ribner v. Racso Butter & Egg Co., (1929) 135 Misc. Rep. 616, 621,
238 N. Y. S.132.
17'Mississippi Theatres Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local Union, (1936) 174
Miss. 439, 164 So. 887, (an excellent discussion); Rentschler v. Missouri
Pacific R. Co., (1934) 126 Neb. 493, 253 N. W. 694; Leveranz v. Home Brewing Co., (1922) 24 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 193; Blum & Co. v. Landau, (1926)
23 Ohio
App. 426, 155 N. E. 154.
173 Gregg v. Starks, (1920) 188 Ky. 834, 839, 224 S.W. 459; Mosshamer
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AND "NATURAL"

RIGHTS

Nowhere, with the possible exception of the field of constitutional law, do we find such a widespread use of the metaphysical
doctrines of inalienable and natural rights as in the law of labor
relations. Time after time, courts have resorted to the use of
these doctrines to support their conclusions. The results are not
always desirable or justifiable. For example, it has been held
many times that "the relation of employer and employee is purely
voluntary, resting upon the contract of the parties. Every man
has a natural right to hire his services to any one he pleases, or
refrain from such hiring . ..."174 Just what does a court mean
v. Wabash Ry. Co., (1922) 221 Mich. 407, 191 N. W. 210; Yazoo & M. V.

R. Co. v. Sideboard, (1931) 161 Miss. 4, 14, 133 So. 669; Stephenson v. New
Orleans & N. E. R. Co., (1937) 180 Miss. 147, 177 So. 509, (an action can
be maintained by a group of employees as a class to the same extent that
the action could be maintained in the name of the union) ; Blum & Co. v.
Landau, (1926) 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N. E. 154; Harper v. Local Union,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 48 S. W. (2d) 1033; cf., however, Ry. Co. v.
Wilson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 55 S.W. (2d) 216. Contra: Wilson v.
Airline Coal Co., (1933) 215 Iowa 855, 246 N. W. 753; Hudson & C. N. 0.
& T. P. Ry. Co., (1913) 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47; cf., Louisville & Nashville
Ry. Co. v. Bryant, (1936) 263 Ky. 578, 92 S.W. (2d) 749.
See also, Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., (1923) 198 Ky. 477,
248 S. W. 1042, (a union cannot waive any personal right of a member
gained under an agreement between the union and the employer) ; Hartley
v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, (1938) 283 Mich. 201, 277 N. WV.
885, (An agreement between a union and an employer is executed for the
benefit of all the members of the union and not for the individual benefit
of any particular member. Therefore, such agreement may be modified by
the joint action of the union and the employer even though such modification may be disadvantageous to a particular member of the union.)
174People v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., (1923) 306 Ill.
486, 493, 138 N. E. 155. See also, Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse, (1914)
189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657; Cohn v. Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers', etc.,
Local Union No. 1, (1917) 92 Conn. 161, 101 Atl. 659; Carpenters' Union
v. Citizens' Committee, (1928) 333 Ill. 225, 238, 164 N. E. 393; Citizens'
Co. v. Asheville Typographical Union, (1924) 187 N. C. 42, 121 S. E. 31.
Cf., Reardon, Inc. v. Caton, (1919) 189 App. Div. 501, 178 N. Y. S.713.
See also the following cases on the question of inalienable, natural,
and other metaphysical rights: L. D. Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Bricklayers'
Benevolent & Protective -Union No. 3, (1908) 200 Mass. 110, 85 N. E. 897;
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Fitzgerald, (1921) 237 Mass. 537, 130 N. E.
86; Olympia Operating Co. v. Costello, (1932) 278 Mass. 125, 179 N. E.
804; Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1918) 140
Minn. 481, 486, 168 N. W. 766; Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture
Machine Operators' Local No. 170, (1920) 282 Mo. 304, 314, 221 S.W. 95;
Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, (1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 764, 53 At.
230; Wasilewski v. Bakers' Union, Local No. 64, (1935) 118 N. J.Eq. 349,
350, 179 Atl. 284; Canter Sample Furniture House v. Retail Furniture Employees' Local No. 109, (1937) 122 N. J.Eq. 575, 196 Atl. 210; Grand Shoe
Co. v. Children's Shoe Workers' Union, (1920) 187 N. Y. S. 886, 889;
Wood Mowing & Reaping Machine Co. v. Toohey, (1921) 114 Misc. Rep.
185, 186, 186 N. Y. S. 95; Burgess Brothers Co. v. Stewart, (1921) 114
Misc. Rep. 673, 677, 187 N. Y. S.873; Brandt-Rosen v. Golden, (1932) 143
Misc. Rep. 867, 868, 256 N. Y. S.824; Sherman v. Abeles, (1934) 265 N. Y.
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when it says that a man has a natural right to work or not to work?
If he has a natural right to work, what becomes of that right
when there is no work? What becomes of it when the employer
chooses to lock him out or blacklist him? What value is there
to a right not to work unless, when through no fault of his own,
the worker finds himself without work, there is another means
of support available? Another court has stated that the "right
to contract is not a natural right, but it is the first relative right
that man has when he becomes a social entity.' 17' What is a relative right? Still another court has said that men have the right
to enjoy a "free and natural" condition of the labor market, and
that the "peculiar element of this perhaps newly recognized right
is that it is an interest which one man has in the freedom of another. 1"1 "

Again, one may ask, what is the right to a free and

natural condition of the labor market? It is a matter of great
doubt whether such a condition has ever existed or ever will exist
77
or, if it did exist, whether it would be desirable.
These metaphysical doctrines have been erected into effective
safeguards for the protection of property as against the social and
Time and again they have been
economic claims of the worker. 7
383, 193 N. E. 241; Kealey v. Faulkner, (1908) 7 Ohio N. P. (N.S.)
49, 55, 18 Ohio Dec. N. P. 498; Erdman v. Mitchell, (1903) 207 Pa. St. 79,
91, 56 Atl. 327; Ry. Co. v. Griffin, (1914) 106 Tex. 477, 483, 171 S. W.
703; Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, (N.D. Ohio 1906) 150 Fed. 148;
Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners Union No. 220, (D.
Nev. 1908) 159 F. 500, 514; Coppage v. Kansas, (1915) 236 U. S. 1, 12, 35
Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441; Monday Co. v. Automobile, etc., Local No. 25,
(1920)7 171 Wis. 532, 177 N. W. 867.
' Brost Pattern Works v. Reid, (1922) 24 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 60, 62.
' 7 15Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, (1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 765,
53 Atl.
230.
177When a court talks in terms of natural rights, inalienable rights,
liberty of contract, the right to a free flow of labor, etc., it is placing
itself on the side of those who believe that the main function of the state
is to intervene as little as possible in the economic life of the people. That
is, the court is expressing a wish for a return to the conditions of the
negative state. ". . . What is interesting in the thesis is less the question
of whether it implies a practical policy than the assumptions upon which it
rests. These are, first, that the unfettered competition of private interests
will produce a well-ordered society; and, second, that in life as distinct from
theory, a competition which begins as unfettered will remain such. Neither
assumption conforms to our experience." Laski, The State In Theory And
Practice, (1935) 27.
17s"Conservative historians like McMaster, Ford, or President Wilson,
have repeatedly pointed out that the Federal Convention was organized not
by democrats like Jefferson, Patrick Henry, or Samuel Adams, who were
prominent in the Revolutionary movement, but by the commercial and
propertied classes, who were frightened at the excesses of the popular state
governments. The Federal Convention, however, agreed not on eternal
" Cohen, Law and the Social
principles, but on practical compromises ..
Order (1933) 15.
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used to break strikes aimed at the amelioration of working conditions. It is no exaggeration to assert that they deal with a
world of abstractions and make believe. The arguments which
are based upon them lack substance, they are mere images of a
shadow existence. An excellent example is Cooks', etc., Union v.
Papageorge,in which the court very gravely points out that the
"Constitution grants to every man under the protection of the
American flag, the right to make contracts for his personal services; free from hindrance or obstruction by his fellow men, and
he has the inalienable right to freely use his hands for whom he
pleases, upon such terms as he pleases. These rights include both
the right to sell and the right to purchase labor, and no law would
be upheld that would deprive the laborer and employer of the
right to contract with one another."'179
179(Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 230 S. W. 1086, 1088. See also, Pierce v.
Stablemen's Union Local No. 8760, (1909) 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324;
Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local No. 782, (1922) 35 Idaho
418, 207 Pac. 132; Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Ass'n, (1922) 305 Ill.
331, 137 N. E. 222; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown, (1909)
80 Kan. 312, 102 Pac. 459; Willner v. Silverman, (1909) 109 Md. 341,
71 Atl. 962; Mechanics' Foundry & Machine Co. v. Lynch, (1920) 236 Mass.
504, 128 N. E. 877; Construction Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades Council,
(1917) 136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520; Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass
Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, (1899) 59 N. J.Eq. 49, 46 Atl. 208; Brennan v.
United Hatters of North America, Local No. 17, (1906) 73 N. J.L. 729,
65 Atl. 165, (this right is declared to be inalienable) ; Jordan's Wearing
Apparel v. Retail Sales Com. Union, (N. J.1937) 193 Atl. 806; Sherman v.
Abeles, (1934) 265 N. Y. 383, 390, 193 N. E. 241; Mattison v. Ry. Co.,
(1895) 2 Ohio N. P. 276, 3 Ohio Dec. 526, (where an employer discharges
an employee and then places him on a blacklist thus preventing him from
obtaining employment in the same field of work, such action, on the part
of the employer, interferes with the employee's right to seek employment) ;
Journeymen v. Master Horseshoers, (1912) 13 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 297, 23
Ohio Dec. N. P. 338; see also, Johnson v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., (1928)
128 Or. 121, 270 Pac. 772; Erdman v. Mitchell, (1903) 207 Pa. St. 79, 56
Atl. 327, (it is questionable whether this decision would be good law today
in Pennsylvania in view of the recent labor legislation enacted there) ; cf.,
Ry. Co. v. Griffin, (1914) 106 Tex. 477, 171 S. W. 703, (a law against
blacklisting by employers held invalid); Langenberg Hat Co. v. United
Cloth Hat & Cap Makers, (E.D. Mo. 1920) 266 Fed. 126; National Labor
Relations Board v. Washington Coach Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1936) 85 Fed.
(2d) 990, (the Wagner Act was attacked as denying to the employer the
right to hire and discharge at will but it was held that the statute is not an
unreasonable restriction of that right), aff'd. Washington Coach Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, (1937) 301 U. S.142, 57 Sup. Ct. 648, 77
L. Ed. 1062; Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938) 93 F. (2d) 985, 988, ("The act does not
attempt to regulate the employer's control of his business in the employment, promotion, or discharge of employees so long as he does not attempt
thereby to interfere with the right of self-organization of the employees or
to intimidate or coerce them") ; Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, (1937) 301 U. S.58, 132, 57 Sup. Ct. 645 81 L. Ed. 893; cf.,
American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A., (1936) 222 Wis. 338,
370, 268 N. W. 250, (the Wisconsin Labor Code was under consideration
in this case); see also. Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Rueping
Leather Co., (Wis. 1938) 279 N. W. 673; also, Norris-La Guardia Act,
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The inalienable right about which the court speaks is a hollow
right indeed unless it is so implemented as to allow the employee
equal bargaining power with the employer. Unless this is done,
we approximate again the stage of our economic development in
which the yellow dog contract, company unions, lockouts and
blacklists were prevalent. The problems of. the relation between
employer and employee cannot be solved by learned discussions
of inalienable and natural rights. Their solution lies in a recognition of the fact that there is no substance in the so-called right of
a worker to use his hands freely for whomever he pleases, upon
such terms as he pleases, except as he combines with others to
adopt effective means to give value and content to that right.
The right to dispose of one's labor and to make agreements with
respect to that labor may be both inalienable and natural (though
this is open to debate), but that right is a sham unless it can be
exercised upon a basis of equality approximate to the employer's
so-called inalienable and natural right to employ or discharge at
will. Experience has illustrated beyond question that an employer dealing with each employee separately has a decided advantage in the bargaining that takes place. One does not equal
one in this case.
Another metaphysical concept which has had a wide usage in
labor controversies is the doctrine of freedom or liberty of contract. It is often said that individuals have the right to contract
or to refrain from contracting, and the right to a free market.'
Thus in InterboroughRapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, it was held that,
"The relations of the plaintiff and its employees are based on
consent. Each has freedom of contract."' 1 This doctrine generally is made use of to sustain the right of employers to make
individual contracts with employees, to discharge employees at
will, to prevent the introduction of a closed shop, and in other
82 similar situations.
Mch. 23, 1932, C. 90, 47 Stat. at L. 70, Code Title 29, secs. 101-115. Wagner
Labor Relations Act, July 5, 1935, C. 372, 49 Stat. at L. 449, Code Title 29,
secs. 151-166.
18OL. D. Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Bricklayers' Benevolent Protective
Union No. 3, (1908) 200 Mass. 110, 85 N. E.897; Mechanics' Foundry &
Machine Co. v. Lynch, (1920) 236 Mass. 504, 128 N. E. 877.
1m(1928) 247 N. Y. 65, 73, 159 N. E. 863.
282 Union Labor Hospital Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., (1910)
158 Cal. 551, 112 Pac. 886, (as a condition of employment, employer forced
employees not to deal with the plaintiff hospital) ; Jones v. E. Van Winkle
Gin & Machine Works, (1908) 131 Ga. 336, 62 S. E.236; Keith Theatre v.
Vachon, (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692; United Shoe Machinery Corp.
v. Fitzgerald, (1921) 237 Mass. 537, 130 N. E. 86; State v. Dalton, (1908)
134 Mo. App. 517, 114 S.W. 1132; Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy,
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"The absolute certainty which is one of our legal ideals, an
ideal responsible for much that is irritatingly mechanical in our
legal system, is demanded chiefly to protect property. And our
courts regard the right to contract not as a phase of liberty-a sort
of freedom of mental motion and locomotion-but as a phase of
property, to be protected as such. A further result is to exaggerate private right at the expense of public interest .... 183
The whole idea of liberty of contract, which is today treated as a
natural and inalienable right, was wholly unknown in our law prior
to 1886.18' Thus we note how ephemeral is our concept of
natural and inalienable rights-unknown today, an eternal and
sanctified doctrine tomorrow. Freedom of contract has actually
almost come to be the exception and not the rule. It has been
hedged about by scores of legislative enactments and judicial
opinions. It is sheer nonsense to talk of freedom of contract
between parties who are not equals in negotiating a contract.
Liberty of contract begins with the establishment of equality of
position between the parties. 18
The whole doctrine of liberty of contract was considered by
the late Wanamaker, J., in a brilliant dissenting opinion in the
(1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 Atl. 230; Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v.

Lavin, (1928) 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863; Brost Pattern Works v. Reid,
(1922) 24 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 60; Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Fed.
of F. F. H. W., (1931) 305 Pa. St. 206, 157 Atl. 588; Ry. Co. v. Griffin,
(1914) 106 Tex. 477, 171 S.W. 703; Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerk's

Union, Local No. 148, (1935) 184 Wash. 322, 51 Pac. (2d) 372. See also,
Agwilines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1936)

87 Fed. (2d) 146, 150, ("The prohibitions against interference by employers
with self-organization of employees were not only unknown, they were
obnoxious to the common law.")
1s3Pound, Liberty of Contract, (1909) 18 Yale L. J.454, 461.
l84Pound, Liberty of Contract, (1909) 18 Yale L. J.455.
185 Coppage v. Kansas, (1915) 236 U. S. 1, 26, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L.
Ed. 441, (see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes. Cf., this with
the majority opinion on page 17, which is sheer sophistry.) See also,
Cameron v. International Alliance, (1935) 118 N. J. Eq. 11, 28, 175 At. 692;
Jackson, Chief of Police v. Berger, (1915) 92 Oh. St. 130, 140, 143, 110
N. E. 732, (dissenting opinion of Wanamaker, J.: "This 'liberty of contract'
theory has been severely overworked by our courts. It has become decidedly threadbare. .

.

. This theory has been invoked to protect almost

every infamy that can be put into the form of a contract, and it has chiefly
grown up by reason of the favor extended to it by our courts under the
mistaken view of the 14th Amendment. The colored man's rights, which
were supposed to be the primary consideration of the amendment, have
been lost sight of, and the 'soulless' corporations seem to have been the chief
beneficiaries. . . .The truth is that the individual workman today, seeking
employment in the large corporate industrial and transportation plants,
enjoys no such thing as liberty of contract. He enjoys it in law, but not
in fact") ; Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Fed. of F. F. H. W., (1931)
305 Pa. St. 206, 157 Atl. 588, (see the dissenting opinion) ; West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, (1937) 300 U. S.379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703.
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case of Jackson, Chief of Police, v. Berger.8" In discussing the
essential weaknesses of the doctrine, he wrote,
"Organization is the keynote of the age. This is true not only
in educational, religious and benevolent lines, but especially is it
true in every kind and branch of business. Formerly the individual
man did the business of the country. Today he does about as
much business as the individual dollar does. The individual man
has given way, first to the simple partnership, syndicates and the
like, all of which have brought about a condition in the business
world that has practically eliminated the individual man in individual business and substituted therefor a manager or superintendent, or other officer or agent, with a board of directors, stockholders and millions of capital and credit back of him.
"This being the situation as to capital and business, the workingman years ago began to realize his weakness, inequality and
dependence in contracting with the employer for his labor.
"... The truth is that the individual workman today seeking
employment in the large corporate industrial and transportation
plants, enjoys no such thing as liberty of contract. He enjoys it
in law, but not in fact.
"... What I mean is that any employer, by the exercise of his
power under the so-called right of liberty of contract, may dissolve and destroy any labor union by the withholding of employment, by discharging by coercion those who are now, or hereafter
may become members of such lawful labor organization.
"The employer is to have the right to organize without the
consent of his workmen, but the workmen are not to enjoy the same
right of organization unless they secure the consent of the employer. Is that equal protection of the law ?,,11
UNIoN RULES
A fair number of decisions in labor controversies have turned
upon the effect of the internal rules and regulations of trade unions
upon third parties. Thus it has been held that if the rules adopted
by a union are not aimed at one particular employer and if they
do not set up arbitrary discriminations between one individual or
corporation and another, they are valid rules and their enforcement will not, in and of itself, be a basis for a suit by any particular employer who may happen to feel the impact of those
rules in action.1 8 Standing by itself, this statement seems equitable enough and no real complaint can be brought against it. The
difficulty is, however, that many jurisdictions have either mis180(1915) 92 Ohio St. 130, 110 N. E. 732.
187(1915) 92 Ohio St. 130, 140, 143, 110 N. E. 732.
188j. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, (1908) 154 Cal.
581, 98 Pac. 1027; New Jersey Painting Co. v. Local No. 26, (1924)

N. J.Eq. 632, 126 AtI. 399.
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applied it or refused to apply it, with results that are astonishing,
to say the least. A good example of the extraordinary reasoning
in which many of the courts indulge is found in Chicago F. of M.
v.Musicians' Union of North America.8 9
In this case a musicians' union had a by-law that none of its
members should work with other musicians who were nonunion
men. One of the members engaged himself to play in an orchestra which was composed of the members of another union which
was considered an outlaw union and, therefore, no union at all by
the first union; that is, the members of the second union were
placed in the same class as nonunion men by the first union. The
member was requested by his union to abide by its rules or to
suffer the prescribed penalties. The theatre which had employed
this member filed an action to enjoin this threatened action by the
union. In granting the injunction, the court declared that
. .. when the will of the majority of an organized body, in

matters involving the rights of outside parties, is enforced upon
its members by means of fines and penalties, the situation is essentially the same as when unity of action is secured amongst unorganized individuals by threats and intimidations. A fine imposed upon a member of a voluntary organization for purpose of
discipline may be perfectly proper and lawful; but a fine imposed
injuring
upon such member for the purpose of coercing him into
10
another in person or property . . . would be neither."

It is, of course, replete with
This argument is not unusual.'
erroneous thinking. The first error is the assumption that labor
unions, unlike any of the other collective undertakings of men, do
not need to impose fines and penalties for violations of their rules
'89(1908) 139 Il1. App. 65.

190(1908) 139 Ill. App. 65.
191L. D. Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Bricklayers' Benevolent & Protective
Union No. 3, (1908) 200 Mass. 110, 123, 85 N. E. 897; cf., dissenting
opinion in, Reynolds v. Davis, (1908) 198 Mass. 298, 84 N. E. 457; Purvis
v. Local No. 500, (1906) 214 Pa. St. 348, 63 Atl. 585; Allis-Chalmers Co. v.
Iron Molders' Union No. 125, (E.D. Wis. 1906) 150 Fed. 155.
In, Haverhill Strand Theater, Inc. v. Gillen, (1918) 229 Mass. 413,
118 N. E. 671, (it was held that a union rule which provides that a minimum
number of musicians must be employed by any employer of musicians is an
illegal rule because it interferes with the employers' right to a free flow
of labor) ; cf., Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians'
Ass'n, (1912) 118 Minn. 410, 136 N. IV. 1092; Kealey v. Faulkner, (1908)
7 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 49, 18 Ohio Dec. N. P. 498, (the rules of the union
were held coercive because of their far-reaching effect-the court seems to
have been justified in its position) ; Journeymen v. Master Horseshoers,
(1912) 13 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 297, 300, 23 Ohio Dec. N. P. 338, (the enforcement of a rule of an employers' association to expel a member if he refuses
to cooperate in a lockout of union employees is an unreasonable and
coercive action and may be enjoined at the suit of the union.) But see, Des
Moines Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, (1927) 204 Iowa 1195, 213 N. W.
264.
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and laws, perhaps upon the assumption either that they will never
he violated, or that, if violated, punishment will not be necessary.
Unfortunately, all collective agencies have discovered that men
are often deterred from violating rules because of their unwillingness to incur the imposition of the accompanying fines and penalties. Even the courts themselves have exercised this prerogative
in contempt cases. Labor unions, in these instances, are no exception to the general rule. The second error arises with the attempt
to find a similarity between the punishment of its members by a
union, where these members have voluntarily agreed to abide by
its rules and suffer its penalties if they fail to so abide, and the
effort of an outsider to impose penalties upon nonunion men for
refusing to accept unionization. There is no comparison between
these situations. The third error is in speaking of coercion in
connection with the act of a union in imposing its penalties upon
an erring member The individual joined the union voluntarily.
In becoming a member he agreed to obey the union's rules and
regulations and to suffer its fines and penalties if he failed to obey.
Where is the coercion? The proper answer is found in such cases
as Bossert r'. United Brotherhood, Carpenters& Joiners of Amnerica. in which the court, in referring to this question, said,
"To say that men may organize and refuse to work under certain conditions or upon a certain class of materials, and then compel the organization to keep in membership those who refuse to
abide by its purpose, is to destroy the organization. If there be
the power of expulsion, there must of necessity be the lesser power
to fine according to rule, provided
the person desires to retain
'' 2
membership in the organization. 19
x02(1912) 77 Misc. Rep. 592, 137 N. Y. S. 321. To the same effect are
the following cases: Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, (1907) 53 Fla.
969, 975, 43 So. 590; Seymour Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers', etc., Union,
(1932) 163 Md. 687, 164 Atl. 752; Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians' Ass'n, (1912) 118 Minn. 410, 136 N. W. 1092, (that
a rule of an incorporated union is ultra vires does not give a cause of action
to a third party who may be injured by the enforcement of that rule) ;
Bayer v. Brotherhood of Painters, (1931) 108 N. J. Eq. 257, 154 Atl. 759;
Bossert v. Dhuy, (1917) 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582; O'Keefe v. Local
463, (1938) 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77; Rhodes Bros. Co. v. Musicians,
etc., Local No. 198, (1915) 37 R. I. 281, 92 Atl. 641; Wabash R. Co. v.
Hannahan, (E.D. Mo. 1903) 121 Fed. 563; Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1926) 15 Fed. (2d) 16, 18; cf., Hass,
Inc. v. Local Union No. 17, (D. Conn. 1924) 300 Fed. 894; see, however,
Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters. (D.C. 1927) 23 Fed. (2d)
743; Zaat v. Building Trades Council, (1933) 172 Wash. 445, 20 P. (2d)
589. Cf., Chicago Fed. of Musicians v. Musicians' Union of North America,
(1908) 139 Ili. App. 65, 71; Cameron v. International Alliance, (1936) 119
N. J. Eq. 577, 585, 183 AtI. 157.
Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union, (1912) 147 Ky. 170, 143
S. W. 1018, (when the members of a union acting as a body clothe the
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The term "collective bargaining" has achieved a certain prominence these days. The doctrine of collective bargaining has not
always been so fashionable. Only a few short decades ago the
right of workers to bargain collectively was denied as vigorously
as it is today maintained. In these few years it has already become, oddly enough, a "God-given right which formed society
and moulded governments."1 98 What is collective bargaining as
applied to the field of labor relations? It is merely the right of
men to join together for the purpose of joint or collective action
with a view to improving their economic situation. It is a recognition by the workers that their strength lies in union, that the norm
of our industrial civilization is no longer the individual but the
organized group. 1 4 This has long since been recognized by the
world of business-witness the gigantic corporations, the monopolies among our'utilities, the holding companies, the national and
international cartels, trade associations and the like. This right to
join together for bargaining purposes has been and still is being
bitterly fought by many employers because they realize that
they hold a tremendous advantage when they can deal with their
individual employees one by one. No other reason can adequately
explain the desperateness with which countless employers have
fought and are still fighting legislation which seeks to safeguard
the right to bargain collectively. The struggle is by no means
concluded.
"LABOR

DISPUTES"

Although the Congress of the United States has defined a
labor dispute, there still remain large areas in which that definition
is, at most, advisory. It would be well, therefore, to see what
the courts heretofore have held constitutes a labor dispute. The
essentials upon which many courts formerly agreed are that the
dispute must be between an employer and his employees, and it
officers of the union with authority to negotiate a new agreement with the
employer, it makes no difference that some of the members are satisfied
with the existing agreement and do not want a change-the power of the
officers to negotiate cannot be abridged except by action of the union as a
body); Loewe v. California State Fed. of Labor, (N. D. Cal. 1911) 189
Fed. 714, (it is no defense to an action to enjoin a boycott that the defendants acted under the rules of their union.)
193 Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper
Guild, (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 545, 549, 195 Atl. 378.
19 4Cole v. Atlanta Terminal Co., (N.D. Ga. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 131, 132;
Railroad Co. v. Webb, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1933) 64 Fed. (2d) 902.
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must be in relation to wages, hours and working conditions.
During the past few years there has been a growing opinion, now
codified in a considerable body of legislation, that this conception
of a labor dispute no longer meets the needs of an industrial
democracy which has reached the stage of solidification and, therefore, of increasing struggle to obtain a share of the goods and
benefits to be distributed. This legislation and a number of courts
express the feeling that many controversies which were outlawed
by the old definition are essentially valid efforts by workers to
better their conditions and that such efforts are entitled to respect. " '
Some of the results of the early conception of what constitutes a labor dispute were: That it was not a labor dispute for
unionists to strike because nonunion workmen were employed;
that strikers cannot picket a place of business of a customer of
their employer because he is not a party to the labor dispute between the strikers and their employer; that it is not a labor dispute when an outside union tries to organize the business of a
nonunion employer by picketing and other similar means; that
it is not a labor dispute where an employer discharges his union
employees and decides to operate the business himself and the
union pickets his place of business in an endeavor to have the
9
These holdings do not
discharged employees re-employed.9'

105See note 15, supra. See also, Simon v. Schwachman, (Mass. 1938) 18
N. E. (2d) 1.
1ON. & R. Theatres, Inc. v. Basson, (1925) 127 Misc. Rep. 271, 215
N. Y. S. 157; De Agostina v. Holmden, (1935) 157 Misc. Rep. 819, 285
N. Y. S. 909, (see legislative definition of a labor dispute) ; Wiley v. Retail
Clerk's Union, (1934) 32 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 257; Starr v. Laundry, etc.,
Union, (1936) 155 Or. 634, 63 P. (2d) 1104, (see recent Oregon labor
legislation); Lipoff v. United Food Workers Industrial Union, (Pa. 1938),
Labor & Unemployment Ins. Service, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 19561, (based
on recent Pennsylvania labor legislation); Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S.
Clerks v. Texas & N. 0. R. Co., (S.D. Tex. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 876, (based
on Railway Labor Act) ; Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v. Furniture Workers'
Industrial Union, (D.N.J. 1934) 8 Fed. Supp. 209, (based on Norris-La
Guardia Act); L. L. Coryell & Son v. Petroleum Workers' Union, (D.
Minn. 1936) 19 Fed. Supp. 749, (based on Norris-La Guardia Act) ; Cupples
Co., Inc. v. American Fcd. of Labor, (E.D. Mo. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 894,
(based on Norris-La Guardia & Wagner Acts); Sharp & Dohme, Inc. v.
Storage Warehouse Employees Union, (E.D. Pa. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 701 (a
dispute between two labor unions as to which shall contract with the employer is a labor dispute-based on the Norris-La Guardia Act) ; Blankenship v. Kurfman, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 96 Fed. (2d) 450, (based on
Norris-La Guardia Act); The New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery
Co., Inc., (1938) 303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703, 82 L. Ed. 683, (based on
Norris-La Guardia Act); American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H.
of A., (1936) 222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250, (based on Wisconsin Labor
Code.)7
I9 Kemp v. Division No. 241, (1912) 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389, (see
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bear a very close relation to the industrial ferment that is going
on all about us. They represent a refusal to recognize that a
labor dispute involved anyone who, by his actions or his failure
to act, may have a real influence upon the controversy where the
principal controversy involved employer and employee. Where
it involves an outside union, a labor controversy may exist even
though the employer and employees may not desire to participate.
The reason for this is pointed out in Bhlmauerv. Portland Moving
Picture Machine Operators' Protective Union.'98 The court, in
holding that a labor dispute existed even though the individuals
involved were not employees, did so upon the ground that
"This right of presenting its side of a controversy, organized
labor may exercise by lawful means, in a lawful manner, when
its members have reasonable grounds to apprehend that the
practices or pay of any employer will produce an injurious effect
on the working conditions of employees generally, or of those in a
particular trade or calling, even though there may be no direct
controversy between the employer and his immediate employees."' 99
In a few instances where a labor dispute has arisen between
an employer and his employees, third parties have attempted to
intervene. Sometimes they have claimed a direct interest, sometimes only the interest of a member of the general public. Where
a stranger to the controversy attempts to intervene by bringing
pressure to bear upon one or the other of the parties directly concerned, courts are likely to hold that it is not in the interest of
lawful competition and, therefore, wrongful. The fact that the
stranger acts with a good motive is not held to justify the intervention because intervention can only be attempted by one with
a direct interest in the controversy. 20 So a salesman on comdissenting opinion); A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union
No. 16, (1908) 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 940; Keith Theatre v. Vachon, (1936)
134 Me. 392, 187 At. 692; New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern,
(1914) 218 Mass. 198, 105 N. E. 885; Feller Local 144, (1937) 121 N. J.
Eq. 452, 191 Atl. 111 ; Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American
Newspaper Guild, (1928) 124 N. J.Eq. 71, 199 AtI. 599; Bieber v. Bininbaum, (1938) 168 Misc. Rep. 943, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 63; Thompson v.
Boekhout, (1937) 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674; Markowitz v. Retail
Dry Cleaners Union, (1935) 3 Ohio Opinions 366; Saltzman v. Employees'
Local, (1937) 10 Ohio Opinions 6, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 354.
198(1933) 141 Or. 399, 17 P. (2d) 1115.
199(1933) 141 Or. 399, 403, 17 Pac. (2d) 1115. See also, George J.
Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades Council, (1917) 136
Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520; Lichterman v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning
Drivers Union, (Minn. 1938) 282 N. W. 689; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, (1936) 155 Or. 652, 669, 63 Pac. (2d) 1090.
2OoCarpenters' Union v. Citizens' Committee, (1928) 333 Ill. 225, 164
N. E. 393.
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mission for an employer whose employees are on strike is not
held to have an interest sufficient to maintain a suit to enjoin the
striking employees from interfering with other employees of the
firm. 2 0' On the other hand, a subscriber to a telephone company,
bondholders of a corporation, and a customer holding a contract
with a strike bound employer, have been held to have a direct
20 2
enough interest to maintain actions against the striking unions.
But the members of one union have been enjoined from lending
assistance to another union which is conducting a strike because
"the utmost, apparently, that can be said is that as workingmen, they sympathize with the efforts of a fellow workman of a
different class and engaged in a different occupation to improve
their conditions. They have not a sufficient interest in the result
to justify their act. . . .Their interest is too remote and too uncertain."203
Apparently the interest of an investor in his investment and of
a telephone subscriber in his telephone service, stand upon a
different plane from the interest of a worker in the conditions of
fellow workers.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
What, if any, interest has the public in a labor controversy?
Unquestionably the public has a genuine interest in a labor
controversy-an interest which should always receive serious
consideration. "Individual liberty must be subject to such restraint as the public interests may require, and when the two
conflict, the former must yield.120 4 Thus the public interest
demands that violent methods should not be used by either side to
a labor dispute; that collective bargaining rights be granted to
workers; that agreements between employer and employee be
sustained wherever possible because they tend toward industrial
peace and industrial democracy. These and other similar matters
are definitely the concern of the public. 2 2 But the general con20
202 Davis v. Henry, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1920) 266 Fed. 261.
Stephens v. Ohio Telephone Co., (N.D. Ohio 1917) 240 Fed. 759;
Carter v. Fortney, (N.D. W. Va. 1909) 170 Fed. 463; Chesapeake & 0. C. A.
Co. v.03Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co., (S.D. W. Va. 1902) 119 Fed. 942.
" Foster v. Retail Clerks' International Protective Ass'n, (1902) 39
Misc. Rep. 48, 55, 78 N. Y. S. 860. Cf., however, Blumauer v. Portland
Moving Picture Machine Operators' Protective Union, (1933) 141 Or. 399,
17 Pac.
204 (2d) 1115.
Kemp v. Division No. 241, (1912) 255 Il.213, 243, 99 N. E. 389.
See also, Moore Drop Forging Co. v. Fisher, (1921) 239 Mass. 434, 132
N. E. 169; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., (E.D.
Wis. 1894) 60 Fed. 803; M. & M. Wood Working Co. Inc. v. Plywood &
Veneer5 Workers, (D. Ore. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 11, 17.
2oPierce v. Stablemen's Union Local No. 8760, (1909) 156 Cal. 70,
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sideration of the public interest should not be held as a club over
either labor or capital. That it has been so used is amply illus-

20
trated by many of the reported decisions.

6

In a number of instances, injunctions have been issued against
striking employees upon the spurious argument that society favors
the utmost freedom of the individual to engage in a lawful trade,
and if the actions of the strikers hamper that freedom they are
unlawful.207 The lengths to which some courts will go in perverting into nonsense the very real interest of the public in a labor
dispute is well illustrated in R. A. Freed & Co. v. Doe, in which
an injunction was issued against a union striking for a closed
shop in a department store on the ground that the public has an
indirect right in the choice of department store salespeople by
reason of the likes and dislikes which customers form for certain
of them. 20 8 It would seem that the public interest is not served
by denying to workers the same rights which are granted to employers and that it is best served by placing the employer and the
employee upon a basis of equality in their dealings with each
other as nearly as this can be done.
ANTI-TRUST LAWS
On a number of occasions, the acts and actions of trade unions

have been held unlawful as being in restraint of trade, or as
creating or tending to create a monopoly. These holdings have
been generally based upon the language of the Sherman AntiTrust Act and similar state laws. It will be recalled that the
Sherman Act, among other things, declared it to be unlawful to
form a combination or monopoly in restraint of trade or com103 Pac. 324; Baltic Mining Co. v. Houghton, (1913) 177 Mich. 632, 144
N. W. 209; Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of Silk Workers,
(1934) 116 N. J. Eq. 146, 155, 172 Atl. 551; see also, Kealey v. Faulkner,
(1908) 7 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 49, 18 Ohio Dec. N. P. 498, (in this case the
rules of the union were held to be so unreasonable as to be against public
policy); Blum & Co. v. Landau, (1926) 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N. E. 154;
Starr v. Laundry, etc., Union, (1936) 155 Or. 634, 63 Pac. (2d) 1104;
& Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks, (1926) 287 Pa. St. 171, 134 AtI. 430.
Jefferson
20
6For cases in which the public interest was used as a club, see, Keith
Theatre v. Vachon, (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 AtI. 692; L. D. Willcut & Sons
Co. v. Bricklayers' Benevolent Protective Ass'n No. 3, (1908) 200 Mass.
110, 85 N. E. 897; Columbus Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Pittsburgh
Building Trades Council, (W.D. Pa. 1927) 17 Fed. (2d) 806; R. A. Freed
& Co. v. Doe, (1935) 283 N. Y. S. 186.
2o7Keith Theatre v. Vachon, (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692; International Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 222, 193 Atl. 808;
Grand Shoe Co. v. Children's Shoe Workers' Union, (1920) 187 N. Y. S.
886; Hellman v. Salesmen's Ass'n, (1919) 23 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 177.
154 Misc. Rep.
* 208(1935) 283 N. Y. S. 186. See also, semble (1935),
644. 278 N. Y. S. 68, 74.
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merce.' 0 " In order to bring labor within the purview of AntiTrust legislation, it was necessary for the courts to hold that the
word "trade," as used in this legislation, was used in a very broad
sense. Thus, when a worker offers his services to an employer
in exchange for pay, this exchange constitutes "trade" and the
worker's labor is an article of commerce, that is, a commodity
within the meaning of the statute.21 0 This line of reasoning has
been used to test the validity of all sorts of labor controversies.
It has been held many times that a demand for a closed shop
is unlawful because its achievement would give labor a monopoly
211
and thus prevent nonunion workmen from earning a livelihood.
Other courts have held such a demand unlawful when its real object is "to compel the employers . . . to submit to an attempt to

' 21 2
obtain for the union a complete monopoly of the labor market.
How is it to be determined whether a monopoly is the real object
or whether it is merely an incidental result of the efforts of the
workers to better their conditions through a closed shop? It is
2
00July 2, 1890, C. 647, 26 Stat. at L. 209, Code Title 15, secs. 1-7, 15,
secs. 1, 2. See also, House Report No. 1707, 51st Congress, Committee on the
Judiciary,
April 25, 1890, p. 1.
21
OCampbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1922) 151
Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., (1921)
259 U. S.344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975, (the Sherman Act includes
trade unions) ; United States v. Railway Employees' Dep't, (N.D. Ill. 1922)
283 Fed. 479. Cf., Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, (1908) 215 Mo. 421,
444, 114 S.W. 997; Aberon Bakery Co. v. Raimist, (1931) 141 Misc. Rep.
774, 2776, 254 N. Y. S.38.
"Keith Theatre v. Vachon, (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692; Folsom
v. Lewis, (1911) 208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316; Stearns Lumber Co. v.
Howlett, (1928) 264 Mass. 511, 163 N. E. 193; but cf., Goyette v. Watson
Co., (1923) 245 Mass. 577, 140 N. E. 285; International Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 222, 193 Art. 808; Bedford Co. v. Stone Cutters'
Ass'n, (1927) 274 U. S.37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916, but see dissenting
opinions of Stone & Brandeis, JJ.; cf., Levering & Garrigues Co.v. Morrin,
(1933) 289 U. S. 103, 53 Sup. Ct. 549, 77 L. Ed. 1062; cf., also, State v.
Stewart, (1887) 59 Vt. 273, 9 Atl. 559; National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason
Builders' Ass'n, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1909) 169 Fed. 259.
See, State v. Jacobs, (1900) 7 Ohio N. P. 261, 10 Ohio Dec. N. P. 252,
(a secondary boycott was held to violate the state anti-trust act); Markowitz v. Retail Dry Cleaners' Union, (1935) 8 Ohio Opinions 366, (an attempt to maintain union prices held to be an unlawful restraint of trade.)
See also, Cameron v. International Alliance, (1936) 119 N. J. Eq. 577, 589,
183 Atl. 157. Contra: Maisel v. Sigman, (1924) 123 Misc. Rep. 714, 205
N. Y. S.807; Farulla v. Freundlich, Inc., (1934) 152 Misc. Rep. 761, 274
N. Y. S.70; Sheehan v. Levy, (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) 215 S.W. 229; International Organization v. Red Jacket C. C. & C. Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1927)
18 Fed. (2d) 839, 843, (". . . we do not think that the International Organization, United Mine Workers of America, constitutes of itself an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade and commerce because it
embraces a large percentage of mine workers of this country or because its
purpose is to extend its membership so as to embrace all of the workers
in the
mines of the continent.")
2 12
Folsom v. Lewis, (1911) 208 Mass. 336, 338, 94 AtI. 316.
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apparent that such a test leaves a very broad discretion indeed in
the hands of the court. Still other courts have held that a demand
for a closed shop in a single factory is consonant with public
policy and, therefore, lawful, but that such a demand in substantially an entire industry may be unlawful as creating an unlawful
monopoly. 3 Thus a monopoly may be lawful or unlawful in proportion to its effectiveness. It is altogether possible that these
courts are concerned with preventing trade unions from becoming
very effective. A sure way to accomplish this is to keep an industry part union and part nonunion. 214 Of course, such a motivation never appears on the surface of an opinion, but how deep
does it lie below a statement that
"The principle underlying all the cases involving the question
of conspiracy made effective through the violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law is to the effect that the plaintiff injured by
reason of such conspiracy or boycott has a right to demand that
trade be permitted to flow in its normal course unimpeded and
undisturbed by the acts of the defendants and that public policy
also demands this. Just as soon as the public is deprived of the
benefit of full and free competition, or the individual is deprived
of the benefit of conducting his business in the manner which
seems to him most advisable, a restraint arises in normal trade
conditions, which, if without justification, cannot be said to be
lawful."21 5
Is there such a thing as business flowing in a normal course without impediment or obstruction? And it may also be asked whether
full and free competition exists anywhere in our economic life.
If labor is considered a commodity or article of commerce,
then the position of those courts which have construed various
acts and demands of trade unions as in restraint of commerce or
trade, may have some basis for justification if the other weaknesses
in the contention can be glossed over. But labor is not a commodity. 216

It is impossible to separate a workman from his labor.

They are not separate entities. One does not sell labor in the
same sense that one sells sugar or building materials. The Sher213 Four Plating Co. v. Mako, (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 298, 194 Atl. 53.
14

2 Williams v. Quill, (1938) 277 N. Y. 1, 6, 12 N. E. (2d) 547, (the
court recognizes that effective employee action is unified action. ". . . the

object of the contract and of the action of the defendant labor union is to
advance its own interests and ability of its members through the closed
shop, to meet on even terms their employers in present or future negotiations.")
21
Hellman v. Salesmen's Ass'n, (1919) 23 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 177, 186.
216
Maisel v. Sigman, (1924) 123 Misc. Rep. 714, 205 N. Y. S. 807. See
also, Title 15, section 17, October 15, 1914, C. 323, section 17, 38 Stat. at L.
730.
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man Anti-Trust Act and similar state laws were not meant to
apply to labor unions. They were enacted in response to widespread demands for a curb on the activities of large-scale business,
on the propensities of these businesses to drive small business out
of operation by reason of the monopolies obtained by the ever
growing colossi of the business .world. The use of the words
"trade" and "commerce" in the statute clearly imports something
other than the labor of workers. To read into the Act a restraint
upon the legitimate activities of labor unions is to give it a meaning which was never intended.21
However, if it be conceded
that labor unions were meant to be included, then it must be remembered that not all restraints are forbidden-only unreasonable
restraints were prohibited by the anti-trust laws.218 Of course,
what is or is not an unreasonable restraint must be determined
by the court, and in arriving at a conclusion it should not be
forgotten that if a closed shop demand seems to portend a monopoly of labor, or if any other action by a union will tend to restrain
commerce, these are but indirect results of a primary purpose
which the union believes will better the conditions of its members
and perhaps of labor generally. It is a rare case indeed in which
the primary and direct purpose of the union is to create a monopoly
or a restraint of commerce. There is a wide difference between
such a primary purpose and the adoption of a method of achieving a good end which may have as an incidental effect a restraint
of trade or commerce. The former is unlawful, the latter should
be damnum absque injuria. Many courts have unwisely refused
to make the distinction."' 0
27Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades Council (1917),
136 Minn. 167, 161 N. V. 520; Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1922) 151 Minn. 220, 233, 186 N. W. 781, (see the dissenting
opinion of Dibell, J.) But see, United States v. Cassidy, (N.D. Cal. 1895)
67 Fed. 698, 705.
21,Bedford Co. v. Stone Cutters' Ass'n, (1927) 274 U. S. 37, 56, 47
Sup. 2Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916, (see dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis.)
'Berry v. Donovan, (1905) 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603; Campbell v.
Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1922) 151 Minn. 220, 186 N. W.
781; United States v. Taliaferro, (W.D. Va. 1922) 290 Fed. 214; Bedford
Co. v. Stone Cutters' Ass'n, (1927) 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed.
916; Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, (E.D. Pa. 1929)
35 Fed. (2d) 203; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1937)
90 Fed. (2d) 155, (a sit-down strike held to place the strikers in a position of
violating the Sherman Act because the merchandise in the plant was being
prevented from moving in interstate commerce) ; cf., the following cases:
Seymour Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers', etc., Union, (1933) 163 Md. 687,
164 At. 752; Snow v. Wheeler, (1873) 113 Mass. 179; Construction Co.
v. St. Paul Building Trades Council, (1917) 136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520;
National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Ass'n, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1909)
169 Fed. 259; United Leather Workers v. Herkert, (1927) 265 U. S. 457,
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The widespread misapplication of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act by the courts, together with the growing tendency to issue
injunctions in labor controversies, led to the enactment of the
Clayton Act by the Congress of the United States. 22 0 Section 17
of the Clayton Act indicates a definite effort to eliminate the antitrust act decisions in labor disputes when it provides that "the
labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." 221 However, it was not clear as to whether it was intended to apply to all labor disputes or only to those in which
employers and their employees were concerned..2
The net result was that the Clayton Act proved almost entirely ineffective
to stem the flood of labor injunctions. This was due to a number
of causes, chief among these being the argument that the Act did
not make lawful any act or acts which were unlawful at the time
the Act was passed; that it applied only where a labor dispute between employer and employee existed; and that the Act did not
forbid injunctions in strike cases when "necessary to prevent an
irreparable injury to property or to a property right.

22 23

It is

44 Sup. Ct. 623, 68 L. Ed. 1104; Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, (S.D. N.Y. 1928)

27 Fed. (2d) 560; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, (1933) 289 U. S.
103, 22
107, 53 Sup. Ct. 549, 77 L. Ed. 1062.
OClayton Anti-Trust Act, Title 15, section 12, Oct. 15, 1914, C. 323,
section 1, 38 Stat. at L. 730. See also, House Report No. 612, 62nd Congress,
Committee on the Judiciary, April 26, 1912, p. 37. Great Northern Ry. Co.
v. Local, (D. Mont. 1922) 283 Fed. 557, 564, ("In strikes, employers too
often with little cause are quick to seek injunctions and their intimidating
advantages, and courts too often likewise grant them. The consequence is a
disposition to view the courts as partisans of the employers, and the judicial
writs of injunction as weapons against employees however lawfully they be
proceeding. And it is of this Pandora's box of obvious evils to society that
the Clayton Act is designed to somewhat close the lid." How far short of
accomplishing its purpose the Clayton Act fell is attested to by the Norris
and Wagner Acts); Columbus Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Pittsburgh
Building Trades Council, (W.D. Pa. 1927) 17 Fed. (2d) 806, 808, ("To
restrict the broad interpretation which might have been given to the Sherman Act (Compt., St. section 8820, et seq.), practically preventing all strikes
by labor
unions, the Clayton Act (38 Stat. at L. 730) was passed.")
22
1Title 15, section 17, Oct. 15, 1914, C. 323, 38 Stat. at L. 730. See
also,2 note
216, supra.
22Title 29, section 52, Oct. 15, 1914, C. 323, section 20, 38 Stat. at L.

738. 22 2

Moreland Theatres Corp. v. Portland Moving Picture, etc., Union,
(1932) 140 Or. 35, 43, 12 P. (2d) 333. Packing Co. v. Butchers' Union,
(1916) 18 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 457, 30 Ohio Dec. N. P. 438, (the Clayton
Act does not allow a union to conduct a secondary boycott); Webb. v.
Cooks', etc., Union No. 748, (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 205 S. W. 465, (discusses the state statute) ; Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co., (N.D. Ohio
1917) 240 Fed. 759; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, (1921) 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189; RemingtonRand v. Crofoot, (1936) 248 App. Div. 356, 289 N. Y. S. 1025, (in discussing
sec. 876-a, Civil Practice Act of New York, the court held that the statute
did not render lawful any act which was unlawful when it was enacted.)
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readily apparent that the door was left open for all of the old
abuses. Again the questions arose as to what constituted a labor
dispute and under what situations could it be said that irreparable
injury resulted. If the statute did not make lawful at least some
of the acts which had theretofore been considered unlawful by
the courts, it is at least permissible to question the reason for its
enactment.
With the failure of the Clayton Act to abate the evils which
it was intended to cover, the insistence that something be done to
curb the zealousness of the courts in issuing injunctions in industrial disputes became more urgent and the growing epidemic of
individual employee contracts called for a remedy. The Congress
finally acknowledged these conditions by the passage of the
Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act.2

24

Prior to the enact-

ment of the Norris Act, several states had adopted legislation
outlawing the so-called yellow dog contract. The Coppage Care,
22
however, terminated the usefulness of such legislation. 1
NORRIS AND WAGNER ACTS

Since the passage of the Norris Act a number of states have
adopted substantially similar legislation. 22 1 The more liberal
courts have held that such legislation does not abridge any constitutional rights nor does it constitute class legislation or deprive
the courts of any inherent equity jurisdiction.22 A number of
Cf., The New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., Inc., (1938) 303
U. S. 552, 562, 58 Sup. Ct. 703, 82 L. Ed. 683, ("The legislative history of
the (Wagner) Act demonstrates that it was the purpose of the Congress
further to extend the prohibitions of the Clayton Act respecting the exercise
of jurisdiction by federal courts and to obviate the results of the judicial
of that act").
construction
2
24Title 29, section 101, et seq., March 23, 1932, C. 90, sec. 1, 47 Stat at
L. 70. See also, House Report No. 669, 72nd Congress, Committee on the
Judiciary, March 2, 1932, pp. 2, 3.
"2-Coppagev. Kansas, (1915) 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed.
441; People v. Western -Union Telegraph Co., (1921) 70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac.
146; In re Opinion of the Justices, (N.H. 1933) 166 Atl. 640; Jackson, Chief
of Police v. Berger, (1915) 92 Oh. St. 130, 110 N. E. 732. See also, Order
of RR. Telegraphers v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., (W.D. Ky. 1906)
148 Fed. 437, (this was an early case in which federal statute of 1898, outlawing yellow-dog contracts exacted by interstate carriers, was held invalid
as not within the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce); Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union
No. 220, (D. Nev. 1908) 159 Fed. 500; Montgomery v. Pacific Electric Ry.
Co. 2(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 680.
2The following states have adopted legislation which more or less
resembles the Norris-La Guardia Act: Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin,
Wyoming.
22
7Local Union No. 26 v. City of Kokomo, (1937) 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

courts have arrived at some of the same ends contemplated by
the Norris Act without the aid of any legislation but merely by
the proper exercise of the powers of a court of equity. 228 But the
Anti-Injunction Act did not wholly solve the problems it was intended to reach. 229

Although definite benefits accrued as the

result of the Act, a number of courts continued to apply it so as
to lead to a continuance of many of the abuses previously complained of. There were, however, some positive benefits, which
included a diminution of the number of temporary injunctions
granted, and a more or less general discontinuance of the yellow
dog contract practice. Of course, these results were principally
obtained in the federal courts and in those states which adopted
similar legislation.
The right of collective bargaining and the right to attempt the
unionization of nonunion fields, among other rights, were still
beset with the injunctive processes of the courts of equity, which,
although slower to grant such relief, nevertheless continued to
grant it. In a word, legislation had not brought industrial peace.
It was noticeable also that the company union idea was experiencing a phenomenal growth. The movement to discharge employees
for union activities reached considerable proportions. By 1935
it was quite apparent that the Clayton Act and the Norris-La
Guardia Act were not enough.
(2d) 624; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, (1926) 155 Or. 652,
664, 63 Pac. (2d) 1090; Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners,
(1935) 318 Pa. St. 401, 178 Atl. 291; In re Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing
Co., (N.D. Ohio 1935) 11 Fed. Supp. 198, (court in bankruptcy proceeding
disposed of a labor controversy in connection with the operation of the
bankrupt business disregarding the provisions of the Norris Act on the
strength of sub-sections 1 and m, section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act);
Lipoff v. United Food Workers' Industrial Union, (Pa. 1938) Labor and
Unemployment Insurance Service, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 19561; The Grace
Co. v. Williams, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1938) 96 Fed. (2d) 478, (Syll. 2: "The
Norris-La Guardia Act, requiring hearing and findings of certain facts
precedent to granting of injunctions in cases involving labor disputes, does
not prohibit courts from restraining acts of fraud and violence"). Contra:
In re Opinion of the Justices, (1931) 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649; In re
Opinion of the Justices, (1933) 86 N. H. 597, 166 Atl. 640; Bayonne Textile
Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers, (1933) 114 N. J. Eq. 307, 168 Atl.
799; Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., (1936) 188 Wash. 396, 63 Pac.
(2d) 397, (Washington Norris Act-held invalid because it is an attempt
to encroach upon the judicial power. The opinion seems to be a poorly
considered one. See, the dissenting opinion) ; cf., American Furniture Co.
v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A., (1936) 222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250.
228Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades Council, (1917)
136 Minn. 167, 161 N. V. 520; Albee & Godfrey Co., Inc. v. Arci, (N.Y.
Misc. 1923) 201 N. Y. S. 172; Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades
Council,
22 9 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1926) 13 Fed. (2d) 123.
Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, (1936) 155 Or. 652,
665, 63 Pac. (2d) 1090.

JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD TRADE UNIONS

The latest piece of legislation upon which much hope has been
pinned is the Wagner National Labor Relations Act enacted by
the Congress of the United States in 1935.230 Its purpose, as
emphasized by the report of the House Committee on Labor, is
"to remove certain important sources of industrial unrest engendered, first, by the denial of the right of employees to organize
and by the refusal of employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining .... ,,-"11 It is an attempt to keep labor disputes
out of the courts until all other methods of settling them have been
exhausted.2 32 Thus, the employer is required to bargain sincerely
with his employees or their representatives, though he is not compelled to reach an agreement contrary to his wishes. 233 On the
other hand, there is no attempt to "regulate the employer's control of his business in the employment, promotion, or discharge
of employees so long as he does not attempt thereby to interfere
with the right of self-organization of the employees or to intimidate or coerce them. '234 The authority for the enactment of the
statute was found in the commerce clause of the federal constituUnited States, in a series of
tion, and the Supreme Court of the
25
cases, gave the Act a broad scope.
3

5, 1935, C. 117, 46 Stat. at L. 1084, Code Title 29, secs. 151-166.
House Report No. 1147, 74th Congress, Committee on Labor, June
page 8.
10, 1935,
2
3'Bulkin v. Sachs, (Pa. 1938) Labor and Unemployment Insurance
Service, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 19570; see also, National Labor Relations
Board v. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1937) 90 Fed.
(2d) 233
520.
Canter Sample Furniture House v. Retail Furniture Employees' Local
No. 109, (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 575, 196 Atl. 210; National Labor Relations
2 Ojuly
231

Board v. The Sands Manufacturing Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1938) 96 Fed.
(2d) 721. In, The Virginian Railway Co. v. System Fed. No. 40, (1937)
300 ,U. S. 515, 557, 57 Sup. Ct. 592, 81 L. Ed. 789, the court held that under
the Railway Labor Act the employer is only under "the affirmative duty of
'treating with' the authorizing representatives of its employees for the
purpose of negotiating a labor dispute."
3lAppalachian Electric Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938) 93 Fed. (2d) 985; Canter Sample Furniture House
v. Retail Furniture Employees' Local No. 109, (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 575,
196 Ati. 210; see also, Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board,
(1937) 301 U. S. 103, 132, 57 Sup. Ct. 650, 81 L. Ed. 953, ("The act permits
a discharge for any reason other than union activity or agitation, for collective bargaining with employees") ; National Labor Relations Board v.
Carlisle Lumber Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1937) 94 Fed. (2d) 138; National
Labor Relations Board v. The Sands Manufacturing Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir.
1938) 96 Fed. (2d) 721, 724, ("The National Labor Relations Act does not
prevent the employer from hiring individuals on whatever terms he may by
unilateral action determine") ; National Labor Relations Board v. Union
Pacific Stages, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1938) 99 Fed. (2d) 153.
:-National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin, (1927) 301
U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893; National Labor Relations Board v.
Fruehauf Trailer Co.. (1937) 301 U. S. 49, 57 Sup. Ct. 642, 81 L. Ed. 893;
National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co.,
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Formerly it had been held uniformly that the process of manufacture did not directly affect interstate commerce but was rather
intrastate business. Therefore, its regulation was not within the
scope of the federal government either under the general welfare clause or under the interstate commerce clause of the federal
constitution. 23 6 However, since the adoption of the Wagner Act
it has been held that
"Where activities have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to
protect interstate commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control, almay be intrastate in character when separatethough the activities
'23 7
ly considered.

(1937) 301 U. S. 58, 57 Sup. Ct. 645, 81 L. Ed. 893; Associated Press v.
National Labor Relations Board, (1937) 301 U. S.58, 57 Sup. Ct. 645, 81 L.
Ed. 893; The New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., Inc., (1938)
303 U. S.552, 561, 58 Sup. Ct. 703, 82 L. Ed. 683; Consolidated Edison Co.
v.National Labor Relations Board, (1938) 59 Sup. Ct. 206. See also, El
Paso Electric Co. v. Elliott, (W.D. Tex. 1936) 15 Fed. Supp. 81, (National
Labor Relations Act does not apply to a situation in which the employer
entered into an employees' representation agreement with nonunion employees
before the Act was enacted) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Carlisle
Lumber Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1937) 94 Fed. (2d) 138, (Wagner Act is
applicable to a situation in which the strike and discharge because of striking
had occurred prior to the effective date of the Act) ; Jeffrey-De Witt Insulator Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1937) 91
Fed. (2d) 134; Clover Fork Coal Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1938) 97 Fed. (2d) 331; Mooresville Cotton Mills, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938) 94 Fed. (2d) 61,
(National Labor Relations Act does not apply to striking employees who
seek reinstatement where they have obtained regular and substantially
employment elsewhere).
equivalent
2 36
Stout v. Pratt, (W.D. Mo. 1935) 12 Fed. Supp. 864; Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., (1936) 298 U. S.238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160. Cf., Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (1938) 59 Sup.
Ct. 206, (the court goes far in this case to break down the distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce).
237Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1938) 95 Fed. (2d) 390, Syll. 1, affirmed as to this portion of the case
by the Supreme Court on Dec. 5, 1938, 59 Sup. Ct. 206. Tway Coal Co. v.
Glenn, (W.D. Ky. 1935) 12 Fed. Supp. 570; National Labor Relations Board
v. Jones & Laughlin, (1936) 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 81 L. Ed. 893.
The question has arisen as to whether Congress having legislated upon
the subject of labor controversies which affect interstate commerce such
action has preempted the field and deprived the states of power to take
action in the same field. See, Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. Lodge 66,
(1938) 295 Ill. App. 323, 14 N. E. (2d) 991; see also, Lauf v. E. G. Shinner
Co., (1938) 303 U. S.323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578, 82 L. Ed. 515; Wisconsin Labor
Relations Board v. Rueping Leather Co., (Wis. 1938) 279 N. W. 673.
There should be no question that if the federal government has enacted
legislation regulating labor relations a state is deprived of power to legislate
in the same field whether it is "in the interests of peace, health and order
of the state" or not. The position adopted by the Wisconsin court is hardly
maintainable. The situation under discussion here was provided for in the
New York Labor Relations Act in sec. 715, of that Act.
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This change in point of view is a welcome one, and bids fair to
give a real impetus to the adoption of regulatory measures which
will be of genuine assistance in the solution of many of the pressing problems in the field of labor controversies. Legislation
similar to the Wagner Act has been adopted in some of the
states.23 s The power of the states to pass such regulatory legislation has been held to reside in the police power of the state. 239
That the Wagner Act, the Norris Act and state legislation of a
similar nature, have succeeded in somewhat broadening the generally accepted definition of a labor dispute and in making collective bargaining a little more palatable cannot be doubted. But
it would be a mistake to assume that the fight is won. Many
courts are not yet ready to surrender on a number of important
fronts. The old battles will have to be fought many times again
before it can be said that more than the elementary rights of
240
labor has been definitively settled.

Two major difficulties stand in the way of an early solution of
the problems in the field of industrial controversies. The first of
these is the fact that even if the Norris and Wragner Acts are a
positive solution, they apply to only a limited field. There are a
large number of states in which no similar legislation has been
adopted and, therefore, the situations which arise are dealt with
without the aid of whatever benefits this legislation may lend.
The second is that no matter how clear the purpose and the scope
of such legislation may seem, it is subject to the interpretation of
the courts. In each case it is necessary to decide whether the
statute applies. Judicial interpretation has enervated many a
law for which high hopes were held. In this connection Jeremy
Bentham wryly observed that
"The word interpretation has a very different meaning in the
mouth of a lawyer from what it has when employed by other
people. To interpret a passage in an author, is to bring out of it
the sense which the writer had in his mind; to interpret the law, in
238
The Wisconsin, New York and Massachusetts Labor Relations Acts
are good examples. At the November, 1938, election the voters of Oregon
approved legislation which prohibits strikes except by a majority of a company's employees in a direct dispute over wages, hours and working conditions, requires an accounting of union funds and prevents union interference
with any lawful commercial, manufacturing or farming enterprise. Obviously
such legislation will solve none of the existing problems and will undoubtedly
create many new ones.
-'LFenske Brothers v. Upholsterers' International Union, (1934) 358
Ill.
239, 193 N. E. 112; Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Rueping
Leather
240 Co., (Wis. 1938) 279 N. W. 673.
Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, (1935) 155 Or. 652,

668, 63 Pac. (2d) 1090.
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the sense at least of the Roman lawyers, is often to get rid of the
intention clearly and plainly expressed, and to substitute some
other for it, in the presumption that this new sense was the actual
intention of the legislator.
"With such a method of proceeding there is no security. Where
the law is fixed, though it be difficult, obscure, incoherent-the
citizen always has a chance to know it. It gives confused intimidation, less efficacious than it might be, yet always useful; we see
at least the limits of the evil it can do. But let a judge dare to arrogate to himself the power of interpreting the laws, that is to say,
of substituting his will for that of the legislator, and everything
becomes arbitrary; no one can foresee the course which caprice
will take. The question is no longer of the actual evil; however
comparison with the magnitude
great that may be, it is small
241 in
of possible consequences."1
What Bentham observed of the Roman lawyers may also be said
with justification of common law lawyers.
Judicial interpretation has done much to emasculate the efforts of the federal Congress and the state legislatures. Thus it
has been held that a statute similar to the Norris Act did not apply
to a situation in which the disputants did not sustain the relation of
employer and employee; that a statute which defined labor as
other than a property right is unconstitutional; that the National
Labor Relations Act places the legislative stamp of approval
on company unions; that a state statute based on the Clayton
Act applied only where the employees were still working; that a
sign in a barber shop reading, "No scabs wanted here," constituted a restraint of interstate transportation in violation of sections 1 and 4 of the Sherman Act and section 16 of the Clayton
Act; that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act applied to labor unions;
that the Clayton Act applied only to labor disputes between employer and employee; that a statute to prevent an employer from
making it a condition of employment that his employees agree
not to become or remain members of any labor organization while
so employed violated the federal constitution; that a dispute between employees and employer over an attempt to unionize a
branch of the plant in which they did not actually work was not a
labor dispute within the terms of the Clayton Act; that because
Congress did not use the word "picketing" in the Norris Act when
it defined and limited the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States it indicated its intention to leave in those courts jurisdiction
to restrain, if necessary, any picketing of a coercive, intimidating
character, which, as has been heretofore indicated, raises the ques241
Bentham, The Theory of Legislation (1931) 155.
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tion when and under what circumstances picketing is coercive and
intimidating; that a struggle between two unions as to which shall
represent the employees is not a labor dispute within the terms of
the Norris Act. 242 These are but a few of the results of interpretation by the courts. In New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery
Co., the situation was acknowledged by the Supreme Court of the
United States when it said:
"The legislative history of the act [Norris-La Guardia Act]
demonstrates that it was the purpose of the Congress further to
extend the prohibitions of the Clayton Act respecting the exercise
of jurisdiction by federal courts 243
and to obviate the results of the
judicial construction of that act.1

In discussing the perplexing problem of judicial interpretation
in connection with the Clayton Act, the court, in Great Northern
Railroad Company v. Brosseatt, summed it up succinctly when it
said that
"Notwithstanding the legislative history of the statute and
its highly remedial character, as indicated by its history and the
reports of the committees having it in charge, many lower federal
courts have studiously striven to disregard its plain language
and the actual intent of Congress as disclosed by the history of the
statute. Some have held that all strikes cause irreparable injury
and, therefore, the employer is entitled to an injunction to prevent
such injury. Other courts have gone so far as to hold that
the entire statute was a trick by Congress to frame the measure
so that one part of it would nullify itself. Other courts have said
there was no such thing as peaceful picketing, and hence no such
thing as peaceful persuasion; therefore, the plain language of the
statute must be disregarded by the court and all picketing and all
attempts by strikers to exercise their rights of peaceful persuasion were to be restrained, and injunctions have been accordingly
issued. Other courts, notwithstanding the specific language of
the last clause of section 20, that the doing of the acts which it
2

Bull v. International Alliance, (1925) 119 Kan. 713, 214 Pac. 459;
Hotel, Restaurant, etc., Local Union No. 181 v. Miller, (1938) 272 Ky. 471,
114 S. W. (2d) 501 (cf., House Report No. 1147, 74th Congress, Committee
on Labor, June 10, 1935, page 17) ; Bogni v. Perotti, (1915) 225 Mass. 152,
112 N. E. 853; Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council, (1920) 99 Or. 1, 192
Pac. 765; United States v. Taliaferro, (W.D. Va. 1912) 290 Fed. 214;
Duplex Co. v. Deering, (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed.
349 (Clayton Anti-Trust Act); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co.,
(1921) 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975; Columbus Heating and
Ventilating Co. v. Pittsburgh Bldg. Trades Council, (W.D. Pa. 1927) 17
Fed. (2d) 806; Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Anderson, (E.D. Ill. 1934) 7 F.
Supp. 332; United Electric Coal Companies v. Rice, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1935)
80 Fed. (2d) 1. See also, Simon v. Schwachman, (Mass. 1938) 18 N. E.
(2d) 1; Adams v. Building Service Employees Union, (Wash. 1938) 84
Pac. (2d) 1021.
-'The New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., Inc., (1938) 303
U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703, 82 L. Ed. 683.
24
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permits should not be held to be in conflict with any federal law,
have restrained strikes upon the ground that they violated the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law and statutes forbidding the obstruction
of the United States mails.
"In my judgment, all such action by courts is a gross abuse
of judicial power and a direct refusal on their part to obey a
statute which was intended to limit their powers. It may be that
the statute is economically and socially unwise, because of the
vast injuries which strikes inflict upon society. Those considerations, however, are for Congress and not for the courts. There is
no reason that a just court can assign why American courts should
as the English
not have as cheerfully obeyed the Clayton Act
'
courts obeyed the Trades Disputes Act of 1906. 244
What was said here by the court of the fate that befell the
Clayton Act in the courts is generally true of the fate of other
legislation in the field of labor relations. As we have seen, the
Norris and Wagner Acts and state legislation upon the same
subject have met and are meeting somewhat similar treatment.
We have but to look at the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
McReynolds in National Labor Relations Board v/. Jones &
Laughlin Co., to see what can happen to the legislative intent in
the hands of a court out of sympathy with the economic and social
aims of the legislature. 24 That the opinion happens to be the
dissenting opinion does not mean that a change in the complexion
of the court may not make it some day the majority opinion.
Such an occurrence is well within the realm of possibility. 24
Apparently the efficacy of legislation rests in large part upon
the readiness both of public opinion to receive it as a solution and
of the courts to accept it at its face value. Either a hostile public
opinion or courts economically and socially out of sympathy with
the purposes of the statute involved, or both, will destroy the
effectiveness of the legislation, or at least reduce its efficacy to a
considerable degree.2 47 What then can be said for the future?
244(D.N.D. 1933) 286 Fed. 414, 420.
245(1937) 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893.
246
Compare, Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S.525, 43
Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785, and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, (1937)
300 U. S.379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703.
247Pierce v. Stablemen's Union Local No. 8760, (1909) 156 Cal. 70, 103
Pac. 324, (St. 1903, p. 289, Ch. 235, which provided that employees concerned
in a trade dispute should not be subject to injunction held invalid as constituting class legislation) ; cf., Local Union No. 26 v. City of Kokomo, (1937)
211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E. (2d) 624; Bull v. International Alliance, (1925) 119
Kan. 713, 241 Pac. 459, (the holding of the court is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the legislation involved) ; Jensen v. St. Paul Motion Picture
Machine Operators' Local Union, (1935) 194 Minn. 58, 259 N. W. 811, (state
Norris Act strangely interpreted to prevent picketing in the dispute under
consideration) ; Elkind & Sons v. Retail Clerks', etc., Ass'n, (1933) 114
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CONCLUSION

There are three fields in which it will be necessary to work
intensively to accomplish the goal which all men of good will
desire, whether they be aligned with labor or capital. These three
are legislation, legal education and public opinion. It would be
a comparatively simple task to outline plans for the functioning
of an industrial world so that the points of friction would be
minimized. Such plans usually border on the utopian and have
generally been found to work better on paper than in action. We
N. J. Eq. 586, (a statute which permits picketing legalizes a private nuisance
and legislature cannot do that) ; Feller v. Local 144, (1937) 121 N. J. Eq.
452, 191 At!. 111; Associated Flour Haulers v. Sullivan, (1938) 168 Misc.
Rep. 315, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 982; Thompson v. Boekhout, (1937) 273 N. Y.
390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674; Jewish Hospital v. Doe, (1937) 252 App. Div. 581,
300 N. Y. S. 1111; The Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. New York State
Labor Relations Board, (N.Y. 1938) Labor and Unemployment Insurance
Service, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 19627, (an order by the labor relations
board to bargain exclusively with one union does not preclude employer
from negotiating individually with employees acting for themselves); The
Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Workers, (Ohio 1937), Labor and Unemployment Insurance Service, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 16114; Heitkemper v.
Central Labor Council, (1920) 99 Or. 1, 192 Pac. 765, (the court definitely
refused to abide by the local statute) ; Culinary Workers' Union No. 331 v.
Fuller, (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 105 S. W. (2d) 295; Knapp-Monarch Co. v.
Anderson, (E.D. I1. 1934) 7 Fed. Supp. 332, (The interpretation given by the
court to the Norris Act is unjustified) ; United Electric Coal Companies v.
Rice, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1935) 80 Fed. (2d) 1, (Norris Act misinterpreted);
Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
(W.D. Mo. 1937) 20 Fed. Supp. 767; Donnelly Garment Co. v. International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, (W.D. Mo. 1937) 21 Fed. Supp. 807
(this case is worth nothing because of the remarkable about-face by Otis, J.,
from an opinion in the case cited immediately preceding this one. For further proceedings in this case see (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 309) ;
Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union Local No. 148, (1935) 51 Pac. (2d)
372.
In, Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers, (1933) 114
N. J. Eq. 307, 168 Atl. 799, we find an argument that indicates the difficulties
which confront attempted solutions of the labor problem by legislation. The
court holds that the statute does not apply because the prerogatives of the
Court of Chancery do not emanate from the Legislature and, therefore,
cannot be encroached upon by it. See also, Frank v. Herold, (1901) 63 N.
J. Eq. 443, 52 Atl. 152; In re W. C. Reilly, (1919) 23 Ohio N. P. (N.S.)
65, 31 Ohio Dec. N. P. 364. Cf., Aberdeen Restaurant Corp. v. Gottfried,
(1935) 158 Misc. Rep. 785, 285 N. Y. S. 832, (in this case the court does
not try to evade the legislative fiat). On the question of the attitude which
courts should adopt toward remedial legislation there is an excellent statement in, Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, (1936) 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22.
See also, In re Sweitzer, (1917) 13 Okla. Cr. 154, 162 Pac. 1134; Miller
Parlor Furniture Co. v. Furniture, etc., Union, (D. N.J. 1934) 8 Fed. Supp.
209; Tway Coal Co. v. Parrish, (1937) 300 U. S. 379, 393, 57 Sup. Ct. 578,
81 L. Ed. 703. But cf., Heintz Mfg. Co. v. Local No. 515, (E.D. Pa. 1937)
20 Fed. Supp. 116; Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 338, 42 Sup.
Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254.
Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. Feidelson, (W.D. Tenn. 1936) 13 Fed. Supp.
153, (the opinion is expressed that federal district courts ought not declare
a statute unconstitutional except where there is no other alternative) ; Precision Castings Co. v. Boland, (W.D. N.Y. 1936) 13 Fed. Supp. 877.
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must not forget that solutions must be practicable as well as
desirable.
If we start by asking what is the principal problem that
confronts us, the answer might well be that that problem is to obtain
a realization upon the part of both employer and worker that while
their interests do not entirely coincide, they are also not mutually
exclusive-that one cannot prosper at the expense of the other.
There can be no real industrial democracy until these two forces
acknowledge the fact that both have an active interest in the finished product which is brought into existence by the combination
of the financial investment of the one and the labor of the other.
This means that there must be recognition upon the part of the
employer that the worker is entitled to recognition as an equal,
and that in order to be an equal he must be allowed to acquire
equal economic power through combination with his fellow workmen. It is folly to talk of freedom of contract, of the right to
work or not to work, of voluntary individual employee contracts
and the like. A contract is voluntarily and freely entered into
when both parties to that contract negotiate as economic equals.
There can be no voluntary bargaining, in the real sense of the
word, with an inferior. Therefore, the employer must be willing
to allow the worker to organize freely and without interference
or fear of economic reprisal. We are living in an age in which
collective action is recognized as a necessity. Large scale business operations are not a passing phenomenon-they are absolutely necessary to the proper functioning of our economy. It
serves no real purpose to talk of a return to the days when the
business world was composed of small individual units. We
cannot go back to a day that is passed without serious dislocation
of our economy. Our industrial world has become geared to
intensive and extensive operations, and one might as well talk of a
reversion to the horse and buggy as to a return to an era of small
scale business. The individual workman does not fit into the
present day picture as an effective economic bargaining unit. His
salvation lies not in individual action but in combining with his
fellows. The rights which we grant freely to business should and
must be granted just as freely to the worker. When employer and
employee attain equal bargaining status, their respect for each
other will lead them toward a willingness to negotiate peacefully
in the confidence that as equals the advantage does not lie on either
side.
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Arguments in terms of conspiracies, justifications, inalienable
rights, etc., are no longer valid if they ever were. Good faith is an
essential element in all of the undertakings of mankind. If that
element is lacking, our whole civilization becomes a hollow
mockery. Trade unions and their members should be considered
as acting in good faith unless it is clearly proven otherwise. Seldom
indeed has it been the case that workers have deliberately embarked
upon a course of sabotage or of obstruction for the sake of sabotage or obstruction. There must be a readiness and a willingness
to distinguish between effective action which may cause incidental
damage, and damaging action for its own sake.
In an industrial system in which collective action on the part
of labor is welcomed, there will be less friction and more co2 48
It
operation. This has been demonstrated time and time again..
is true that in a number of instances labor has had misguided
leadership and poor advice. But this is also true of business. So
long as we remain what we are, there will always be instances
of such conduct, but these are the exception and not the general
rule. The answer is not suppression, but a chance to develop
along the lines of co-operation. Given the chance to treat with
business as equals, there will develop (and in fact already has
developed) a quality of labor leadership and responsible trades
union units which augurs well for the future. Those employers
who refuse to recognize this may be classed as survivals from the
embryonic stage of the industrial era.249
*WPAgwilines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 5th
Cir. 1936) 87 Fed. (2d) 146, 150; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
& Laughlin, (1937) 301 ,U. S. 1, 42, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893, ("Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of
employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace. Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of
the most prolific causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the
history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice
and requires no citation of instances. . . .")

See also, Senate Report No. 573,

Committee on Education & Labor, May 1, 1935, p. 2.
24
9By reference to a responsible unit it is not intended to infer that labor
unions should be compelled to incorporate. Incorporation is not synonymous
with responsibility. It has certainly not meant this in the case of business
organizations. The term "responsible unit" is here used in the sense of the
feeling of responsibility that should come naturally to all organizations as
they gain in strength and prestige. Whether a union is incorporated or not,
its life blood is its members and if they do not feel a sense of responsibility,
the corporation which would be their outward shell would only reflect their
feelings. Corporations are moral in their dealings with others only so far
as the individuals who operate them are moral. The courts have developed
a very satisfactory technique of dealing with unincorporated associations and
this should not be disturted.
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What part can legislation play in this scheme ?2s0 It is a truism
that legislation cannot be effective if it has outrun its time. Legislation that works is legislation that is in step with the dominant
thought of its era. Before the Norris-La Guardia and Wagner
Acts were enacted, much of the material covered by these acts
was already considered" to be the law by a small but growing
minority of courts. Some courts of equity are keeping abreast
of the times. For them such legislation is merely a codification
of what they have already decided. For other courts these statutes can serve as guides, and for still others they are only something to interpret away because they do not fit in with their personal economic and social views. Thus legislation can be effec250

That legislation will not wholly solve our problems is apparent from

the records of the United States Department of Labor which indicate that
in 1934, the year prior to the passage of the Wagner Act, there were 1,856
strikes, in 1935, 2,014 strikes, in 1936, 2,172 strikes, in 1937, 4,470 strikes.
However, in the first seven months of 1938, there were only 1,353 strikes
compared with 3,217 in the same period of 1937, which may indicate that
perhaps the Wagner Act may bring in its wake better industrial relations.
The Minnesota State Bar Association, in December, 1937, appointed
a Committee on Labor and Social Security Law for the purpose of studying,
among other things, the labor legislation of other countries and of other states
in this country and on the strength of that study to make its recommendations
to the Association. The committee has completed its study and made its
recommendations which are embodied in the 1938 Proceedings of the Minnesota State Bar Association. The report is thorough and well prepared but
one recommendation is of doubtful value and may, if adopted, result in
aggravating a situation which is, at most, only temporary. Reference is
made to the recommendation that, "the employees should be protected in the
selection of their representatives not only against coercion by their employer,
but also against coercion by fellow employees and against coercion by outside organizers. Such a provision is particularly needed at this time when
two rival organizations of labor are competing with each other for the
privilege of organizing the employees in different industries." The competition which now exists between the C. I. 0. and the A. F. of L. is no
more unusual than competition between two or more business houses for the
business of a third party. No one has ever seriously suggested that such
competition is coercive of that third party. The fear is unjustified and the
recommendation would not serve any worthy purpose if enacted into law.
It is suggested that the New York courts have had to deal with this problem
without the aid of any such law and no dire results have occurred there as
a result of the decisions of the courts and, by the same token, none will
occur in Minnesota or any other jurisdictions.
See also, House Report No. 1147, 74th Congress, Committee on Labor,
June 10, 1935, p. 16. Jevons, The State in Relation to Labour (1882) 165:
" . . it is clear that there can be no royal road to legislation in such
matter.... We must consent to advance cautiously, step by step, feeling our
way, adopting no foregone conclusions, . . . expecting no infallible guide.
We must neither maximize the functions of government . . .nor minimize
them .... Moreover, we must remember that, do what we will, we are not
to expect approach to perfection in social affairs. We must recognize the
fact clearly that we have to deal with complex aggregates of people and
institutions, must often take 'all in all or not at all.' Tolerance therefore is
indispensable. We may be obliged to bear with evil for a time that we may
avoid a worse evil. ..."
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tive but only in-so-far as the courts and public opinion want it to
be. The Norris and Wagner Acts, and similar statutes, will not
solve our problems, but they can be of assistance even if they do
no more than act as educational forces of public opinion. It is
undoubtedly true that the Norris and Wagner Acts, especially the
latter, have been of invaluable aid in educating labor and many
employers to a standard of labor relations which had not been
either widely recognized or practiced before the passage of that
legislation. Indeed, the public itself has received a liberal education in these fields because of the publicity attendant upon the
passage and enforcement of these statutes and similar legislation. Public opinion can be a powerful agent in the solution of
the employer-employee problem in this country. Its force is
already apparent in our legislation-legislation which has come
a long way from the early unlawful enticement of servants statutes and anti-picketing statutes to the Norris and Wagner Acts.
It is vitally necessary that public opinion be kept abreast of the
needs of our times and this can best be done by throwing light on
the dark places of our industrial economy rather than by the
organization of medieval vigilante committees.
The final but not the least important element which must be
considered is the bench and bar. 251 The law has for centuries
been principally concerned with the protection of property rights
and the security of transactions.2 5 2 The training which the legal
profession has received has leaned generously toward the conservative side. While it is true that the law should not outdistance the times in which it exists, it is also true that it must
not lag with the hindmost. The law should be an instrument of
progress-an instrument to interpret life in the terms of today. 2 3
Law schools must sooner or later realize that some of their graduates, as legislators and judges, will eventually help to make and
apply the law. Their education should equip them with a philosophy
that is alive and vibrant to the needs and desires of the age in
which they live. It is no longer sufficient to train men to a keen
knowledge of the purely legal subjects. They should and must
be well grounded in the social and economic conditions and
2 1
5 Cohen, Law and the Social Order (1933) 4: "Still it is true that most
improvements in the law had to be won against the opposition of the bench
and bar."
2
52Maitland,
Constitutional History of England (1908) 538. Also,
Jevons, The State in Relation to Labour (1882) 38.
-r3See the dissenting opinion of Maxey, J., in Kraemer Hosiery Co. v.
American Fed. of F. F. H. W., (1931) 305 Pa. St. 206, 241, 157 Atl. 588.
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philosophies of the workaday world in which they and the law must
operate. So long as judges continue to have a part in making the
law, and so long as their personal economic and social views continue to intrude themselves into their opinions (and being human
they will find it difficult to exclude these opinions entirely), lawyers
should be trained to take these matters into account to the best
24
advantage of the society in which they live and work. 5
A good part of our hope for the future lies in a general realization that the problems of labor relations will not be solved by
reference to abstract theories but rather by a determination on the
part of the employer to recognize that the stake of the employee
in his work is larger than just a job-by a determination on the
part of the employee to so govern himself as to be worthy of the
position which he seeks in the economic life of the day-by a
determination on the part of the courts to recognize that their
place in labor disputes is that of an arbiter and not that of a
partisan.
254Lasld, The State in Theory and Practice (1935) 24.

